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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the realisation of manufacturing strategies. It 
describes the development and testing of a structured methodology which can 
be used to determine some of the reasons why a firm may be unable to 
implement its manufacturing strategy. The methodology is known as a 
"congruence audit". 
It is widely accepted that manufacturing strategies are important, but little has 
been written about how they should be developed and implemented. In the 
literature which does exist, however, a key theme is consistency, with many 
authors arguing that strategies can only be realised through consistency of 
decision making and action. 
Given that people are ultimately accountable for most of the decisions and 
actions taken in an organisation, it can be argued that consistency of decision 
making and action might best be achieved if; (a) there is widespread empathy 
with the organisation's strategic goals (goal congruence), and (b) the 
organisation's signalling systems - especially those concerned with goal setting, 
performance measurement, feedback and reward - induce decision making and 
action which is consistent with these goals (system congruence). 
This research set out to test two propositions: 
(a) That a process which can be used to identify areas of 
either goal or system incongruence (a congruence audit) 
can be developed. 
(b) That such a process can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. 
Xl 
There were three main phases to the research. Phases one and two involved the 
development and testing of processes for identifying areas of either goal or 
system incongruence. Phase three involved the integration of these processes 
and the application of the resultant congruence audit. In total four companies 
participated directly in the study. Managers from a further fourteen were 
consulted. 
The key findings can be summarised under the categories of content and 
process. In terms of content, the data gathered during the congruence audits 
indicate that the level of goal congruence is highest between a firm's senior 
managers and those employees who work on the shop floor. Furthermore they 
suggest that the way in which the goal setting, performance measurement, 
feedback and reward systems influence employees, varies both from firm to 
firm and across the organisation's hierarchy. Most importantly, they imply that 
one of the main reasons firms are unable to realise their manufacturing strategies 
is that senior managers often inadvertently encourage their subordinates to 
pursue courses of action which are inappropriate. 
In terms of process, the congruence audit serves as a structured means of: 
-Defining what a management group believes manufacturing should be 
doing. 
-Identifying what other employees think manufacturing actually is doing. 
-Establishing whether any mismatches in perception occur. 
-Determining whether such mismatches in perception are a function of the 
organisation's goal setting, performance measurement, feedback or reward 
systems. 
-Provoking debate so that the issues raised can be resolved. 
It should be noted that as this ~esis focuses on the development and testing of a 
process within a limited set of firms, further research is required to confmn the 
findings and to explore whether the congruence audit can be used more widely. 
xu 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
"'W ould you tell me, please, which way 1 ought to go from here?' 
'That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,' said the Cat. 
'I don't much care where - ' said Alice. 
'Then it doesn't matter which way you go,' said the Cat. 
, - so long as 1 get somewhere,' Alice added as an explanation." 
(Carroll, 1984, 75). 
Many people appear to believe that strategies and plans are synonymous 
(Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1986). In reality, however, strategies are more 
complex than plat:1s because they evolve as decisions are made and courses of 
action are pursued (Mintzberg, 1978). Take Nissan, for example, where the 
intended business strategy is "to build profitably the highest quality car sold in 
Europe" (Gibson, undated). If the purchasing manager at Nissan were 
independently to decide to buy low cost, low quality components then Nissan 
could end up following a strategy radically different to the one it had planned to 
adopt. 
This hypothetical example highlights the importance of consistency and 
illustrates how strategies are realised as decisions are made and courses of 
action are pursued at different levels in organisations. Indeed it has been argued 
that a strategy can only be said to exist when one can identify a consistent 
pattern of decisions and actions within a frrm (Mintzberg, 1978). 
The significance of consistency has long been acknowledged in the 
manufacturing strategy literature. Skinner (197 4b, 37), for example, suggested 
that a manufacturing company should contain a "powerfully aimed, focussed, 
designed infrastructure in which every element of the system attempts to 
accomplish the same unique performance criteria". 
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Hayes and Schmenner (1978) argued that it should be possible to determine 
what a firm's manufacturing strategy is, simply by examining which proposals 
it consistently rejects. And Wheelwright (1984) said that the quality of a fmn's 
manufacturing strategy is a function of the consistency: 
-between the manufacturing and business strategy; 
-among the manufacturing and other functional strategies; 
-among the decision categories which make up the manufacturing strategy; 
-between the manufacturing strategy and the business environment. 
Despite the widespread recognition of the importance of consistency, however, 
little effort has been devoted to the exploration of whether the concept can be 
used in a practical setting - particularly with respect to the human side of 
manufacturing management. Indeed, as Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark 
observe: 
"much of the writing about manufacturing managers and management tends to focus 
on the success or failure of certain key decisions, such as the choice among 
competing process technologies, plant locations, and capital investments. [But] as 
every experienced manager knows ... a handful of "right" decisions plays only a 
relatively small part in making a company ultimately successful. To be effective, 
decisions must be interpreted by and implemented through people - people who are 
often geographically distant from one another, have different skills, job descriptions, 
educational backgrounds, career expectations, and who sometimes speak different 
languages. Somehow the strength, intelligence, and allegiance of this mass of 
diverse individuals must be harnessed and directed toward the common goals. 
Therefore, the most critical task confronting a senior manager is not simply to 
acquire the best resources and make the right decisions but to build and operate 
through a purposeful organisation" (Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988,96). 
The research reported in this thesis sought to determine whether a structured 
methodology (a congruence audit) based on the concept of consistency could be 
used to identify some of the reasons why a firm may be unable to implement its 
3 
manufacturing strategy. Given that people are ultimately accountable for most 
decisions and actions taken in an organisation, then writers on organisational 
culture would claim that to ensure consistency of decision making and action, 
and hence realisation of strategies, an organisation's strategic goals should be 
widely shared (Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981). Business strategists 
and organisational behaviourists, on the other hand, would argue that 
consistency of decision making and action can be induced through the use of 
strategic controls or performance management systems (Bevan and Thomson, 
1991; Child, 1985; Erban, 1989; Fowler, 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990; 
Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Lorange, 1982; Pugh et aI, 1988). 
Intuitively both of these VIews are appealing and the key assumptions 
underpinning this work are that consistency of decision making and action, and 
hence realisation of strategies, might best be achieved if: 
(a) There is widespread empathy within the firm with the 
organisation's strategic goals. This isg!>1l1 congruence. 
(b) The organisation's signalling systems - especially those 
concerned with goal setting, performance measurement, 
feedback and reward - induce decision making and action 
which is consistent with the organisation's strategic 
goals. This is system congruence. 
The research set out to test two propositions: 
(a) That a process, which can be used to identify areas of 
either goal or system incongruence (a congruence audit) 
can be developed.' 
(b) That such a process can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
4 
manufacturing strategy. 
The research aims were as follows: 
(a) Develop and test a process (a goal congruence audit) 
which can be used to identify areas of goal incongruence. 
(b) Develop and test a process (a system congruence audit) 
which can be used to identify areas of system 
incongruence. 
( c) Integrate these two processes to form a congruence audit 
which can be used to identify areas of either goal or 
system incongruence. 
(d) Establish whether the congruence audit provides a 
structured means of identifying some of the reasons why a 
firm may be unable to implement its manufacturing 
strategy. 
The remainder of this thesis has been divided into seven chapters. In this first 
chapter the assumptions underpinning the work, the research propositions and 
the research aims have been documented. The core concepts of goal and system 
congruence have also been defmed. 
In chapter two the literature relevant to this thesis - including that on business 
strategy, manufacturing strategy, organisational culture and organisational 
behaviour - is reviewed. 
In chapter three the main themes that emerged during the literature review are 
summarised and the conceptual framework underling the research is presented. 
Following this, the research propositions are restated and the research 
5 
methodology is described. The purpose of chapter three, then, is to formally 
document the link between the literature and the research. 
Chapters four and five are devoted to a description of the development and 
testing of the processes used to identify areas of either goal or system 
incongruence. In chapter six, the knowledge gained during the piloting of these 
processes is used to develop a congruence audit, and the data gathered during 
the two case studies in which it was applied are presented. The purpose of 
chapters four, five and six is to present the field work. 
In chapter seven the issues raised by this research are discussed as the 
congruence audit is appraised. 
Finally, in chapter eight, the key findings of the research are documented and 
possible areas for future work are identified. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0: Introduction 
The aim of the research reported in this thesis was to establish whether a 
structured methodology based on the concept of consistency (a congruence 
audit) could be used to identify some of the reasons why a firm may be unable 
to realise its manufacturing strategy. Prior to the development and testing of the 
congruence audit, however, it was necessary to answer the following questions: 
-What is manufacturing strategy? 
-How are manufacturing strategies developed and realised? 
-What might inhibit the realisation of a manufacturing strategy? 
-What related issues are raised in other streams of literature such as that on 
business strategy, organisational behaviour and organisational culture? 
Each of these questions will be addressed in this chapter. We will begin by ) 
looking at the literature on business strategy as this is widely accepted as being 
~ than that on manufacturing strategy (Adam and Swamidass, 1989; 
Anderson and Schroeder, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). Next we will tum to the 
literatures on organisational behaviour and organisational culture as these raise I 
some _ pertinent issues. Then we will review the manufacturing strategy 
literature. Finally we will discuss the specific studies that relate directly to the 
research reported in this thesis. 
2.1: Business strategy 
The term strategy is derived from the Greek word strategos meaning the art of a 
general (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986) and, in the field of business 
management, is typically defined as: 
"the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and 
the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals" (Chandler, 1962, 13). 
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The earliest true form of strategy, strategic planning, was developed primarily 
by industrialists in the early 1950s as they became increasingly concerned that 
their firms were failing to meet the requirements of the market place (Ansoff et 
al., 1976). Strategic planning involved a rational analysis of both the firm and 
the environment within which it operated. The purpose of the fonner was to 
identify the organisation's strengths and weaknesses, while the latter was 
designed to highlight the opportunities and threats inherent in the market place. 
Ultimately the objective of these analyses was to find ways in which the finn 
could use its strengths to exploit opportunities while minimising its weaknesses 
and hence vulnerability to threats (Andrews, 1971). 
Figure 2.1: The modem strategic problem (Ansoff et al., 1976) 
Traditional 
Strategic 
Planning 
-1:1 fI} External 
a 8 Linkages 
~ .! ----~---__f'~---., 0ll,.C 
~ Q 
=... Internal 
~ =.C nf' . ~ 0 Igurahon 
Planning Implementation 
Proce~es ~ 
Economic 
Informationa 
As figure 2.1 shows traditional strategic planning focuses on external linkages, 
planning (problem solving) and technological, economic and informational 
variables only. Nowadays these elements are seen as but a part of a wider 
strategic problem that also encompasses issues such as how should a firm be 
configured internally so that it is best able to offer what is required by the 
market, how can the strategy implementation process best be controlled, and 
what psychological, sociological and political variables need to be considered 
when formulating and implementing a strategy (Ansoff et al., 1976). As this 
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wider strategic problem became more apparent, strategic planning was replaced 
by strategic management, which has been described as: 
"A more complete way of managing a business concerned not only with markets and 
decision making, but also with social developments, implementation and the fit of 
strategy with organisational structure and climate" (Hussey, 1990, 5). 
Papers on strategy are often categorised according to whether they focus on 
what should be addressed in a strategic debate - the content literature - or how 
strategies should be developed and implemented - the process literature - (Fahey 
and Christensen, 1986; Huff and Reger, 1987; Leong et al., 1990; Voss, 
1992). Many of the early writers on strategy, notably Ackoff (1970), Andrews 
(1971) and Ansoff (1986), saw the process of strategy formulation as a logical 
one in which plans were developed and then implemented. However Mintzberg 
(1978), among others, has argued that this view fails to recognise the true 
complexity of the process as it assumes that strategies are always formulated 
explicitly, developed consciously and purposefully, and made in advance of the 
decisions to which they apply. Support for Mintzberg's thesis is provided by 
Bailey and Johnson (1992), Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984), Hart (1992) and 
Mills (1993), all of whom point out that a variety of strategy development and 
deployment processes, other than the traditional planning model, are presented 
in the literature. The most common being entrepreneurial, adaptive and 
ideological. 
The entrepreneurial mode of strategy formulation has its roots in the economics 
literature. Strategies developed using this approach are imposed on the 
organisation by a minority of its members (Mintzberg, 1978). Hart (1992) 
labels this the command mode and says that it usually involves top management 
setting direction for everyone else. 
The adaptive paradigm is based on the work of Lindblom (1959), although he 
coined the phrase "the science of muddling through". Quinn (1980) uses the 
10 
expression "logical incrementalism" in the same context and suggests that under 
this mode managers have a view of where they want the organisation to be and 
continually take small evolutionary steps toward it. 
The third strategy process paradigm, the ideo logical one, is synonymous with 
Prahalad and Hamel's concept of strategic intent (1989). Mintzberg and Waters 
(1985) summarise this mode of strategy formulation as follows: 
"When members of an organisation share a vision and identify so strongly with it 
that they pursue it as an ideology, then they are bound to exhibit patterns in their 
behaviour, so that clear realised strategies can be identified. These may be called 
ideological strategies" (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, 262). 
Hart (1992) suggests that under this paradigm the role of top management is to 
create a compelling long term vision which provides meaning for the 
organisation's activities and a sense of identity for its employees. A practical 
example of an ideological strategy is NEC's vision of "C&C" - the union of 
computers and communications. Through this NEC has been able to create a 
powerful metaphor which emphasises the importance of technological synergy 
within the firm (prahalad and Hamel, 1989). Interestingly the ideological mode 
of strategy formulation correlates with Campbell and Tawadey's (1990) concept 
of mission. 
Whichever of the above views one ascribes to - and there is increasing evidence 
to suggest that most strategies are a result of several interacting processes 
(Bailey and Johnson, 1992; Hart, 1992) - there is effectively universal, albeit 
sometimes implicit, agreement with Mintzberg's (1978) thesis that a strategy 
can only be said to exist, a posteriori, once a consistent pattern can be identified 
in the firm's decision and action streams (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Porter, 
1980, 1985; Summer et aI., 1990). Take, for example, the entrepreneurial 
mode of strategy formulation. If, as Hart (1992) suggests, the manager's role 
in this mode is to be a commander, then the strategy can only be realised if 
11 
everyone consistently obeys his orders. Similarly the rationale underlying the 
ideological mode of strategy implementation is that a clearly defined vision will 
provide a framework which constrains, guides or induces consistency of 
decision making. 
Perhaps the most difficult strategy process to relate to Mintzberg's (1978) thesis 
is the adaptive one. But imagine monitoring the path of an ant over a period of 
time. On the surface the ant's movements might appear random. As it 
encounters obstacles it will climb over them, change direction or even double 
back on itself. Over an extended period, however, it will become apparent that 
the ant's movements are directed toward some goal - that is, they are driven by 
an underlying consistency of purpose. So it is for managers who employ 
logical incrementalism. Their actions might appear random, but in reality they 
are consistently directed towards the realisation of a strategy (Mintzberg, 1973). 
At a more practical level an example based on Porter's (1980, 1985) generic 
strategy of overall cost leadership can be used to illustrate the point that a 
strategy can only be realised through consistency decision making and action. 
Imagine a firm where the intended business strategy is overall cost leadership. 
\ 
If anyone makes a decision which is inconsistent with this strategy, the strategy \ 
\ 
may become diluted. Say, for example, the quality control manager decides to ,\ 
introduce stringent quality control procedures calling for 100% inspection. 
Product quality is likely to improve and manufacturing costs are likely to 
increase. Hence the firm's strategy will start to become one of differentiation -
highish quality and lowish cost - rather than one of overall cost leadership, as 
was intended. This may not be an undesirable change in strategic direction. 
Indeed as figure 2.2 shows, strategies can emerge as a result of organisational 
learning or in response to changes in the external environment For the purpose 
of this thesis, however, the key point is that unless, there is some consistency of 
decision making and action, over an extended period of time, the firm will be 
unable to realise any strategy. 
I 
Figure 2.2: Intended, emergent and realised strategies (Mintzberg, 1978) 
Intended 
Strategy 
Emergent 
Strategy 
Realised 
Strategy 
The above discussion raises an important question, namely if strategies can only 
be realised through consistency of decision making and action, then how can 
such consistency be induced within a firm? The business strategy literature 
identifies strategic con troIs as one means of doing this (Lorange, 1982; 
Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984). According to Bungay and Goold (1991) a 
strategic control system normally involves the following: 
-agreement of business objectives; 
-monitoring of performance against these objectives; 
-feedback on results achieved; 
-incentives and sanctions for business management 
Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) use the stimUlus-response model shown in figure 
2.3 to argue that people are generally calculative. They suggest that as people 
weigh up the personal costs and benefits of any course of action before deciding 
what they will do, the strategic control system should be designed so that 
personal gain is maximised through successful implementation of strategy. 
Goold and Quinn (1990) adopt a slightly broader definition. They see strategic 
controls as a means of monitqring the implementation of strategy as well as 
influencing it, and suggest that there are three reasons why a strategic control 
system should be established. 
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Figure 2.3: Stimulus-response model of strategic control (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984) 
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Future application, 
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performance 
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Control 
Standards of 
performance, 
comparison and 
evaluation, feedback. 
"First, a fundamental task for any large organisation is to coordinate the efforts of all 
those who work within it (Barnard, 1962) ... Second, individual managers must be 
personally motivated to seek the goals that have been agreed. The provision of 
personal incentives and sanctions is important in creating this motivation (Slater, 
1973) ... Third, even the best-laid plans will sometimes fail. Senior management 
must then decide when and how to intervene, either by agreeing to altered goals, 
pressing for new plans or changing the responsible management. The control system 
prompts such action" (Goold and Quinn, 1990,44). 
Similarly Bungay and Goold (1991) see strategic controls as non-financial 
performance measures. They suggest that they can be used as a means of: 
-clarifying what good performance is; 
-making explicit the tradeoffs between profit and investment; 
-introducing individual strategic stretch targets; 
-ensuring that corporate management knows when to intervene because 
business performance is deteriorating. 
Despite the academic interest in strategic controls there has been relatively little 
empirical research on their use (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Horovitz (1979) 
surveyed 52 European companies and found that although planning had evolved 
from a short to a long-term activity, control at the top management level still 
focused on monitoring short term operational performance rather than 
achievement of strategic plans. More recently Goold and Quinn (1988) 
surveyed 200 of the largest British companies and reported that only 11 per cent 
of them claimed to have a strategic control system. These findings can be 
contrasted with those of Daniel and Reitsperger (1991), who surveyed 26 
Japanese automotive and consumer electronics firms and found that: 
"Japanese fums have taken to heart the strategic management literature advocating 
strategic controls... Our fmdings indicate that modifications of management control 
systems by Japanese manufacturers are applied in Japanese plants as well as in 
operations abroad. These findings and the success of Japanese manufacturers in 
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penetrating world markets support the normative theory that management control 
systems should be modified to fit strategy" (Daniel and Reitsperger, 1991, 616). 
Based on the data he collected while working with 30 health care businesses, 
Simons (1991) has suggested that strategic control systems can be used either 
diagnostically or interactively. He argues that traditionally strategic controls 
have been seen as diagnostic management by exception tools. That is, 
managers are thought to use the control system as a feedback mechanism to 
ensure that they are informed when actual outcomes differ significantly from 
those planned. He reports that in practice, however, managers sometimes 
choose to have close personal involvement with a strategic control system. That 
is, they use the system interactively to ensure their subordinates focus on 
specific strategic uncertainties. Interestingly there is increasing evidence that 
Japanese firms use their management accounting systems in this way (Dugdale, 
1990; Hiromoto, 1988; Morgan and Weerakoon, 1989). 
"High-level Japanese managers seem to worry less about whether an overhead 
allocation system reflects the precise demands each product makes on corporate 
resources than about how the system affects the cost-reduction priorities of middle 
managers and shop-floor workers" (Hiromoto, 1988, 22). 
It should be noted, however, that the concept of using the management 
accounting system to induce behaviour consistent with the firm's goals is not 
particularly novel. Indeed as long ago as 1974 Hopwood suggested that 
managers should pay more attention to the behavioural implications of 
management accounting, while in 1972 Horngren argued that: 
"Above all, management accounting systems and techniques should encourage 
managers to act in harmony with the overall objectives of the organisation" 
(Horngren, 1972, 9). 
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2.2: Organisational behaviour and culture 
Many of the concepts debated in the strategy literature can be traced back to 
work done by organisational behaviourists fifty years ago. Take, for example, 
coordination or consistency of purpose. As discussed earlier, Mintzberg (1978) 
has suggested that a strategy might best be described as a consistent pattern of 
decisions and actions. This notion appears to be synonymous with Barnard's 
(1938, 1948) view that an organisation only comes into being when: 
"(i) there are persons able to communicate with each other (ii) who are willing to 
contribute to action (iii) to accomplish a common purpose" (Pugh et al., 1988,68), 
Similarly, Fayol (1949) integrates the notions of strategy development and 
deployment when .he defmes the five core activities of management as: 
(a) To forecast and plan - examining the future and drawing up the plan of 
action. 
(b) To organise - building up the structure, material and human, of the 
undertaking. 
(c) To command - maintaining activity among the personnel. 
(d) To coordinate - binding together, unifying and harmonising all activity 
and effort. 
(e) To control - seeIng that everything occurs in conformity with 
established rule and expressed command. 
More recently parallels between the two fields can be observed in the arena of 
strategic or management control. Figure 2.4, for example, shows Child's 
(1985) model of the management control process. The similarities between this 
and Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1984) model of the strategic control process are 
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striking. 
Figure 2.4: The process of management control (Child, 1985) 
Manager Goals .... Evaluation 
~ and reward t 
Standards 
(instructions, Measurement 
targets) 
~ 
Operating ~ Results Subordinates behaviour (output) 
Having recognised the fact that there is considerable synergy between the 
organisational behaviour and business strategy literature, it should be noted that 
the concepts discussed in the organisational behaviour literature are often richer. 
Authors such as, Bungay and Goold (1991), Daniel and Reitsperger (1991) and 
Simons (1991), for example, still use the same concepts as Lorange did in 1982 
when discussing strategic control. Organisational behaviourists, on the other 
hand, appear to have explored management control more fully and: 
-Have established that there are four different modes of management 
control. (See table 2.1). 
-Argue that the appropriateness of the management control system is 
contingent on the organisation's size and age (Child, 1985) 
-Question whether it is possible to develop the equitable performance 
measures that a management control system requires (Vroom and Deci, 
1983). 
-Take issue with the assumption that people are generally calculative 
(Etzioni, 1961, 1964; Weber, 1947). 
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Table 2.1: The four modes of management control (Child, 1985) 
Personal Centralised Control 
-Centralised decision making. 
-Direct supervision. 
-Personal leadership founded upon ownership or charisma, or 
technical expertise. 
-Reward and punishment reinforce conformity to personal 
authority. 
Bureaucratic Control 
-Breaking down of tasks into easily definable elements. 
-Formally specified methods, procedures and rules applied to the 
conduct of tasks. 
-Budgetary and standard cost-variance accounting controls. 
-Technology designed to limit variation in conduct of tasks, with 
respect to pace, sequence and possibly physical methods. 
-Routine decision making delegated within prescribed limits. 
-Reward and punishment systems reinforce conformity to 
procedures and rules. 
Output Control 
-J obs and units designed to be responsible for complete outputs. 
-Specification of output standards and targets. 
-Use of "responsibility accounting" systems. 
-Delegation of decisions on operational matters. 
-Reward and punishment linked to attainment of output targets. 
Cultural Control 
-Development of strong identification with management goals. 
-Semi-autonomous working. 
-Strong emphasis on selection, training and development of 
personnel. 
-Rewards orientated towards security of tenure and career 
progressIon. 
Weber (1947), for example, argues that authority can be legitimised in 
organisations through three mechanisms - an individual's charisma, the 
organisation's history, or a rational-legal structure. Hence he would criticise 
Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1984) model of the strategic control process because it 
relies solely on a rational-legal mechanism. 
"The system is called rational because the means are expressly designed to achieve 
specific goals, i.e. the organisation is like a well-designed machine with a certain 
function to perform, and every part of the machine contributes to the attainment of 
maximum performance of that function. It is legal because authority is exercised by 
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means of a system of rules and procedures through the office which an individual 
occupies at a particular time" (Pugh et al., 1988, 17). 
Similarly Etzioni (1961, 1964) contends that organisations rely on two types of 
compliance to ensure that their members behave in an appropriate manner. 
"Compliance in any organisation is two sided. On the one hand it consists of the 
control structures that are employed: the organisational power and authority structure 
which attempts to ensure that obedience is obtained. This Etzioni calls the structural 
aspect since it is concerned with the formal organisational system and the kind of 
power that the organisation uses to enforce compliance ... 
The second aspect of compliance is based on the extent to which members of the 
organisation are committed to its aims and purposes. This is the motivational aspect 
and is expressed in the kind of involvement that the individual has with the 
organisation that he belongs to. The more intensely an individual is involved in the 
organisation the more likely he is to work towards the realisation of its goals" (Pugh 
et al., 1988, 74). 
Hence Etzioni would criticise the traditional strategic control model because it is 
based on the assumption that the first of the above means of ensuring 
compliance, i.e. the formal system, is dominant in most organisations. 
Interestingly in the organisational behaviour literature the concept of 
management control has recently been superseded by that of performance 
management (Erban, 1989; Fowler, 1990). According to Bevan and Thompson 
(1991) an organisation with a textbook performance management system 
should: 
-Have a shared vision of its objectives, or a mission statement, which it 
communicates to all its employees. 
-Set individual performance management targets which are related to both 
operating unit and wider organisational objectives. 
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-Conduct a regular, formal review of progress towards these targets. 
-U se the review process to identify training, development and reward 
outcomes. 
-Evaluate the effectiveness of the whole process and its contribution to 
overall organisational performance to allow changes and improvements to 
be made. 
A performance management system, then, not only provides a means of 
enhancing an individual's commitment to an organisation, Etzioni's (1961, 
1964) second method of ensuring of compliance, but also ties in with the 
concepts of an ideological strategy and a cultural control system, through the 
inclusion of a reference to the generation of a shared organisational vision. 
The notion of a shared organisational ViSion IS also discussed in the 
organisational culture literature. There it is argued that consistency of decision 
making and action will result if the organisation's values are widely shared by 
its members (Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981). Following their study of 
excellence in Japanese and American organisations Pascale and Athos (1981) 
employ a musical analogy to explain how this might work. 
"In management, as in music, there is a bass clef as well as a treble. The treble 
generally carries the melody in music, and the melody's equivalent is the manager's 
style. A manager's style - the way he focuses his attention and interacts with people 
- sets the tune for his subordinates and communicates at the operational level what 
his expectations are and how he wants business conducted. Beneath these messages 
is a deeper rhythm that communicates more fundamentally. The bass in music -
whether hard rock or a classical symphony - often contains much of what moves the 
listener. So, too, the "bass" of management conveys meanings at a deeper level and 
communicates what management really cares about" (Pascale and Athos, 1981, 177). 
In an unrelated study Peters (1978) argues that management can shape the glue 
which binds the organisation together, the superordinate goals or shared values, 
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by paying careful attention to the mundane tools of management - symbols, 
patterns and settings. He suggests that as most employees watch what a fIrm's 
senior managers are doing, then if the Chief Executive consistently (a pattern) 
fills his calendar (a symbol) with meetings (a setting) to discuss quality then 
most of his employees will come round to the view that quality is of 
fundamental importance. Other organisational culturists, such as Deshpande 
and Parasuraman (1986), Ouchi (1979) and Schwartz and Davis (1981), take 
this one stage further by exploring how corporate culture and strategy can be 
matched through the use of cultural audits and contingency models. 
In summary, then, there appears to be widespread agreement with Mintzberg's 
(1978) thesis that strategies are realised through consistency of decision making 
and action (Faulkner and Johnson, 1992; Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; 
Porter, 1980; Skinner, 1974b; Summer et al., 1990). In the business strategy 
literature it is usually argued that such consistency can be achieved through the 
use of strategic controls (Bungay and Goold, 1991; Goold and Quinn, 1990; 
Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Lorange, 1982; Lorange et aI., 1986). These are 
similar to the organisational behaviourist's centralised, bureaucratic or output 
based management control systems (Child, 1985). More recently, at least in the 
organisational behaviour literature, the concept of management control has been 
superseded by that of performance management (Bevan and Thomson, 1991; 
Erban, 1989; Fowler, 1990). A textbook performance management system, not 
only incorporates the main elements of a traditional strategic control system, but 
also introduces the notion of shared values or cultural control. A theme, which 
is pursued more fully in the organisational culture literature (Ouchi, 1981; 
Pascale and Athos, 1981). Hence there appear to be two fundamental ways of 
inducing consistency of decision making and action within organisations. The 
first is through the use of a formal control system, while the second relies on 
widely shared organisational values. These two mechanisms are neither 
mutually exclusive, nor all encompassing, as issues such as individual 
motivation and organisational history have a role to play (Child, 1985). They 
appear, however, to be the two primary means of inducing appropriate 
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behaviour that are recognised in the business strategy, organisational behaviour 
and organisational culture literature. Hence let us now turn to the 
manufacturing strategy literature and examine the extent to which they have 
been considered by the Production and Operations Management (PfOM) 
community. 
2.3: Manufacturing strategy 
The manufacturing strategy literature lags behind that on business strategy ( 
(Anderson and Schroeder, 1991) and it was not until the early 1980s that the 
importance of manufacturing strategy became widely acknowledged (Chase, 
1980; Miller et aI., 1981). Indeed, of the 116 different books and papers on 
manufacturing strategy that Swamidass (1989) included in his selected 
bibliography, only 17 per cent of them were published prior to 1980. The 
earliest of these, "Manufacturing - Missing Link in Corporate Strategy" 
appeared in the Harvard Business Review in 1969. Skinner began that paper 
by saying: "a company's manufacturing function typically is either a competitive 
weapon or a corporate millstone" and so started a revolution in the strategic 
management of the manufacturing function (Skinner 1969, 136). The purpose 
of the next section is to examine that revolution by reviewing that literature 
which focuses on the content - the what - of manufacturing strategies. This will 
answer the first of the questions posed earlier, namely what is manufacturing 
strategy. 
2.3.1: The content literature 
In his seminal paper on manufacturing strategy Skinner (1969) suggested that 
many top executives fail to understand the full implications of the business 
strategy because they do not address the following questions: 
"If we are to compete with an X product of Y price for Z customers using certain 
distribution channels and forms of advertising, what will be demanded of 
manufacturing in terms of costs, deliveries, lead times, quality, and reliability? 
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Given the facts of the economics and the technology of the industry, how do we set 
ourselves up to meet the specific manufacturing tasks posed by our particular 
competitive strategy?" (Skinner, 1969, 144). 
These questions define the two generic content variables - manufacturing task 
and policy decisions - which are now widely accepted as being the core of 
manufacturing strategyl (Leong et al., 1990). It appears that Skinner's (1969) 
aim was to provide an holistic framework within which these questions could 
be addressed. 
During the early 1970s Skinner was largely responsible for the development of 
manufacturing strategy (Skinner, 1971, 1974a, 1974b, 1978). Initially he 
focused on the structural policy decisions, such as span of process, choice of 
process and equipment, plant location, determination of critical elements for 
control, while he paid little attention to the infrastructural issues, such as the 
control systems and management of the organisation (Skinner, 1969). Two 
years later, however, and following extensive field work he wrote: 
"In a nutshell, our methods of decision making, communicating, scheduling, and 
supervising make up the infrastructure of our plants; and these internal elements are 
proving more resistant to change than the purely technological ingredients on which 
factory managers and engineers tend to focus" (Skinner, 1971,65). 
It is interesting to note that this shift in emphasis which Skinner's early work 
exhibits, predates, but parallels one that can be observed in the field of 
Production/Operations Management as a whole (Neely, 1993a)2 and is also, as 
this review will show, a trend which underlies the manufacturing strategy 
literature. 
1 For the purpose of this thesis manufacturing strategy is defmed as the extended pattern of 
decisions and actions, both structural and infrastructural, which determine the capabilities of a 
manufacturing system and specify how it will operate in order to meet a set of manufacturing 
objectives which are consistent with the overall business objectives (Platts and Gregory, 
1990, modified). 
2 See Appendix 1. 
By the late 1970s the concept of manufacturing strategy was becoming 
increasingly popular. Skinner had already developed the concept of focus, 
arguing that the manufacturing function could best support the business strategy 
if its task was defined so that it only had to meet a limited and narrow set of 
objectives (Skinner, 1974a, 1974b). Hayes and Schmenner (1978) supported 
this thesis when they argued that the competitive priorities of the firm had to be 
defined before one could decide whether to focus the manufacturing function 
around products or processes. Others were examining issues such as the 
manufacturing marketing interface (Shapiro, 1977); the product process life 
cycle (Hayes and Wheelwright 1979a, 1979b); and the problems associated 
with strategic planning (Banks and Wheelwright, 1979; Hobbs and Heany, 
1977; Wheelwright and Banks, 1979). Unfortunately all of these authors were 
focussing on single elements of manufacturing strategy, rather than trying to 
develop Skinner's holistic framework and perhaps this partly explains why it 
took so long for the importance of manufacturing strategy to become widely 
acknowledged (Chase, 1980; Miller et aI., 1981). 
Wheelwright (1978) was probably the first author who actually returned to I 
Skinner's (1969) holistic view when he developed the conceptual framework 
shown in figure 2.5. This framework not only helped to operationalise 
Skinner's earlier work, but has also been used, either directly or indirectly, by 
Buffa (1984); Fine and Hax (1984, 1985); Haas (1987); Hayes and 
Wheelwright (1984); Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark (1988); Hill (1980, 1985, 
1989); New (1979, 1992a, 1992b); Platts and Gregory (1990) and Samson 
(1991). 
Wheelwright's (1978) paper is important for two reasons. Firstly he focuses '~_ 
primarily on the structural decision categories - process, capacity, plants and \ 
vertical integration. This bias t?ward the "harder" end of the spectrum remained 
throughout most of the 1980s (H~yeS and Wheelwright, 1984~. Indeed it was J 
not until 1988 that it was fmally lrud to rest by Hayes, Wheelwnght and Clark/ 
"Our earlier book [Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984] focussed most of its attention on 
manufacturing structural decisions [capacity, facilities, technology, vertical 
integration], but over the years we have become increasingly impressed by the 
importance of infrastructural elements [work force, quality, production planning and 
control, new product development processes, performance measurement and reward 
systems, organisational structure and design]. We have seen a number of companies 
that were able to build a powerful competitive advantage around their internal 
capabilities and teamwork, even though their plants and equipment were not 
exceptional; but we have never seen one that was able to build a sustainable 
competitive advantage around superior hardware alone. For this reason ... it is almost 
impossible for a company to spend its way out of a competitive difficulty" (Hayes et 
aI, 1988, 22). 
Figure 2.5: Manufacturing strategy content (Wheelwright, 1978) 
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Second Wheelwright (1978) appears to have been the first to explicitly 
recognise that not only does each competitive priority have multiple dimensions, 
but also that it can be measured in a variety of ways. 
"Efficiency - This criterion encompasses both cost efficiency and capital efficiency 
and can generally be measured by such factors as return on sales, inventory turnover 
and return on assets. 
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Dependability - The dependability of a company's products and its delivery and price 
promises is often extremely difficult to measure. Many companies measure it in 
terms of percent of on-time deliveries. 
Quality - Product quality and reliability, service quality, speed of delivery, and 
maintenance quality are important aspects of this criterion. For many firms this is 
easy to measure by internal standards, but as with the other criteria, the key is how 
the market evaluates quality. 
Flexibility - The two major aspects of flexibility changes are in the product and the 
volume. Special measures are required for this criterion, since it is not generally 
measured" (Wheelwright, 1978, 61). 
More recently the whole question of competitive priorities and whether there 
really are tradeoffs between them has become the topic of debate (Skinner, 
1992). The traditional view is that it is impossible for manufacturing to quickly 
make a wide range of high quality and low cost products (Skinner, 1969). One 
of the first to question this view was Wheelwright (1981) when he suggested· 
that many Japanese managers seek ways to improve quality and reduce costs 
simultaneously. In 1986, using data collected during the manufacturing futures 
survey, Nakane hypothesised that Japanese managers attack the competitive 
priorities quality, time, cost and flexibility sequentially (DeMeyer et al., 1989). 
And in 1990 Schonberger suggested that: 
''World-class strategies require chucking the [trade-off] notion. The right strategy has 
no optimum, only continual improvement - in all things" (Schonberger, 1990, 21). 
The world class manufacturing view, however, is not universally accepted, I 
especially by those who advocate a more traditional model of manufacturing 
strategy. New (1992a), for example, argues that while one can question 
whether certain tradeoffs exist, especially those relating to quality and cost, 
most of the evidence is anecdotal and drawn from the repetitive batch 
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manufacturing industry. And Slack (1991) points out that there is a time 
dimension to the debate, for while it is usually impossible for a production 
manager to double a factory's output in twenty four hours without increasing 
cost, it may be possible for him to do so over an extended period of time. This 
point is important because it links manufacturing strategy to continuous 
improvement. Effectively Schonberger is suggesting that one has to improve 
continuously along all the competitive dimensions, whereas most manufacturing 
strategists would argue that, given limited resources, it is necessary to focus 
one's improvement activities (Neely, 1990). 
There has been some debate as to how manufacturing actually contributes to the 
business. Hayes and Wheelwright (1984) suggest that there are four stages of 
evolution to manufacturing's strategic role. In stage 1 - internally neutral - the 
objective is to minimise the negative impact of the manufacturing function. 
Commonly, this involves using external experts to make decisions of strategic 
importance to manufacturing, using internal management control systems to 
monitor manufacturing performance and ensuring that manufacturing is kept 
flexible and reactive. In stage 2 - externally neutral - manufacturing's role is to 
help the business maintain parity with its competitors. Industry practice is 
followed, the planning horizon for manufacturing investment is extended so that 
it incorporates a single business cycle and capital investment is seen primarily as 
a way of catching up with the competition. In stage 3 - internally supportive -
manufacturing exists to provide credible support to the business strategy. 
Manufacturing investments are screened for consistency with the business 
strategy, the implications of changes in business strategy for manufacturing are 
considered and a systematic approach to the long term development of the 
manufacturing function is adopted. In stage 4 - externally supportive - the 
business actually pursues a manufacturing based competitive advantage. 
Efforts are made to anticipate the potential of new manufacturing practices and 
technologies, manufacturing is involved in major marketing and engineering 
decisions and long range programmes are pursued in order to acquire 
capabilities in advance of needs. Traditionally writers on manufacturing L:· 
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strategy (Skinner, 1969; Hill, 1985) have adopted the view that the strategic 
role of the manufacturing function is best described as stage 3. Recently, 
however, with the growing interest in the learning organisation (Senge, 1992) 
and core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), there has been increased 
emphasis on stage 4. 
Alternative models of manufacturing strategy have also been suggested. 
Rhodes (1991), for example, presents a model of manufacturing strategy based 
on business processes, but makes no real attempt to operationalise it. Kotha 
and Orne (1989) introduce the concept of generic manufacturing strategies, 
following Porter's work (1980, 1985), and Sweeny (1991) suggests that such 
strategies may provide a way of managing the inherent complexity of 
developing manufacturing strategies. As with that on business processes, 
however, work on this topic is still at a very early stage and "it is still unclear 
whether generic manufacturing strategies do actually exist" (Sweeny, 1991, 6). (-
Indeed empirical evidence is only now becoming available (DeMeyer, 1992; 
Sweeny, 1993). 
Data on the use of manufacturing strategies in industry is limited (Anderson et 
al., 1989; Leong et al., 1990). The manufacturing futures survey has been 
used by Ward et al. (1988) to show that the main policy decisions identified in 
the literature match the strategic concerns of industry. And Tunalv (1992) has 
presented data supporting the hypothesis that business units with a 
manufacturing strategy are significantly more successful, in terms of their 
financial performance, than those without one. 
In this section of the review the evolution of the manufacturing strategy 
literature has been described. It has been shown that there is widespread 
agreement within the academic 'community that a manufacturing strategy should 
consist of a series of statements describing what manufacturing is supposed to 
do - the competitive priorities - and how manufacturing is supposed to do it -
the policy decisions. Table 2.2 summarises the development of manufacturing 
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strategy since 1969. Note that it was not until 1989 that performance 
measurement, a central element in the strategic control process, was included in 
the framework. Traditionally manufacturing strategists appear to have focussed 
on issues such as where should plants be located and what should their capacity 
be (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984). Only recently has it become widely 
accepted that a sustainable competitive advantage might result if consistency of 
purpose exists throughout the organisation (Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 
1988). 
2.3.2: The process literature 
Most of the work on strategy formulation has been carried out by business 
strategists (Leong et aI., 1990; Mintzberg and Quinn, 1992). Three generic 
approaches to developing manufacturing strategies, however, can be identified 
in the mainstream manufacturing strategy literature. The first, which can be 
described as top-down, was suggested by Skinner (1969) and is implicit in the 
work of Fine and Hax (1984), Hayes and Wheelwright (1984), Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark (1988), and Wheelwright (1978) but explicit in that of 
Platts and Gregory (1990). Skinner's (1969) approach, shown in figure 2.6, 
is, in many ways, similar to the one advocated by business strategists such as 
Ackoff (1970), Andrews (1971) and Ansoff (1986). He suggests that once a 
SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis has been 
conducted and the business strategy defined, then the manufacturing task can be 
derived and the policy decisions made. To use Hayes and Wheelwright's 
(1984) terminology, then, Skinner (1969) sees manufacturing strategy as 
internally supportive. Hence he would argue that one of the key questions that 
needs to be addressed when developing a manufacturing strategy is; how does 
one ensure that the manufacturing task and policy decisions are consistent with 
the business strategy? 
The top-down approach to manufacturing strategy development can be 
contrasted with Hayes' (1985) suggestion that the traditional strategic planning 
model of "ends-ways-means" may be fundamentally flawed. Hayes argues that 
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Table 2.2: The evolution of manufacturing strategy 
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Figure 2.6: The manufacturing strategy development process (Skinner, 1969) 
Industry Factors 
1. Competitive Situation 5. Economics 6. Technology 
-Number Cost structures Process 
Kind Key cost-margins Equipment 
Resources of competitors Industry structure Critical determinants 
Nature Cost flexibility Materials 
Trends _ Trends 
~r + + 4. Manufacturing Task ~ 3. I ..... ..... Company Strategy J .. .. 8. Company Manufacturing Polices 
-+ 
Productivity, Service, Span of process Quality, Return on Scale of process 
2. Company Inventory investment Choice of process and equipment 
Plant location ~ 
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and so on. Management organisation Products 
Equipment 
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Technical expertise 9. Requirements to be met by Manufacturing Vice President and Management .. 
~~ 10. Manufacturing Systems 11. Manufacturing Controls 12. Manufacturing 
and Procedures Operations 
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13. Results defmed in teImS of productivity, service, quality and return on investment ~ 
the ends companies seek, that is their goals, are often short term, too easily 
copied and focus on quantitative issues, like return on investment, rather than 
the qualitative factors through which competitive advantage is usually gained. 
Furthermore, he points out that the ways, or strategies many firms adopt, place 
too much emphasis on goals and not enough on vision, and quotes William 
Bricker, chairman and CEO of Diamond Shamrock, who says; 
"Why has our vision been so narrowed? Why has our flexibility been constricted? 
To my mind there is one central reason: our strategies have become too rigid ... A 
detailed strategy [is] like a road map ... [telling] us every turn we must take to get to 
our goal ... The entrepreneur, on the other hand, views strategic planning not as a road 
map but as a compass ... and is always looking for the new road" (Hayes, 1985, 114). 
Hayes continues by asking if the order of the terms ends, ways, means should 
be reversed. He suggests that firms could begin by developing their means -
human and physical resources - and then find ways of exploiting matches 
between the firm's existing means and the market's requirements to achieve the 
ultimate end, which is a sustainable competitive advantage. 
Such an approach is effectively a bottom-up process of strategy development 
and there are various examples of this having worked in practice. Pilkington 
Glass, for example, have been able to secure a sustainable competitive 
advantage through the development of the float-glass production process (Hill, 
1985). All of Pilkington's competitors have to pay royalties if they wish to use 
this process and so, through the entrepreneurial development of its own 
technological means, Pilkington has attained a sustainable cost advantage. 
The bottom-up approach to strategy formulation, also links in with the concepts 
of core competence (Cleveland et al., 1989; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Vickery, 1991), core capabilities (Stalk et al., 1992) and the learning 
organisation (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Senge, 1992). One of Pilkington's core 
competencies is the float-glass production process. One of Toyota's, on the 
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other hand, is the Toyota Production System, which itself has been developed 
through a process of continuous learning and improvement (Womack et aI., 
1990). If one were to adopt this view of strategy formulation, then, one of the 
key questions that would have to be addressed is; how does one ensure that the 
resources devoted to the development of new "means" (core competencies, core 
capabilities, etc.) are not wasted? 
The third generic process that can be used to develop a manufacturing strategy 
can best be described as iterative and is the one that is implicit in Hill's (1980, 
1985) model. He advocates the five step approach to the development of the 
corporate, marketing, business and manufacturing strategies, shown in figure 
2.7 and argues that manufacturing managers have traditionally only been 
involved in the last two stages - process choice and the development of the 
manufacturing infrastructure. Hill (1980) believes this is partly because they 
view themselves as being primarily responsible for fine tuning the 
manufacturing system so that it can respond to the requirements of the business 
and also because they lack the language to explain the strategic implications of 
their function. He points out that this reactive mode of strategy development 
paradoxically means that the manufacturing function has little influence on the 
choice of how a firm decides to compete in the market place (the business 
strategy) even though it has a major impact on whether the chosen competitive 
criteria can be met. He therefore argues that the loop shown in figure 2.7 
represents the true iterative nature of how the strategy development process 
should be conducted and suggests that not only must manufacturing try and do 
what is required, but also that the corporate, marketing and business strategies 
should be defined in a way that acknowledges the inherent strengths and 
weaknesses of the manufacturing function. 
The three approaches described above are all academic models of the 
manufacturing strategy development process. Little empirical data which 
describes the processes actually used by industry is available (Anderson et al., 
1989; Leong et al., 1990) and that which exists usually comes in the form of 
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case studies (Hill, 1989; Samson, 1991). Voss (1992), for example, 
interviewed executives from four U.K. companies, all of whom had been 
involved in the development of manufacturing strategies. The data he collected 
showed that the manufacturing strategy fonnulation process nonnally consists 
of the four stages shown in figure 2.8. 
Figure 2.7: Hill's model of manufacturing strategy (Hill, 1985) 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Corporate Marketing How do products Manufacturing Strategy 
Objectives Strategy win orders? 
Process choice Infrastructure 
growth product markets price processes functional 
profit and segme support 
ROI delivery speed 
other delivery 
"financial' reliability 
measures colour range 
product range role of 
work 
innovation structuring 
leader or 
follower organisational 
structure 
In an attempt to operationalise some of the manufacturing strategy concepts the 
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry commissioned a workbook entitled 
Competitive Manufacturing which is described as "a practical approach to the 
development of a manufacturing strategy" (DT!, 1988). This book is a useful 
tool because it provides a series of check sheets which enable a group of 
managers to define their finn's competitive priorities and assess whether their 
manufacturing policies are appropriate. But even the authors admit that it is 
merely the first step in the process of developing a manufacturing strategy. 
There is slightly more literature on realising str~tegies than there is on their 
development, perhaps because the relevant data can be collected through both 
surveys (Swamidass, 1986; Schroeder et al., 1986; Anderson et al., 1991) and 
case studies (Booth, 1990; Hill, 1989; New, 1992a; Samson, 1991). 
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Figure 2.8: The four stages of strategy fonnulation (Voss, 1992) 
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Competitor analysis 
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Specify ideal plant 
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Implementation 
In 1986 Swamidass surveyed 35 U.S. finns and found that: 
-The tenn manufacturing strategy is not well understood in industry. 
-There is a mismatch between executives' perception of the strengths of 
manufacturing and its strategic role. 
-There is a mismatch between the manufacturing priorities of the Chief 
Executive and the Manufacturing Managers. 
-Manufacturing strategy is neither visible nor obvious in most finns. 
In a separate study Schroeder et al. (1986) surveyed 39 manufacturing 
managers who were attending a course at the U ni versity of Minnesota and 
found that: 
-Only one third of the managers present claimed that their firms had clear 
and consistent manufacturing strategies. 
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-The terminology surrounding the subject was seen to be confusing. 
-Manufacturing strategies tend to be derived from business strategies. That 
is, the strategic role of manufacturing is best described as stage 3 using 
Hayes and Wheelwright's (1984) terms. 
Anderson et al. (1991) repeated this exercise a few years later when they 
surveyed 53 manufacturing executives who were attending executive 
programmes at the University of Minnesota. This time their survey focussed on 
the process of developing both manufacturing and business strategies and found 
that 
-Manufacturing executives are often asked to help with the development of a 
business strategy late in the cycle. 
-ManufacturiQg strategies are not as well documented or communicated as 
business strategies. 
Unfortunately - from a research perspective - case studies such as those 
presented by Hill (1989) and Samson (1991) tend to be success stories and 
hence it is difficult to glean specific information from them regarding the 
barriers to manufacturing strategy realisation. One study which departs from 
this format, however, is described by Marucheck et al. (1990). They invited 
executives from six companies to discuss manufacturing strategy formulation 
and implementation at an open meeting and report that: 
-All the firms used a traditional top down process of strategy formulation. 
-In general the processes they used were reactive to both the corporate and 
marketing strategies. 
-Several of the policy decision categories were constrained by the corporate 
philosophy. 
-The implementation process was seen as one of gaining employee 
acceptance. 
-The most difficult task in implementation was changing the corporate 
culture especially when it was embedded in an obsolete cost accounting 
system. 
37 
-Other areas of difficulty included maintaining consistency across all levels 
of management in the organisation, gaining top management support and 
developing appropriate styles of leadership. 
In this section the paucity of literature on the process of developing and 
realising manufacturing strategies has been discussed. Leong et al. (1990) 
argue that progress in the field has been limited by the lack of empirical data and 
the failure of manufacturing strategists to import ideas from related disciplines, 
especially business strategy. One such idea is the notion that strategies can only 
be realised through consistency of decision making and action. This concept is 
implicitly accepted by many manufacturing strategists (Hayes and Wheelwright, 
1984; Hill, 1985; Platts and Gregory, 1990; Skinner, 1971), but its 
implications are rarely discussed. Marucheck et al. (1990), for example, 
identify changing a corporate culture embedded in an obsolete cost accounting 
system and maintaining consistency across all levels of management, as two 
major barriers to the realisation of manufacturing strategy, but fail to 
acknowledge that shared organisational values or the use of appropriate strategic 
controls may overcome these problems. It appears that while the concepts of 
goal and system congruence are implicitly accepted by many authors (Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1971), manufacturing 
strategists on the whole have failed to explore whether they can be used in an 
operational setting. Having said this a number of uni-dimensional studies of 
both goal and system congruence have been reported. These are reviewed in 
the next section. 
2.4: Relevant studies: 
In this section those studies of goal and system congruence that have been 
identified as being ~~~A~.!!Y .. E~.I~vant to ttte 'Y9rk.c~~Eo.~.~" in ~!~ ~~~~i~,will be e~"'b~:f~'" 
reviewed. In order to simplify this process, the research into goal congruence 
will be reviewed separately to that into system congruence. 
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2.4.1: Goal congruence: 
Grinyer and Norburn (1977-78) report a study of 21 firms in which they sought 
evidence of a general causal relationship between corporate planning and 
performance. They restricted the scope of their investigation by focusing solely 
on the strategic issues of market penetration and product range. Data were 
collected during 91 structured interviews. Consensus, or congruence, was 
measured by calculating the percentage of interviewees within a firm who gave 
the same answer to a specific question. Performance was related to return on 
net assets. During each interview Grinyer and Norburn asked the interviewee 
to specify existing corporate objectives and to identify those that they thought 
desirable. Having analysed the data they rejected their hypothesis that financial 
performance is positively correlated with widely shared corporate objectives. In 
fact they found "that for 'ideal' objectives (but not for actual ones), there may 
be a slight negative correlation" (Grinyer and Norburn, 1978, 107). These 
findings were supported by DeWoot et al. (1977-78) following their study of 
168 Belgian firms. 
In 1980 Bourgeois studied top management agreement on both corporate 
objectives (goals) and competitive weapons (means). First he interviewed the 
chief executive officers of 12 non-diversified public corporations and asked 
them to specify which members of their staff were most closely involved with 
the strategy development process. Then he surveyed the 71 managers identified 
and asked them to rate the importance of 12 corporate goals and 23 competitive 
weapons, on a five point scale. 
Bourgeois hypothesised that: 
-Agreement on ends (corporate objectives) and means (competitive 
weapons) would lead to the highest levels of performance. 
-Agreement on ends but Qot on means would lead to the second highest 
levels of performance. 
-Agreement on means but not on ends would lead to the third highest levels 
of performance. 
-Agreement on neither ends nor means would lead to the lowest levels of 
performance. 
Figure 2.9: Matrix showing Bourgeois' (1980) hypotheses 
Agreement 
on ends 
W ill lead to the 
highest level of 
performance 
Will lead to the 
second highest 
level of 
performance 
No agreement 
on ends 
Will lead to the 
third highest 
level of 
performance 
Will lead to the 
lowest level of 
performance 
He calculated the level of dissonance, or incongruence, by summing the 
standard deviations of the respondent's ratings and defmed frrm performance as 
a composite of return on invested capital (total assets), growth in capital, 
growth in net earnings, growth in earnings per share, and five year averaged 
growth in profit margin. 69 of the 71 questionnaires were returned and having 
analysed the data Bourgeois said: 
"the only secure conclU3ion that can be drawn ... is that consensus on means always 
yields higher performance than disagreement on means, while allowing disagreement 
on less tangible goals tends to be associated with better performance. Also, the 
worst performance results in goals agreement combined with means disagreement -
i.e., when a flfffi agrees on where it wants to go but, it can't agree on how to get 
there! This suggests a 'paralysis of action' condition in which consensus of purpose 
is not sufficient for the law of equifinality to take hold if the f1fffi's subunits wish to 
allocate resources to too many diverse competitive weapons for concerted action to 
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prevail. That is, disagreement on the choice of competitive weapons may hurt 
because the domain navigation strategies of the different functional areas clash, 
causing muddled and internally inconsistent or incomplete strategies" (Bourgeois, 
1980, 243-244). 
Bourgeois defines "ends" as profit, growth rate and market share, whereas he 
categorises cost reduction, employee efficiency and product quality as "means". 
These categorisations are important because Bourgeois' means equate to a 
manufacturing strategist's competitive priorities and hence Bourgeois' findings 
suggest that agreement on competitive priorities should lead to higher levels of 
organisational performance. 
Hrebiniak and Snow (1982) examined the relationship between top-
management agreement on an organisation's strengths and weaknesses and firm 
performance. To do so they collected survey data from 247 executives in 49 
different companies. In their questionnaire each respondent was asked to rate 
various organisational functions (general management, financial management, 
marketing/selling, production, etc.) as strong, average or weak. Managerial 
agreement was calculated as a function of the standard deviation of the 
responses and organisational performance as a ratio of total operating income to 
total assets. Having analysed the data, Hrebiniak and Snow (1982, 1153) 
found that "agreement among top executives on an organisation's strengths and 
weaknesses is related to organisational performance". They argue that this 
result shows how important it is for top management to work together to define 
the firm's strengths and weaknesses during the strategic planning process. 
Dess (1987) reports a study of the relationship between organisational 
performance and top management agreement on company objectives and 
competitive methods in the paint and allied prod~cts industry. He argues that 
because of the intense competitive pressures in this industry "a high level of 
consensus in strategy-making is ... critical in promoting a unified direction for 
the firm and enhancing the successful implementation of a given strategy" 
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(Dess, 1987, 260). Having received 74 usable responses (80%) from his 
survey of 19 firms Dess found that consensus on either company objectives or 
competitive weapons was positively correlated with a firm's performance. 
After acknowledging that this finding contradicts Bourgeois' earlier study, Dess 
points out that the studies are not necessarily comparable as they use different 
performance indicators. 
St. John and Rue (1991) explored the relationship between the coordinating 
mechanisms used by firms (formal forecasting procedures, management by 
objectives linked to performance appraisal, and a written strategic plan), the 
degree of consensus between marketing and manufacturing, and market place 
performance reputation. They collected their data by surveying 168 vice-
presidents, sales managers, and plant managers within 15 companies in the 
U.S. carpet industry and found that consensus between departments was 
strongly related to market place performance reputation. 
Other authors have examined consensus in organisations, but made no attempt 
to link it to performance (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Stagner, 1969). 
Hambrick (1981), who investigated the extent of strategic awareness in top 
management teams, argues that strategic awareness can be viewed in two 
complementary ways: 
"(1) the degree of agreement between an executive's perception of the 
organisation's strategy and its realised strategy (as externally measured), and 
(2) the degree of agreement between an executive's perception and the chief 
executive's perception of the organisation's strategy" (Hambrick, 1981,263). 
In his study he examined 20 service organisations - either private liberal arts 
colleges, voluntary general hospitals, or life insurance firms - and found that 
often strategic awareness did not even exist at the highest levels of the 
organisation. 
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In the more specialist manufacturing arena there are few practical studies of goal 
congruence. Wheelwright (1978) presents a case study in which the vice-
president of manufacturing asked his managers to prioritise the cost, quality, 
dependability and flexibility elements of the finn's manufacturing strategy. He 
concludes that the discussion this provoked led to a better understanding of the 
strategy within the manufacturing function. Both New (1992b) and Platts and 
Gregory (1990) suggest that a similar technique - competitive profiling - can be 
used at the start of the manufacturing strategy formulation process to generate 
management commitment. 
Richardson et al. (1985) conducted a more formal investigation of goal 
congruence when they examined the relationship between profit, the chief 
executive's goals and his perception of the manufacturing task. In their study 
of 64 Canadian electronics manufacturers they asked each chief executive to 
answer a series of questions and from these defined both the corporate mission 
and the manufacturing task. They then, somewhat subjectively, defined 
whether the two were congruent, or mutually supportive, and hypothesised that 
performance - defmed as profit plus research and development expenses (after 
tax) as a percentage of sales - would be positively correlated with the level of 
congruence. Having analysed the data, Richardson et al. concluded that: 
"performance was positively related to increasing focus [of corporate mission], and 
although congruence between corporate mission and manufacturing task appeared less 
importan~ the relationship was still significant" (Richardson et al., 1985, 25). 
In 1986 Swamidass studied the manufacturing strategies of 35 firms from the 
Pacific Northwest through a series of questionnaires and interviews. In each 
firm he gathered data from both chief executive officers, or their equivalent, and 
manufacturing managers and w·as hence able to c0t:npare their different views of 
manufacturing strategy. He found that: 
"while chief executives stressed quality, technology, etc., which would contribute to 
a business level strategy based on product differentiation, manufacturing managers 
stressed cost, and the keeping of delivery promises" (Swamidass, 1986,471), 
Swamidass also conducted a separate, but related study, with Newell in which 
they used a path analytic model to examine manufacturing strategy, 
environmental uncertainty and performance (Swamidass and Newell, 1987). 
Based on the same data used in the study discussed above they found that 
flexibility was positively correlated with performance; that the more ~ 
r, 
manufacturing managers were involved in strategic decision making the higher ~ 
the levels of performance; and that increased flexibility and higher levels of i 
involvement by manufacturing managers helps ftnns overcome the problems of J 
environmental uncertainty. 
Lindman and Call arm an (1990) examined the link between manufacturing 
strategic consensus and manufacturing operational performance. Although they 
only present their preliminary results and provide no information on their 
methodology, their conclusions are interesting because they find that there is a 
"statistically significant positive association between SBU [strategic business 
unit] manufacturing consensus and manufacturing operational performance" 
(Lindman and Callarman, 1990,397). 
Hailey et al. (1991) report a study of the goal orientation of production and 
quality control managers. They sent a copy of England's (1967) Personal 
Values Questionnaire to 237 production and quality control managers3 and 
asked them what they thought the goals of their businesses were. Based on a 
32 per cent response rate Hailey et al. report a significant difference between the 
goal orientations of the managers surveyed: 
"Production managers perceive' profit maximisation and high productivity as most 
important (e.g. pushing the product through the organisation). Quality control 
managers perceive organisational efficiency and high productivity as most important 
3 All the managers surveyed were members of either the American Society for Quality Control or 
the American Production and Inventory Control Society. 
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(e.g. producing products of sufficient quality)" (Hailey et al., 1991,47). 
When discussing these findings Hailey et al. suggest that these differences may 
be a result of the managers adopting a functional perspective consistent with 
their responsibilities. In terms of the work reported in this thesis, then, Hailey 
et al' s study serves as a reminder that the level of goal congruence observed in a 
firm might be affected by the organisation's structure. 
In t.his section various s.tudies of gO~l congruence documented in both the I 
busIness and manufactunng strategy hterature have been reviewed. It can be I. 
seen that most of the work on goal congruence carried out to date has focused I 
on the top management team. Indeed the author has been unable to find any 
studies which explore whether the concept of goal congruence can be used to 
identify some of the reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. The closest is perhaps the work on surfacing 
managerial assumptions (Bowman and Johnson, 1992; Checkland, 1981; 
Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Eden, 1992; Eden et al., 1979; Eden and 
Radford, 1990; Mason and Mitroff, 1981; Slack, 1991, 1993). Bowman and 
Johnson (1992), for example, have developed a questionnaire, based on 
, 
Porter's generic strategies, which is designed to explore managerial 
preconceptions about business strategy. Similarly the methodologies developed 
for soft systems analysis (Checkland, 1981), strategic options development and 
analysis (Eden et al., 1979) and strategic assumptions surface and testing 
(Mason and Mitroff, 1981) can be used to help surface managerial assumptions, 
especially if the strategy formulation is viewed as a social process (Eden, 
1992). In the more specialised manufacturing and operations arena Slack 
(1991, 1993) argues that the importance-performance matrix can be used to 
highlight, among other things, a lack of goal congruence in the early stages of 
strategy development. 
Most of these techniques, however, are designed to be used with the top 
management team during the business strategy formulation process and are 
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rarely discussed in the manufacturing strategy literature. As a consequence they 
do not appear to have been applied to the manufacturing strategy implementation 
process and this is unfortunate because as Bailey and Johnson (1992) point out: 
"The influence of top level decision-makers decreases as a strategy enters the 
implementation stage, while the influence of lower level managers increases" (Bailey 
and Johnson, 1992, 156). 
2.4.2: System congruence: 
Research on system congruence appears to be more sparse than that on goal 
congruence and most that has been undertaken tends to focus on a single 
system, e.g. performance measurement or reward, rather than adopting an 
holistic perspective (Neely, 1993b). 
Greer and Hawkins (1976) studied sales force compensation and argued that 
unit based commission plans can lead to salesmen maximising their own income 
at the expense of the firm. Shapiro (1977) discussed the conflict between 
marketing and manufacturing and suggested that it is partly a result of the 
evaluation and reward systems used by many fmns. 
"One prime reason for the marketing/manufacturing conflict is that the two functions 
are evaluated on the basis of different criteria and receive rewards for different 
activities. On the one hand, the marketing people are judged on the basis of 
profitable growth of the company in terms of sales, market share, and new markets 
entered. Unfortunately, the marketers are sometimes more sales-oriented than profit-
oriented. On the other hand, the manufacturing people are often evaluated on running 
a smooth operation at minimum cost. Similarly unfortunately, they are sometimes 
more cost-oriented than profit-oriented. 
The system of evaluation and reward means that the marketers are encouraged to 
generate change, which is one hallmark of the competitive marketplace. To be 
rewarded, they must generate new products, enter new markets, and develop new 
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programmes. But the manufacturing people are clearly rewarded for accepting change 
only when it significantly lowers their costs. 
Because the marketers and manufacturers both want to be evaluated positively and 
rewarded well, each function responds as the system asks it to in order to protect its 
self-interest" (Shapiro, 1977, 108). 
This thesis, however, is more concerned with dysfunctionality in the 
manufacturing function induced through the traditional elements of the strategic 
control system, namely the goal setting, performance measurement, feedback 
and reward systems. Fry and Cox (1989) argue that the main problem is local 
performance measurement. They cite the case of a company where the plant 
manager was primarily concerned with return on investment, the product group 
managers were evaluated according to the number of orders that were shipped 
on time, and the supervisors and operatives were measured according to 
standard hours produced. Fry and Cox point out that these measures encourage g 
the supervisors and operatives to save set-up time by producing batches larger f 
1 
than those scheduled. Hence some orders were delayed and the product group ~ 
1 
t managers had to sanction overtime to ensure good due-date performance, 
which, in tum, had a negative impact on the plant's managers performance 
measure - return on investment. 
In one of the more academic studies of performance measurement Richardson 
and Gordon (1980) hypothesised that: 
-As products move through their life cycle the appropriate performance 
measures will change. 
-Performance measures will be easier to develop for products late in their 
life cycle as these tend to compete on cost rather than innovativeness. 
_ Dysfunctional consequences will result if measures are not appropriate. 
-In multi-product facilities "traditional" measures will inhibit innovation. 
-Manufacturing managers will respond to their perceived measures of 
performance. 
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Having collected data during interviews with the chief executive and 
manufacturing managers of 15 Canadian electronics companies they observed 
that 
-The performance measures used did not change as products moved through 
their life cycle. 
-The measures did not become better defined later in the product's life cycle, 
primarily because the performance measures used tended to focus on the 
plant as a whole, rather than individual products. 
-Inappropriate measures did introduce dsyfunctionality. 
-Traditional measures did inhibit innovation. 
-Managers did respond to their perceived measures of performance. 
Richardson and Gordon's study is typical of most of the work on system 
congruence that has been reported in the manufacturing management literature in 
that it focuses solely on the performance measurement system. Woodcock 
(1991), adopted a similar perspective when he examined whether manufacturing 
managers received the strategic data they needed to determine if their function 
was in "control", as did Wisner and Fawcett (1991) when they argued that 
strategy could be linked to operating performance through performance 
measurement. 
In general, the theme that pervades the literature is that pure financial measures < 
~~~:..;t~~ 
of performance are inappropriate for manufacturing (Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Maskell, 1991). Kaplan and Norton (1992) use the analogy of an 
aeroplane cockpit, arguing that executives need to be able to assimilate a lot of 
information at a glance if they are to manage their business effectively. And 
following their research with twelve leading U.S. companies, they suggest that 
a truly "balanced scorecard" would include information on: 
-how customers see the fmn (the customer perspective); 
-what the fmn must excel at (the internal perspective); 
-how the firm can continue to improve and create value (the innovation and 
learning perspective); 
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-how the shareholders see the finn (the financial perspective). 
In this section various studies of system congruence have been reviewed and it 
is apparent that research on the topic is relatively rare. At a broader level this 
chapter has shown that the production/operations management community has, 
on the whole, failed to explore whether the notions of goal and system 
congruence introduced by organisational culturists, organisational behaviourists 
and business strategists, can be operationalised and used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm might be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. 
Indeed the author has only been able to identify one study - that reported by 
Dixon, Nanni and Vollmann (1990) - in which this has even been partially 
attempted. They have developed and tested a Performance Measurement 
Questionnaire (PMQ) which they say can be used by managers to assess the 
status of their measurement systems. The PMQ consists of three stages. In the 
first, general data on both the company and respondent is collected. In the 
second the respondent is asked to identify those areas of improvement that are 
of long term importance to the finn and to say whether the current performance 
measurement system inhibits or supports such activity. While in the third the 
respondent is asked to compare and contrast what is currently most important 
for the firm with the measurement system emphasises. 
Once the data has been collected Dixon, Nanni and Vollmann suggest that four 
types of analysis should be carried out. The first is alignment analysis in which 
the extent of match between the firm's strategies, actions and measures is 
assessed. The second is congruence analysis which provides more detail on the 
extent to which the strategies, actions and measures are mutually supportive. 
The third is consensus analysis, where the data is analysed according to 
m~agement position or function. And the fourth is confusion analysis where 
the range of responses, and hence the level of disagreement, is examined. 
The PMQ, then, can be used to assess the level of both goal and system 
(performance measurement) congruence in an organisation. Dixon, Nanni and 
49 
Vollmann's view of strategy, however, is somewhat unconventional in that they 
list about thirty performance areas, including inventory turnover, cost of 
quality, vendor quality, etc. but make no formal attempt to link these to a fmn's 
manufacturing strategy. Furthermore, they focus exclusively on the 
performance measurement system and do not consider the way in which goals 
are set, feedback is provided, or performance rewarded. 
In summary, then, while there is widespread recognition within the 
manufacturing strategy literature that high levels of goal and system congruence 
may lead to consistency of decision making and action, and hence realisation of 
strategies, the author has been unable to identify any systematic studies which 
have explored the validity and potential of these academic constructs. The 
purpose of the work reported in this thesis is to fill this gap in the academic 
body of knowledge through: 
-The development of a process for auditing the levels of goal and system 
congruence. 
-The testing of this process to discover whether it can be used to identify 
some of the reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its manufacturing 
strategy. 
In the next chapter the research will be explored more fully as the author's 
methodology is documented. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
3.0: Introduction 
Already in this thesis a number of themes have been raised. Briefly these can 
be summarised as follows: 
(a) Manufacturing strategy is now widely accepted as being important 
(Chase, 1980; Miller et al., 1981; Swamidass, 1989). 
(b) The Production and Operations Management (P/OM) community has 
broadly been able to agree on the appropriate content for a 
manufacturing strategy, but has failed to reach any consensus on the 
process~s that should be used to develop and implement one 
(Anderson and Schroeder, 1991; Leong et al., 1990). 
(c) A strategy can only be implemented, or realised, through consistency 
of decision making and action (Faulkner and Johnson, 1992; Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Mintzberg, 
1978; Porter, 1980, 1985; Prahalad and Hamel, 1989; Skinner, 
1974b). 
(d) Consistency of decision making and action can be induced through 
values that are widely shared (Child, 1985; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; 
Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981). 
(e) Consistency of decision making and action can also be induced 
through the use of appropriate goal setting, performance 
measurement, feedback and reward systems (Bevan and Thomson, 
1992; Bungay and Goold, 1991; Child, 1985; Erban, 1989; Fowler, 
1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Lorange, 
1982; Lorange et al., 1986; Simons, 1991). 
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(f) Although the validity of the two previous concepts has been implicitly 
recognised by many manufacturing strategists, the author has been 
unable to fmd any studies which have explored whether the notions of 
goal and system congruence can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its manufacturing 
strategy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to integrate these themes thereby providing a 
coherent justification for the work reported in this thesis. Following this the 
author's research methodology will be explained. The remainder of the chapter 
has been divided into four sections. In the first the conceptual framework 
which underpins the research is presented. In the second the gap in the 
academic body of knowledge that the author sought to fill through this study is 
identified. In the third the research methodology is described. In the fourth a 
brief summary of the chapter is provided. 
3.1: Conceptual framework 
As stated in chapter 1 the key assumptions underlying this research are that 
consistency of decision making and action, and hence realisation of strategies, 
might best be achieved if: 
(a) There is widespread empathy within the firm with the 
organisation's strategic goals (goal congruence). 
(b) The organisation's signalling systems - especially those 
concerned with goal setting, performance measurement, 
feedback and reward - induce decision making and action 
which is consistent with the organisation's strategic goals 
(system congruence). 
For the manufacturing function, the organisation's strategic goals are defmed by 
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the first4 of Skinner's (1969) two dimensions of manufacturing strategy - the 
manufacturing task. This addresses the following question; what must the 
manufacturing function do if it is to support the business strategy? 
As discussed in chapter 2 it is now widely accepted that the manufacturing task 
can be defined in terms of quality, delivery speed, delivery reliability, price 
(cost), and flexibility (Leong et al., 1990). Manufacturing and business 
strategists argue that a fmn will only be able to realise its manufacturing strategy 
if the decisions and actions taken within the manufacturing function are 
consistent, or congruent, with the manufacturing task (Hayes, Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1988; Mintzberg, 1978; Skinner, 1974b). Organisational culturists and 
organisational behaviourists suggest that such consistency should result if the 
appropriate values are widely shared (Child, 1985; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; 
Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981). Hence for the purpose of this thesis a 
high level of goal congruence is said to exist if: 
-The manufacturing task, defined in terms of quality, delivery 
speed, delivery reliability, price (cost) and flexibility, is 
widely understood by those employees who affect whether the 
task is achieved. 
This is represented in figure 3.1 by the arrow linking the top and middle boxes. 
A parallel perspective can be identified in the business strategy and 
organisational behaviour literature. There it is argued that consistency of 
decision making and action can be induced through the use of strategic controls, 
management controls or performance management systems. These are usually 
said to consist of goal setting, performance measurement, feedback and reward 
systems (Bevan and Thomson~ 1992; Bungay and Goold, 1991; Child, 1985; 
Erban, 1989; Fowler, 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 
4 Skinner's second dimension of manufacturing strategy - the policy decisions - which 
describe how manufacturing should seek to achieve the manufacturing task are assumed to be a 
separate issue at this stage. As will be seen in chapter seven, however, this tidy academic 
model does not necessarily reflect reality. 
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1984; Lorange, 1982; Lorange et aI., 1986; Simons, 1991). Hence for the 
purpose of this thesis a high level of system congruence is said to exist if: 
-The firm's goal setting, performance measurement, feedback 
and reward systems are used to induce decision making and 
action consistent with the manufacturing task. 
This is represented in figure 3.1 by the arrow linking the bottom and middle 
boxes. 
Figure 3.1: The conceptual framework underpinning the research 
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The conceptual framework shown in figure 3.1, then, highlights the fact that the 
business strategy, organisational behaviour and organisational culture literatures 
recognise two primary means of inducing consistency of decision making and 
action within organisations. The purpose of this research is not simply to test 
whether this framework applies to the manufacturing environment, but also to 
determine if the concepts it refers to, namely goal and system congruence, form 
the basis of a congruence audit which can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a fmn may be unable to realise its manufacturiJlg strategy. 
3.2: Gap and propositions 
Leong et ale (1990) have suggested that one of the main reasons that the field of 
manufacturing strategy has been developing only slowly is that manufacturing 
strategists have failed to import ideas from other academic disciplines. As the 
literature review has shown there is widespread agreement as to the appropriate 
content for a manufacturing strategy, but little understanding of the processes 
that should be used to develop and implement one. Writers on business 
strategy, organisational behaviour and organisational culture appear to have 
something to offer in this regard. It is widely accepted that strategies are 
realised through consistency of decision making and action (Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; Mintzberg, 1978; Skinner, 1974b), and that 
such consistency can be the result of widely shared values (Child, 1985; Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; Pascale and Athos, 1981), or induced 
through the use of strategic controls, management controls or performance 
management systems (Bevan and Thomson, 1992; Bungay and Goold, 1991; 
Child, 1985; Erban, 1989; Fowler, 1990; Goold and Quinn, 1990; Hrebiniak 
and Joyce, 1984; Lorange, 1982). Manufacturing strategists implicitly accept 
these notions (goal and system congruence), but have made no attempt to 
determine whether they can be exploited in an industrial setting. Indeed all 
those studies of either goal or System congruence that the author has been able 
to identify are somewhat narrow in their scope. Even the broadest of them - the 
work of Dixon, Nanni and Vollmann (1990) - fails to explore the concepts in a 
truly strategic and holistic sense because it adopts an unconventional view of 
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strategy and focuses primarily on performance measurement. There appears, 
then, to be a gap in the body of academic knowledge with regard to how the 
concepts of goal and system congruence can be; (a) operationalised and (b) 
exploited. The research reported in this thesis sought to fill this gap by 
showing how an audit based on these concepts could be used to identify some 
of the reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. 
Of course to do this it was first necessary to develop the congruence audit. 
Hence the research propositions can be stated as follows: 
(a) That a process which can be used to identify areas of 
either goal or system incongruence (a congruence audit) 
can be developed. 
(b) That such a process can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. 
3.3: Research methodology 
The research propositions are based on concepts drawn from the manufacturing 
strategy, business strategy, organisational culture and organisational behaviour 
literature discussed in chapter 2. The purpose of this section is to explain how 
the author sought to test them. Figure 3.2 shows the five step model of the 
P/OM research process proposed by Flynn et al. (1990). This will be used to 
explain the author's research methodology. The sixth step, publication, has 
been omitted from figure 3.2. A number of papers relating to the work reported 
in this thesis, however, have been published (Neely, 1991, 1993a; Neely, 
Aggarwal and Wilson, 1992; Neely and Wilson, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 
1992d, 1992e; Wilson, Neely and Aggarwal, 1993; Wilson, Neely and Chew, 
1993). 
3.3.1: Theoretical foundation 
The main themes identified during the literature review were restated at the 
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Figure 3.2: A systematic approach for empirical research (Flynn et al., 1990) 
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beginning of this chapter. These form the theoretical basis of the research 
reported in this thesis. Flynn et al. (1990) suggest that research can involve 
either building theories or verifying them. 
"Theory verification is the most widely understood approach. It is based on the 
scientific method, in which many operations management researchers are grounded. 
Hypotheses are generated in advance of the study, and they are tested by the data 
collected ... 
A theory-building study is based upon a different origin and uses data in a different 
way... Generally speaking, the origin for a theory-building study is not a 
hypothesis, but rather, some assumptions, frameworks, a perceived problem or 
perhaps a very tentative hypothesis" (Flynn et ai, 1990, 253). 
This research focuses on theory building. That is, it takes an implicit model 
from the literature and tests whether it can be; (a) operationalised and (b) 
exploited. 
3.3.2: Research design 
A variety of research designs can be used for empirical P/OM research. These 
include single or multiple case studies, field experiments, panel studies, focus 
groups, and surveys. For the type of research reported in this thesis, however, 
single or multiple case studies are the most appropriate because the 
development, testing and application of the congruence audit requires the close, 
personal involvement of the researcher (Flynn et aI., 1990). During the course 
of this investigation the author worked directly with four companies and 
consulted managers from a further fourteen. In total over one hundred different 
managers were involved. 
The four core collaborators were all small to medium sized manufacturing 
enterprises5 (SMEs) based in the East Midlands. Company A produces coin 
5 In this thesis the term SME is used to refer to a manufacturing flfffi employing fewer than 
five hundred people. 
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operated amusement games for the leisure industry and has 400 full-time 
employees. It operates in what could be called a fashion market and because of 
this demand for company A's products can vary from 200 to 600 units on a 
weekly basis. 
Company B designs and manufacturers special purpose machine tools for the 
automotive industry. It employs 85 craftsmen and 25 engineers. Recently the 
fIrm has diversifIed and the managing director is now exploring the possibility 
of focusing on the design and manufacture of high technology equipment for 
laser cutting and electro-discharge machining (EDM). 
Company C designs, manufactures and installs timber and plastic laminate 
products for the shopfItting and construction industries. It employs 120 people 
and underwent rapid growth during the late 1980s. In fact between 1985 and 
1990 its turnover increased fIve fold. Company C, however, still has a 
"family" feel to it and appears to be struggling to consolidate its position in the 
market place. 
Company D manufactures electronic control equipment for its US parent. It 
employs 450 people and could be described as world class. The management 
team are currently actively exploring/implementing: 
-Single minute exchange of die (SMED) technology; 
-Product based manufacturing; 
-Just-In-Time manufacturing; 
-Total Quality Management; 
-Personnel loss prevention. 
Of the remaining fourteen companies three were SMEs, one was a Japanese 
transplant based in the UK, and the others were companies that the author 
visited during a three week study tour in Japan. As will be seen later the 
development and testing of the congruence audit took place primarily in 
companies A, B, C and D. The author's contact with the remaining fourteen 
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firms was limited to the exploration of the concepts contained in this thesis 
through panel discussions and semi-structured interviews. 
3.3.3: Data collection methods 
Jick (1979) suggests using multiple data collection methods to enhance the 
validity of research. Flynn et al. (1990) identify historical archive analysis; 
participant observation; outside observation; interviews and questionnaires as 
possible methods. This research involved data collection at two levels. First it 
focused on the development and testing of the congruence audit. Hence data 
which showed how the audit could be improved had to be gathered. These data 
were collected via the author's participant observation. Second each application 
of the congruence audit involved data collection. These data were gathered 
during structured interviews and group discussions. Historical archive analysis 
was also used when appropriate. 
3.3.4: Implementation 
Partly because of the four core collaborator's interests and partly through a 
conscious research design, different pairs of firms were involved in each phase 
of the research. This resulted in the congruence audit being developed 
iteratively both within and across the firms. The term "iteratively" is used 
intentionally in this context. The research began with the author developing a 
pilot version of the goal congruence audit. This was tested formally, in 
companies A and B, and informally during discussions with a number of 
managers from firms in the wider sample. Then, once improvements to the 
congruence audit had been identified, the author set out to explore whether it 
was possible to develop a system congruence audit. Initially this involved 
shadowing managers in company A to establish which systems influenced 
them. Next a series of semi-structured interviews were held with managers 
from firms in both the UK and Japan to determine whether the same systems 
influenced them. Then a pilot version of the system congruence audit was 
developed. This was tested in company C. Finally an integrated congruence 
audit, based on the experience that the author had gained during the 
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development and testing of the pilot versions of the goal and system congruence 
audits. was developed. This "integrated" congruence audit, involving both 
group discussions and structured interviews, was applied to companies C and 
D. The fact that the firms involved in the study vary both in size and location, 
and that they trade in different industrial sectors implies that the congruence 
audit is valid for a variety of companies6. 
As figure 3.3 shows, then, the development and testing of the congruence audit 
involved three main phases. Broadly these can be summarised as follows: 
-Phase 1: The development and testing of the goal congruence audit. 
-Phase 2: The development and testing of the system congruence audit. 
-Phase 3: The integration of the two previous audits and the application of 
the resultant congruence audit. 
Companies A and B were involved in phase one. This consisted of: 
(a) The development of a pilot version of the goal congruence audit. 
(b) Eighteen structured interviews, thirteen in company A and five in 
company B, during which the raw data required by the pilot version of 
the goal congruence audit were collected. 
(c) Analysis of these data. 
(d) Feedback to the companies concerned. 
(e) Identification of ways in which the pilot goal congruence audit could 
be improved. 
Companies A and C were involved in phase two. This consisted of: 
(a) Shadowing five managers in company A to establish which systems 
influenced them. 
(b) Semi-structured interviews with managers from fourteen other 
com panies to determine whether they were influenced by the same 
6 Once the goal congruence audit had been developed an MSc student, working directly with 
the author, applied the same methodology to two Swedish flfIDS (Aldrin, 1991). This lends 
credence to the argument that the methodology is both widely applicable and easily 
transferable. 
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systems. 
(c) The development of a pilot version of the system congruence audit 
(d) Two structured interviews in company C to test whether the data 
collection methods employed in the pilot version of the system 
congruence audit were appropriate. 
(e) Identification of ways in which the pilot system congruence audit 
could be improved. 
Figure 3.3: Iterative development of the congruence audit 
Company A B C D 
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Companies C and D were involved in phase three. This consisted of: 
(a) The integration of the pilot versions of the goal and system 
congruence audits. This resulted in the congruence audit 
(b) The application of the congruence audit to company C. This involved 
a group discussion with five senior managers, followed by fifteen 
structured interviews. 
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(c) The application of the congruence audit to company D. This involved 
a group discussion with eight senior managers, followed by twelve 
structured interviews. 
(c) Analysis of these data. 
(d) Feedback to the companies concerned. 
3.3.5: Data analysis 
As mentioned in section 3.3.3 data were collected at two levels during this 
research. First the author gathered data on the utility, reliability and validity of 
the audits via his participant observation. Due to their inherent subjectivity 
these data cannot be formally analysed, but they are discussed in chapters 4 and 
5 as they form part of the author's experience and hence will have shaped the 
design of the congruence audit 
Second data were collected during the group discussions and structured 
interviews which formed part of the congruence audits. Through a conscious 
research design the majority of these data were quantifiable. This meant that the 
author was able to immediately analyse and feed the data back to the research 
participants using a laptop computer. The interviewee, or the management 
group, was then given the chance to comment on the analysed data, hence 
minimising the risk of interviewer bias. At the end of each study the author also 
presented the aggregate results of the study to either a group of the firm's 
managers or the interviewees. Once again everyone was given the chance to 
comment on the analysis. Thus care was taken to maximise the reliability and 
validity of the data collected during the audit process. 
3.4: Summary 
In this chapter the main themes from the literature review have been summarised 
and the theoretical model which underlies the research explained. Following 
this two research propositions were stated: 
(a) That a process which can be used to identify areas of 
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either goal or system incongruence (a congruence audit) 
can be developed. 
(b) That such a process can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. 
The research methodology has also been detailed. The main data collection 
methods were structured interviews, group discussions and participant 
observation, although these were supplemented by historical archive analysis 
when appropriate. Three phases to the research were identified. Phases one 
and two involved the development and testing of processes for identifying areas 
of either goal or system incongruence. Phase three involved the integration of 
these processes and the application of the resultant congruence audit in two 
firms. Each of these phases and the research methodologies involved in them 
will be discussed more fully in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE GOAL CONGRUENCE AUDIT? 
"If we define organisation as collective action in the pursuit of 
common mission (a fancy way of saying that a group of people 
under a common label- whether an IBM or a United Nations or a 
Luigi's Body Shop - somehow fmd the means to cooperate in the 
production of specific goods and services), then strategy as 
perspective focuses our attention on the reflections and actions of 
the collectivity - how intentions diffuse through a group of people 
to become shared as norms and values, and how patterns of 
behaviour become deeply ingrained in the group. Ultimately, it is 
this view of strategy that offers us the best hope of coming to 
grips with the most fascinating issue of all, that of the 
organisational mind" (Mintzberg, 1987,21). 
4.0: Introduction 
So far this thesis has concentrated on the theoretical dimension of the research -
the literature review and conceptual framework. In the next two chapters, 
however, the emphasis will change as the pilot processes used to identify areas 
of goal and system incongruence are described. This ch apter will focus on the 
development and testing of the first of these processes - the goal congruence 
audit. 
In chapter 3 it was stated that a high level of goal congruence could be said to 
exist in a firm if: 
-The manufacturing task, defined in terms of quality, delivery 
speed, delivery reliability, price (cost) and flexibility, is 
widely understood by those employees who affect whether the 
task is achieved. 
7 Much of the work presented in this chapter is based on a report written by the author for the 
U.K. Department of Trade and Industry entitled: Goal Congruence - A Conceptual Overview 
and a Measurement Methodology (Neely and Wilson, 1992d). 
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Hence auditing the level of goal congruence in a finn involves detennining how 
widely the manufacturing task is understood. There are two dimensions to this 
problem. The first comprises collecting data which show how different 
individuals perceive the manufacturing task. The second involves comparing 
and contrasting their perceptions. 
The rest of this chapter has been divided into seven sections. The first four 
describe the development of the goal congruence audit, the remainder focus on 
its testing. In section 4.1 the problems associated with the identification of 
areas of goal incongruence will be discussed. In section 4.2 the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (Saaty, 1980), which was one of the main data collection 
techniques used in this research, will be explained. In section 4.3 the full data 
collection methodology will be detailed and in section 4.4 the various ways in 
which the data can be compared will be explored. 
Once the goal congruence audit had been developed it was piloted in two fmns. 
The results of the pilot studies will be presented in section 4.5. Flynn et al. 
(1990, 265-266) say that considerations of reliability and validity should 
underlie every step of the research process. "Reliability ... measures the ability 
to replicate the study ... Validity measures two things. First, does the item or 
scale truly measure what it is supposed to measure? Second, does it measure 
nothing else?" In section 4.6 the reliability and validity of the pilot version of 
the goal congruence audit will be discussed. The purpose of this discussion is 
to identify ways in which the goal congruence audit can be improved8. An 
additional question, that of the utility or usefulness of the audit, will also be 
addressed. The chapter will be summarised in section 4.7. 
4.1: Methodological issues 
According to the marketing perspective, organisations achieve their goals by 
satisfying their customers with greater effectiveness and efficiency than their 
competitors (Kotler, 1984). The terms effectiveness and efficiency are used 
8 As will be seen in chapter 6 these improvements were incorporated into the integrated goal 
congruence audit during the course of this research. 
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precisely in this context. Effectiveness refers to the extent to which customer 
requirements are met, while efficiency is a measure of how economically the 
firm's resources are utilised when providing a given level of customer 
satisfaction (Barnard, 1962). If one accepts Barnard's definitions and Kotler's 
assertion, then the manufacturing function can be said to contribute to the 
attainment of the organisation's goals by efficiently providing products and 
services which meet, or exceed, the customer's requirements. This is an 
important point because it explicitly identifies the two dimensions of the 
manufacturing task. The first is the external one - what does manufacturing 
have to do to ensure that the firm's customers are satisfied? The second is the 
internal one - how efficiently can manufacturing do this? 
As discussed in chapter 2, it is widely accepted in the manufacturing strategy 
literature that the manufacturing task can be defined using the generic terms 
quality, delivery speed, delivery reliability, price (cost) and flexibility (Leong et 
al., 1990). However defining the manufacturing task in this way introduces 
two problems. First, it means that manufacturing strategists tend to focus on 
the external dimension of the manufacturing task (Hill, 1985; Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1988; Platts and Gregory, 1990). Hence they often 
fail to acknowledge explicitly internally important issues such as minimising 
manufacturing lead times or costs. Second, despite Leong et aI's (1990) 
assertion, confusion still exists over what the generic terms quality, delivery 
speed, delivery reliability, price (cost), and flexibility actually mean. 
Wheelwright (1984), for example, uses flexibility in the context of varying 
production volumes, while Tunalv (1992) uses it to refer to a firm's ability to 
rapidly introduce new products. And, as shown in figure 4.1, other authors 
such as Garvin (1987), Gerwin (1987), Schonberger (1990), Slack (1987) and 
Stalk (1988) have all pointed out that the generic terms quality, time9 and 
flexibility encompass different dimensions. 
Any methodology for auditing the level of goal congruence in a firm must take 
9 Delivery speed and delivery reliability both fall under the category of time. They are shown 
as factors T3 and T4 respectively in figure 4.1. 
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account of these two problems because if it does not there is a danger that goal 
. 
Incongruence may be masked by people using the same generic terms to talk 
about different concepts or vice versa. Hence it was decided that the pilot 
version of the goal congruence audit would take, as one of its units of analysis, 
the factors shown in figure 4.1 rather than the generic terms quality, delivery 
speed, delivery reliability, price (cost) and flexibility. 
Figure 4.1: The multiple dimensions of quality, time, cost and flexibility 
QUALITY 
Q1: Perfonnance 
Q2: Features 
Q3: Reliability 
Q4: ConfOImance 
Q5: Technical durability 
Q6: Serviceability 
Q7: Aesthetics 
Q8: Perceived quality 
Q9: Humanity 
QO: Value 
TIME 
T1: Manufacturing lead time 
T2: Rate of product introduction 
T3: Delivery lead time 
T4: Due-date performance 
T5: Frequency of delivery 
COST 
C1: Manufacturing cost 
C2: Value added 
C3: Selling price 
C4: Running cost 
C5: Service cost 
FLEXIBILITY 
F1: Material quality 
F2: Output quality 
F3: New product 
F4: Modify product 
F5: Deliverability 
F6: Volume 
F7: Mix 
F8: Resource mix 
Figure 4.2 shows the sort of data that has to be collected in order to audit the 
level of goal congruence in a firm. The box to the right of the one which refers 
to the foremen is split into two columns, A and B. Each column represents a 
different person. In this example, foreman A believes that factor Q 1, product 
performance qualitylO, is the most important element of the manufacturing task; 
that factor Tl, manufacturing lead time, is the second most important; and that 
factor C 1, manufacturing cost, is the third. That is, foreman A thinks that the 
manufacturing function can best contribute to the overall success of the business 
if it quickly and cheaply manufactures products which perform well in the field. 
Foreman B, on the other hand, believes that the manufacturing function can best 
contribute by continually producing new (factor T2) and aesthetically pleasing 
10 The key to these abbreviations is provided by figure 4.1. 
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(factor Q7) products at low cost (factor C 1). 
At the next lower level in the organisation only those employees who work for 
foreman A, operatives Al through to A3, are shown. In this example, 
operative Al believes that factor Ql, producing products of high perfonnance 
quality, is the most important part of the manufacturing task, whilst operatives 
A2 and A3 believe that the manufacturing function can best contribute to the 
success of the business by minimising manufacturing costs, factor C 1. Hence 
it can be said that a higher level of goal congruence exists between foreman A 
and operative AI, than between foreman A and operatives A2 and A3 with 
respect to factor Q 1, product perfonnance qUality. Of course such differences 
of opinion may not be divisive. Indeed it can be argued that they may stimul ate 
debate and hence innovation, or that they are a function of an individual's role 
(Hailey et al., 1991; Pascale, 1990). And so it is important to recall at this stage 
that the purpose of this research is not to provide a tool for surfacing and then 
eliminating the causes of goal incongruence, but to establish whether the 
concept can be operationalised and used to identify some of the reasons why a 
finn may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. 
As figure 4.2 shows auditing the level of goal congruence in a finn involves 
more than merely stating what the manufacturing task constitutes, as one also 
has to prioritise its elements (New, 1992b; Wheelwright, 1978). Hence one of 
the main methodological question that needs to be addressed is; how can data 
which show how an individual prioritises the various elements of the 
manufacturing task be collected. The data shown in figure 4.2 have simply 
been placed in rank order of importance. The problem with ranked data, 
however, is that they provide no indication of the gap between two factors 
(Anastasi, 1988; Meddis, 1984). Take the previous example. Foreman A may 
have believed that factor Ql was by far the most important, whereas operative 
Al may have thought that it was only marginally more important than factors F2 
and C 1. Hence, although the ranked data suggest that there is a high level of 
goal congruence between foreman A and operative Al with regard to factor Ql, 
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a considerable difference of opinion may exist 
Figure 4.2: Auditing the level of goal congruence in a finn 
COMPANY OBJECTIVES 
-To make money 
MANUF ACTIJRING' S CONfRIBUTION 
-To offer high quality products? 
-To always deliver on time? 
-To sell at low price? 
-To meet any customer's order? 
How do the heads of department 
defme the manufacturing 
function's contribution? 
How do the foremen defme 
the manufacturing function's 
contribution? 
How do the operatives define 
the manufacturing function's 
contribution? 
/ 
Al 
QI 
F2 
CI 
A B 
QI Q7 
TI CI 
CI T2 
~ 
A2 A3 
CI CI 
TI T5 
Q4 
An alternative approach would be to ask different individuals to rate each of the 
factors, perhaps using a scale of one through to nine, or unimportant through to 
very important. This approach, however, can be criticised for being too 
subjective as there is a danger that different people will attribute varying 
intensities to the scale itself (Anastasi, 1988; Nunnally, 1980). Continuing with 
the previous example. Foreman A may believe that factor Q1 is by far and 
away the most important, but may only rate it as fairly important on the scale 
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because he never rates anything to do with his job as important Operative AI, 
on the other hand, may frequently rate things as important because the term 
does not provoke the same feeling of intensity for him. There is a danger that 
this could bias the data collection process. 
In his 1978 study, Wheelwright used a different data collection methodology 
when he asked the vice-presidents (VP) and manufacturing managers (MM) of a 
firm to split one hundred points between the generic dimensions of cost, 
quality, dependability and flexibility to reflect their importance (see table 4.1). 
This overcomes the problems raised above, but introduces a new one as many 
people find it difficult to split points between such closely inter-related 
dimensions (Anastasi, 1988; Nunnally, 1980). For all the above reasons, 
pairwise comparisons, based on Saaty's (1980) Analytic Hierarchy Process, 
were used in the pilot studies. The next section contains more detail on the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process. The full data collection methodology used in the 
pilot studies is described in the following one. 
Table 4.1: Wheelwright's (1978) method for determining goal congruence 
Cost QUality Dependability Flexibility 
VP MM VP MM VP MM VP MM 
Product 1 
As is 42 44 17 15 25 26 16 15 
Should be 28 46 24 16 31 26 17 12 
Product 2 
As is 26 20 37 43 24 22 13 15 
Should be 26 30 36 38 26 20 12 12 
4.2: Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process CARP) was designed as a decision making aid 
and is especially suitable for complex decisions which involve the comparison 
of decision elements which are difficult to quantify (Saaty, 1980). It is based 
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on the assumption that when faced with a complex decision the natural human 
reaction is to cluster the decision elements according to their common 
characteristics. If one were to have been offered three identical jobs in London, 
Nottingham, and Birmingham, for example, the choice as to which job to accept 
might rest, among other things, on location. At the next lower level in the 
decision hierarchy, two factors grouped under the generic heading location 
might be; quality of life and cost of living. And at the next lower level, quality 
of life might be split into; number of theatres, number of cinemas, number of 
restaurants and standard of restaurants, while the category cost of living might 
include factors such as; cost of transport, cost of food and cost of housing. 
Figure 4.3: Partial decision hierarchy for job selection based on location 
Which location? 
I 
Quality of Life Cost of living 
I 
I I I I I I I 
Number of Number of Number of QUality of Cost of Cost of Cost of 
cinemas theatres restaurants restaurants transport food housing 
London Nottingham Birmingham 
In reality, the decision maker must identify and categorise all of the decision 
elements which are likely to affect the outcome of the decision before beginning 
the pairwise comparison process. For the sake of simplicity figure 4.3 shows 
only a partial decision hierarchy and ignores some issues which may be 
important; e.g. education facilities, local services, distance from relatives and 
friends,etc. 
Once the full decision hierarchy has been produced, and the decision maker is 
74 
happy that it contains all the relevant decision elements, the pairwise 
comparison process can begin. The raw data are produced as the decision 
maker answers two questions. The first is of the form; "which, in your 
opinion, is the better place to live with regard to the number of cinemas -
London or Nottingham" . If the decision maker were to reply; "London", then, 
in this example, the second question would be of the form; "how much better is 
London than Nottingham". The decision maker would be expected to respond 
to this question by identifying the number on Saaty's scale which best matches 
the strength of his feeling (see table 4.2). Continuing with the previous 
example, then, if the decision maker thought that London was a much better 
place to live than Nottingham, he would respond to the second of the above 
questions by saying; "London is much better than Nottingham - a five on the 
scale" . The process is known as pairwise comparison because each pair of 
factors have to be compared. Once the decision maker has compared London 
and Nottingham, he would be asked to compare London and Birmingham and 
then Nottingham and Birmingham. The data generated during this process are 
recorded in a three by three matrix as shown in figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.4: Sample three by three matrix with raw data 
L N B 
London 1 5 8 
Nottingham 1/5 1 3 
Birmingham 1/8 1/3 1 
The matrix can be read as follows. In column one (C1), row one (Rl) London 
is compared with London and as there can be no preference, -one, meaning 
equally as good is entered. In column two, row one (C2R1) London is 
compared with Nottingham and judged to be much better. Hence a five is 
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entered in C2Rl. The reciprocal value is entered in CIR2 as this refers to the 
comparison of Nottingham with London. In C3R1 London is compared with 
Birmingham and this time judged to be very much better, so an eight is entered 
in the matrix. Once again the reciprocal value is entered in C1R3. Finally 
Nottingham is compared with Birmingham and as Nottingham is judged to be 
slightly better a three is entered in C3R2. 
Table 4.2: The pairwise comparison scale (Saaty, 1982) 
Importance Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance Two elements contribute 
equally to the property 
3 Weak importance of Experience and judgment slightly 
one over another favour one element over another 
5 Essential or strong Experience and judgment strongly 
importance favour one element 
over another 
7 Very strong or An element is strongly favoured 
demonstrated importance and its dominance is 
demonstrated in practice 
9 Absolute importance The evidence favouring one 
element over another is of the 
highest possible order 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between Compromise is needed 
adjacent scale values between two judgments 
Reciprocals If activity i has one of the 
above non-zero numbers 
assigned to it when 
compared with activity j, 
then j has the reciprocal 
value when compared with i 
To complete a three by three matrix, then, three pairwise comparisons have to 
be made. The third comparison actually provides redundant information, as the 
decision maker's preference can be calculated from the ratios given by the first 
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two. The Analytic Hierarchy Process uses this redundant information to check 
the consistency of the decision maker's answers. Imagine, for example, that 
the decision maker had said that London was slightly better than both 
Nottingham and Birmingham. When he is asked to compare Nottingham and 
Birmingham logically he would be expected to have no preference. If, 
however, he said that Nottingham was better than Birmingham then the 
interviewer could probe this inconsistency and hence enhance the validity of the 
raw data. 
More detail on the use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process is provided by Frazelle 
(1985); Gass (1985); Harker (1989) and Saaty (1980). For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, it is sufficient to know that once the raw data have been 
collected they can be converted into; (a) a set of preference weightings, and (b) 
a consistency ratio. The preference weightings indicate the relative preferences 
or priorities that the decision maker assigns to each of the decision elements. 
As their sum is equal to unity, or one hundred percent, the preference 
weightings provide a means of both ranking and rating data while overcoming 
the problems discussed in the previous section. The consistency ratio is simply 
a measure of the consistency of the decision maker's responses and can be used 
as an indicator of the validity of the preference weightings. Appendix II 
explains how the preference weightings and the consistency ratio are calculated 
from the raw data. In the next section the way in which the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process was used in the goal congruence audit will be explained as the 
structured data collection process used in the pilot studies is documented. 
4.3: Data collection process 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter auditing the level of goal 
congruence in an organisation involves; (a) collecting data which show how 
different individuals perceive the manufacturing task and (b) comparing and 
contrasting their perceptions. The previous two sections have discussed some 
of the associated methodological issues. This and the next one describe the 
actual data collection and comparison processes used. As figure 4.5 shows, 
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together these two processes constitute the pilot version of the goal congruence 
audit. 
Figure 4.5: Data collection and comparison in the pilot goal congruence audit 
Data collection 
Collect Collect Collect 
background background background 
infonnation info nn ation infonnation 
, , , , 
" 
Defming the Defming the Defming the 
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing 
task task task 
" " " 
Pairwise Pairwise Pairwise 
companson . comparison companson 
" " 
" 
Data comparison 
The principal data collection technique adopted in the pilot version of the goal 
congruence audit was the structured interview. This was chosen because of the 
need to gather comparable data from different individuals. As figure 4.5 shows 
each interview consisted of the three stages. These are detailed below. 
4.3.1: Stage 1 - background information 
Stage 1 - the collection of the background information - was designed to help 
the interviewee relax and furnish the interviewer with information that may 
prove relevant in the subsequent discussions. Accordingly open ended 
questions based on the check sheet shown in figure 4.6 were asked during this 
stage. 
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Figure 4.6: Check sheet used during stage one 
Name: 
Length of service: 
Brief history of career: 
Job title: 
Accountable to whom: 
Accountable for what: 
Main Duties: 
How is your performance measured: 
What are your objectives: 
How do your objectives relate 
to those of the fIrm: 
4.3.2: Stage 2 • discussion 
The second stage of each interview involved a discussion of what the generic 
terms quality, time, cost and flexibility meant to the interviewee. The purpose 
of this stage was to encourage the interviewee to think about the various 
dimensions of the manufacturing task and to check the comprehensiveness of 
the list of factors shown in fIgure 4.1. During this stage each interviewee was 
asked the following questions: 
-What factors relating to quality, time, cost and flexibility do you think are 
important to the long run success of this company? 
-What factors relating to quality, time, cost and flexibility do you think are 
_ important to this fIrm's customers? 
A series of probing questions were used to ensure that each of the generic 
dimensions were explored fully. First the interviewee was simply asked to talk 
about the generic category under examination. Second they were prompted 
with a comment along the lines of; "are there any other dimensions of quality 
which you think are important to the long run success of this flrtn". Finally the 
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interviewer provided a definition of each of the specific criteria shown in figure 
4.1 and asked the interviewee about it. Figure 4.7 shows a part of the check 
sheet used to collect data on quality generated during the second stage of the 
interview. Similar check sheets were used for the generic dimensions of time, 
cost and flexibility. 
Figure 4.7: Check sheet used during stage two 
Level of Identification 
Probe Probe Probe 
level! level 2 level 3 
Performance 
Internally Important 
Externally Important 
Features 
Internally Important 
Externally Important 
Reliability 
Internally Important 
Externally Important 
Conformance 
Internally Important 
Externally Important 
4.3.3: Stage 3 - pairwise comparisons 
The output from the second stage of the interview was a list of factors which the 
interviewee considered to be either internally (to the company) or externally (to 
the customer) important. In the third stage the interviewee was asked to select 
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and then define in their own terms the eight factors 11 which they thought were 
the most internally important and the eight factors which they thought were the 
most externally important. The definitions were requested for two reasons. 
First so that any goal incongruence due to confusion over the tenninology could 
be identified and second so that if the interviewee defined a factor which was 
missing from the list shown in figure 4.1 it could be added. Figure 4.8 shows 
the resultant single level decision hierarchy. It should be noted that during the 
course of each interview two such decision hierarchies were produced. The 
first corresponded to those things that the interviewee believed were internally 
important and the second identified those factors that they thought were 
externally important 
Figure 4.8: Single level hierarchy for pairwise comparison 
Q1 Q4 QJ 
Internally 
Important Factors 
T1 T4 C1 F2 F4 
Next Saaty's (1980) pairwise comparison process was used to determine how 
each interviewee prioritised the factors in the decision hierarchies. The 
interviewee was first asked which of two factors, factor A or factor B, was 
most important. And then asked to identify the number on Saaty's scale (see 
table 4.2) which most accurately matched the strength of their feeling. The 
tenns factor A and factor B were used to ensure that the interviewee had to refer 
back to the definitions they had already documented, thereby forcing them to 
check that they were being consistent in the use of their terminology. The 
11 Saaty (1980) suggests that no more than ten sets of factors should be included in the 
pairwise comparison process. If there are too many factors the inconsistency in the decision 
maker's response is likely to become unacceptable. If there are too few the manufacturing 
task may be over-trivialised. Hence eight factors seemed to be a reasonable compromise. 
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collected data were analysed immediately using a spreadsheet on a laptop 
computer and represented on a pie-chart where the size of the pie reflected the 
importance the interviewee had assigned to the factor. Figure 4.9 shows an 
example of this. 
Figure 4.9: Sample pie-chart as part of immediate feedback 
Factor 8 
Factor 1 
Factor 6 ~IIII 
Factor 2 
Factor 5 
Factor 3 
Factor 4 
Once the pie-chart had been produced the interviewee was asked whether they 
thought it accurately reflected their opinions. If they disagreed with the 
prioritisations, the appropriate pairwise comparisons were repeated. This 
iterative process, which continued until the interviewee was satisfied, was used 
to enhance the reliability of the data. Appendix IT contains a detailed description 
of how the data were analysed and also some comments on the consistency 
check. As mentioned earlier, a by-product of the pairwise comparison process 
is the generation of redundant data. These data were used to measure the 
consistency of the interviewee's responses. If the consistency ratio were poor 
(greater than 10%) the interviewer had the option of either probing for more 
infonnation or aborting the interview. 
4.4: Data comparison process 
Table 4.3 shows a sample of the data available at the end of each interview. 
The data reflect an individual interviewee's perception of the manufacturing 
task. As indicated by figure 4.5, however, the level of goal congruence in a 
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firm can only be audited by comparing and contrasting the perceptions of 
different interviewees. Hence a series of interviews have to be conducted. This 
section discusses the ways in which the data gathered during such different 
interviews can be compared. 
Table 4.3: Sample of the data produced during each structured interview 
Internally Important Factors Externally Important Factors 
Ql - Performance (22%) Q 1 - Performance (26%) 
Q5 - Durability (5%) Q3 - Reliability (8%) 
Q8 - Perceived quality (8%) Q6 - Serviceability (2%) 
T4 - Due date (11 %) QO - Value (20%) 
C 1 - Manufacturing cost (28%) T4 - Due date (12%) 
C3 - Selling price (22%) C3 - Selling price (23 % ) 
C5 - Service cost (4%) C4 - Running cost (4%) 
F3 - New product (2%) F4 - Modification (4%) 
The output of each interview (see table 4.3) is a function of what factors the 
interviewee thinks are important and how important they think they are. Hence 
there are two generic types of data comparison that can be conducted. The first 
simply involves comparing which factors different interviewees identify as 
important. The second involves comparing how important they think these 
factors are. Figure 4.10 shows the frequency with which the factors shown in 
table 4.1 were identified as internally important by the managing and financial 
directors of company B (see section 4.5.2). This visualisation, and hence data 
analysis technique, falls into the first of the two categories identified above as it 
focuses on which factors are seen as important, rather than how important they 
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Figure 4.10: Factors identified as internally important by the managing and financial directors of company 
B 
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Dimensions of quality, time, cost and flexibility 
are seen to be. 
The interviewee profile shown in figure 4.11, on the other hand, provides more 
data as it not only identifies which factors the managing and fmancial directors 
of company B saw as important, but also how important they believed them to 
be. Hence this visualisation, and data analysis technique, falls into the second 
of the categories identified above. As will be seen in the next section the using 
both of these data comparison processes to analyse the data gathered during the 
pilot studies provided a useful insight into the nature of goal congruence. 
4.5: Pilot studies 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 described the data collection and comparison processes 
which together constitute the pilot version of the goal congruence audit. As 
mentioned in chapter 3, once the audit had been developed it was piloted in two 
firms. The purpose of the pilot studies was to test the reliability, validity and 
utility of the audit, thereby identifying ways in which it could be improved. In 
total 18 structured interviews were conducted - 13 in company A and 5 in 
company B. The sample of interviewees was selected so that data could be 
collected which enabled the reliability, validity and utility of the audit to be 
assessed; (a) through the organisation's hierarchy, (b) across the organisation's 
functions and (c) over time. Sections 4.~.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 detail the data12 
relating to these three pilot studies. 
4.5.1: Through the organisation's hierarchy 
The first pilot study was conducted in company A which manufacturers coin-
operated amusement games for the leisure industry. Company A has five main 
product families and each interviewee was asked to focus on the largest13 of 
these - the AWP (amusement with prizes) product range - to minimise the risk 
of goal incongruence being caused by people adopting different perspectives 
(Hill, 1985; Skinner, 1974a; Wheelwright, 1978). Ten' people were 
12 The raw data are listed in Appendix III. 
13 In terms of sales volume. 
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Figure 4.11: Sample interviewee profiles showing how the managing and financial directors of company B 
prioritised the factors that they identified as internally important 
~~ 
II 
n 
.~ 
.. 
•• 
~~ 
~~ 
_ .. 
.~ ~~ .. 
.4~ 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 QO T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 
Dimensions of quality, time, cost and flexibility 
• Financial Director A Managing Director 
interviewed; the manufacturing and marketing directors, the production and 
development managers, the heads of two manufacturing departments, their 
respective foremen and two technical leading hands. Of the ten interviews, 
three were aborted. The first was abandoned because the development manager 
insisted on talking about his own function and was therefore unable to define 
the manufacturing task. The second was terminated because the technical 
leading hand concerned was only interested in criticising the firm. The third, 
involving the second technical leading hand, was not completed because, 
despite repeated probing, the consistency ratio generated during the pairwise 
comparison process remained extremely poor (greater than sixty percent)14. 
Figure 4.12 shows how the seven remaining interviewees were spread across 
four levels of the organisation's hierarchy. The fact that the interviews with the 
two technical leading hands had to be aborted suggests that people at lower 
levels in an organisation's hierarchy might find it difficult to contribute to the 
audit process. This observation is contradicted, however, by the fact that 
interviewees at all levels of this and other organisations were able to contribute 
to later studies (see section 4.5.3 and chapter 6). 
Figure 4.13 shows those factors that were identified as internally important by 
the seven interviewees during the structured interviews. The data presented in 
figure 4.13 have not been modified in any way. That is, none of the 
interviewee definitions have been taken into account. The chart clearly shows 
the diversity of opinion that exists within the firm's manufacturing function. 
Take, for example, product performance quality (factor Q1). Both the 
marketing and manufacturing directors believe that this is the most internally 
important factor. The production manager, on the other hand, does not even 
include it in his list. One could argue that this is because the production 
manager contributes to product performance quality by ensuring that products 
conform to the design specification (factor Q4) and hence he is likely to believe 
14 Saaty (1980) suggests that if the consistency ratio is greater than ten per cent then there is 
a risk of rank reversal - that is, there is a danger that the actual ranking of the factors may be 
incorrect. Hence in the case of the aborted interview either the author had failed to explain the 
pairwise comparison process adequately or the interviewee was not co-operating. 
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that factor Q4, rather than Q 1, is one of the most important. Figure 4.13, 
however, negates this argument as it shows that the production manager does 
not include conformance to specification in his list of the eight most internally 
important factors. Hence it seems safe to assume that there is a lack of goal 
congruence between the directors and the production manager with regard to, 
among other things, product performance quality. 
Figure 4.12: Interviewees who contributed to the frrst pilot study 
Marketing 
Director 
Head of 
Department 1 
Foreman of 
Department 1 
Manufacturing 
Director 
Production 
Manager 
Head of 
Department 2 
I 
Foreman of 
Department 2 
The alternative method of data comparison suggested in section 4.4 involves 
examining what factors were identified as important, rather than how they had 
been prioritised. Figure 4.14 shows those factors that were identified as 
internally important by more than half the interviewees. Taken together, figures 
4.13 and 4.14 highlight an interesting dichotomy. Figure 4.13 suggests that 
there is a wide variety of opinion within the firm as to what constitutes the 
manufacturing task. Figure 4.14, however, shows that it is widely recognised 
that delivery on time (T4), manufacturing cost (Cl), and the ability to change 
the mix of resources used (F8) are of fundamental importance. Hence there 
appears to be an underlying goal congruence which is partially obscured by 
figure 4.13. These two sets of data suggest that the goal incongruence that 
exists across the hierarchy of company A is not a function of the definition of 
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Figure 4.13: Interviewee profiles showing how the factors that were identified as internally important in 
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Figure 4.14: Factors identified as internally important by more than half of the people interviewed 
in company A 
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the manufacturing task, but of the prioritisation of its elements. That is, the 
important elements of the manufacturing task are widely understood, but the 
way in which they are prioritised is not. 
Further complexity is added to the analysis when the interviewee's definitions 
are taken into account. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 illustrate this. Figure 4.15 
shows those factors that were identified as externally important by more than 
half of the interviewees, but ignores their defmitions. Figure 4.16, on the other 
hand. takes account of these and, as can be seen, shows that three rather than 
two factors are recognised as externally important by more than two thirds of 
the sample. This suggests there is a slightly higher level of agreement (goal 
congruence) about the externally important elements of the manufacturing task 
than indicated by figure 4.15. These data reinforce the importance of having 
precise definitions for each of the factors. 
4.5.2: Across the organisation's functions 15 
The second pilot study took place in company B, which designs and 
manufactures special purpose machine tools for the automotive industry. It has 
two main product lines - traditional and advanced machine tools. This study 
focused on the traditional machine tool business. All five company directors 
were interviewed and none of them experienced any difficulty defining the 
internal and external dimensions of the manufacturing task. This suggests that, 
despite the problems encountered with the development manager of company A, 
the structured data collection process described in section 4.3 can successfully 
be used with managers from functions other than manufacturing. Figures 4.17 
and 4.18 show the interviewee profiles and the factors most frequently 
identified as externally important by the directors of company B. As in the first 
case the interviewee profiles (figure 4.17) highlight the lack of goal congruence 
in the organisation. Take, for example, the managing and financial director's 
profiles. Figure 4.17 shows that the managing director thinks that criterion C 1, 
the manufacturing cost is the most important factor. However manufacturing 
15 This section is based on Neely and Wilson (l992a). 
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Figure 4.15: Factors identified as externally important by more than half of the people interviewed 
in company A 
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Figure 4.16: Factors identified as externally important by more than half of the people interviewed in 
company A taking the interviewee's definitions into account 
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Figure 4.17: Factors identified as externally important by the directors of company B 
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Figure 4.18: Factors identified as externally important hy more than half of the directors of company B 
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cost does not even appear on the financial director's profile, who feels that 
criterion Q8, perceived quality, is the most important. The managing director 
feels criterion C3, selling price, is the second most important factor, whereas 
the financial director suggests that it should be conformance to customer 
specification, which does not appear in the list of the managing director's top 
eight factors. (This may, of course, be because the managing director assumes 
that if his third most important factor, Ql, the product performance is acceptable 
then the product will conform to specification). For the financial director the 
third most important factor is profit. Again this is a factor which does not 
appear in the manufacturing director's top eight criteria. Hence it appears safe 
to assume that there is a lack of goal congruence even within the top 
management team of company B. Despite these observations, however, figure 
4.18 suggests that, as before, the goal incongruence that can be observed is 
largely due to the prioritisation of the factors which constitute the manufacturing 
task and not their definition. That is, most people understand what the task is. 
They do not, however, concur on how important its various elements are. 
4.5.3: Over time 
The third pilot study took place in company A and involved a series of 
interviews with three technical leading hands over a period of six months. Two 
of the interviewees were on an internal management development course. This 
involved them spending three months in each of the firm's major functional 
departments. The third interviewee remained in the same job for the duration of 
the study and was used as a control. The purpose of this study was to examine 
the stability of an individual's perception of what is important over an extended 
period of time as it could be argued that one's perception of what is important 
will be coloured by recent local events, such as the return of a batch of defective 
product. 
Figure 4.19 shows the interviewee profiles for the manufacturing director and 
the management trainees prior to them spending a period of time in marketing. 
Figure 4.20 shows the same profiles, but presents the data for the marketing 
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director and the management trainees after their time in marketing. The greatest 
distinction can be observed in the changing profile of the first management 
trainee (see figure 4.21). Note that prior to joining the marketing department he 
stressed the internal importance of flexibility and had a profile which closely 
resembled that of the manufacturing director. After he left marketing, however, 
perception of what was important had changed and he placed far more emphasis 
on the quality related factors, as did the marketing director. 
During the six months that this pilot study lasted the "control" was interviewed 
three times. On each occasion he was given the option of reselecting, 
redefining, and reprioritising those factors that he had identified as most 
important at the previous interview. Figure 4.22 shows how his perception of 
what was externally important changed during this period. It should be noted 
that the variances are only minor. Hence these limited data suggest that one's 
perception of what is important is relatively stable, even over an extended 
period of time, unless one is subject to a major stimulus, such as a change in 
department or organisational role. 
4.6: Critique of the pilot process 
As already discussed the pilot studies were designed to test the utility, validity 
and reliability of the pilot version of the goal congruence audit. In this context, 
utility refers to the usefulness of the process, reliability refers to the repeatability 
of the process, and validity refers to whether the process examines what it is 
meant to. In this section data gathered as a result of the author's participant 
observation, both during the audit process and whilst providing feedback to the 
companies involved, will be used to critique the pilot version of the goal 
congruence audit along these dimensions. This will involve addressing the 
following questions: 
_ Is the pilot version of the goal congruence audit a useful process? 
-Is the pilot version of the goal congruence audit a reliable process? 
-Is the pilot version of the goal congruence audit a valid process? 
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Figure 4.20: Interviewee profiles for the marketing director and the management trainees after their time in 
marketing 
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Figure 4.21: Interviewee profile showing how the perception of the first management trainee changed once 
he had joined the marketing function 
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4.6.1: Utility of the audit 
The pilot version of the goal congruence audit was designed to identify areas of 
goal incongruence as the literature implies that these will inhibit a firm's ability 
to realise its manufacturing strategy. Hence the utility of the audit is a function 
of whether it enables one to identify areas of goal incongruence efficiently and 
effectively. Figures 4.13 and 4.17 show that goal incongruence exists in both 
companies A and B. Figures 4.14 and 4.18, however, suggest that the goal 
incongruence that can be observed is a function of the prioritisation of the 
factors which together constitute the manufacturing task, rather than their 
identification and definition. Hence while the audit is effective it is not as 
efficient as it might be because the time each interviewee spends on the second 
stage of the data collection process - identifying and defining the factors - is 
largel y wasted. 
Of the eighteen interviews conducted as part of the pilot study, fifteen were 
completed. These included interviews with managers in different functions and 
employees from all level of the organisation's hierarchy. Hence the second 
point to note about the utility of the pilot version of the goal congruence audit is 
that it is easy to understand and use. This was later confirmed when a MSc 
student, working in conjunction with the author, used the author's methodology 
to audit the level of goal congruence in two Swedish companies (Aldrin, 1991). 
4.6.2: Reliability of the audit 
There are two potential sources of unreliability - the process itself and external 
influences. In terms of the data collection process the use of formal check 
sheets and pairwise comparisons minimises the risk of interviewer bias. While 
the structure of the questions, e.g. referring the interviewee back to their own 
definitions, minimises the risk of interviewee bias. As the data comparison 
processes are fixed, they are by defmition repeatable. The most likely source of 
external influence is that recent organisational events may colour an 
interviewee's perception of what is important. The limited data gathered during 
the second of the pilot studies conducted in company A confirm this, but 
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suggest that such changes in perception are most likely to occur if the events 
have a major impact 
4.6.3: Validity of the audit 
The validity of the audit can be examined at two levels - the individual and the 
firm. At the level of the indiVIdual, the immediate analysis and feedback of the 
data is likely to enhance the validity of the data collection process, as will the 
use of the consistency ratio. Following each study the main findings were fed 
back to a senior management team and their accuracy was confirmed during the 
ensuing discussion. Hence it would appear that the data collected were valid. 
4.6.4: Enhancements to the audit 
The goal congruence audit described in sections 4.3 and 4.4, then, not only 
achieves its purpose, but also appears to be both valid and reliable. Having said 
this a number of ways of improving the audit were identified during the pilot 
studies and subsequent analyses. The first relates to the issue of what the term 
"important" means. During the pairwise comparison process the interviewees 
were asked to say which was more important factor A or factor B. Some of 
them responded to this question by asking whether they were meant to be 
identifying what they felt was important, or what they believed the firm's senior 
managers thought was important. This confusion emphasises the significance 
of the phrasing of the question. It should have been of the form; "which do 
you think is more important to the long run success of the firm - factor A or 
factor B". 
The second point that emerged during the pilot studies was that the list of 
factors shown in figure 4.1 is not complete. When the definitions that the 
interviewees had provided were examined it became apparent that some of the 
terms in figure 4.1 could be applied to either the firm or it products. Reliability, 
for example, can be interpreted to mean reliability of the firm - does it always 
keep to the promises it has made, or reliability of the product - does it keep 
working as it should. Another problem was caused by the fact that some of the 
103 
terms were already part of the company's language. In company A, for 
example, the term "features" was used in a design specific context and hence the 
majority of people interviewed in this fIrm saw features as an integral part of the 
product and not as "optional extras". A modified version of figure 4.1 is 
presented in figure 4.23. This shows all the different factors that were 
identified during the interviews. The fact that each interviewee was asked to 
define the factors that they had selected as most important increases the validity 
of the audit. Unfortunately it also lengthens the interviews and complicates the 
data comparison process, as each defInition has to be examined before any 
comparisons can be made. It should be noted that the results of the pilot studies 
suggest that most of the goal incongruence that exists is due to the prioritisation 
of the factors rather than their identification and definition. Hence if each 
interviewee were given a pre-defined set of factors (the manufacturing 
missions) which together constituted the firm's manufacturing task and simply 
asked to prioritise them, the audit could be considerably simplified without 
losing either its validity or reliability. These themes will be taken up in chapter 
six when the integrated congruence audit is described. 
Figure 4.23: The Dimensions of quality, time, cost and flexibility - revised 
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Manufacturing cost 
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Profit 
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4.7: Summary 
In this chapter the first phase of this research, the development and testing of 
the goal congruence audit, has been documented. The chapter began by 
exploring some of the methodological issues associated with the identification 
of areas of goal incongruence. Then the two structured processes - data 
collection and data comparison - which together constitute the pilot version of 
the goal congruence audit were detailed. Next the results of three pilot studies 
were presented. These were used to examine the utility, validity and reliability 
of the audit; (a) through the organisation's hierarchy, (b) across its functions 
and (c) over time. Most of the goal incongruence observed was caused by 
disagreement regarding the prioritisation of the elements which make up the 
manufacturing task, rather than disagreement over their identification and 
defmition. Hence it was concluded that the second stage of the data collection 
process could be eliminated thereby reducing the length of the structured 
interviews. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE SYSTEM CONGRUENCE AUDIT 
5.0: Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was stated that a high level of system congruence could be said to 
exist in a fmn if: 
-The firm's goal setting, performance measurement, feedback 
and reward systems are used to induce decision making and 
action consistent with the manufacturing task. 
Hence auditing the level of system congruence in a flrm involves examining the 
extent to which the flrm' s systems stimulate behaviour which is consistent with 
the manufacturing task. To do this the manufacturing task must be defined, the 
firm's systems identified, and the extent to which the systems encourage 
appropriate behaviour determined. The flrst step in this process - the defmition 
of the manufacturing task - forms part of the integrated congruence audit 
described in chapter 6. Hence the system congruence audit itself consists of 
two stages; (a) identifying what the firm's systems are, and (b) determining 
whether they induce appropriate behaviour. This chapter describes the 
development and testing of the system congruence audit - the second phase of 
this research. 
The remainder of the chapter has been split into four sections. In the first the 
theory underlying the concept of system congruence is briefly summarised. As 
much of this theory is drawn from the business strategy and organisational 
behaviour literature it was deemed necessary to test its applicability to the 
manufacturing environment. This was done through a shadowing study in one 
firm and a series of semi-structured interviews with managers from fourteen 
others. The results of these studies will be presented in section two. In section 
three the pilot version of the system congruence audit will be described and its 
testing documented. The audit was tested during two structured interviews in 
company C. The minor modifications to the audit that this resulted in are 
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discussed at the end of section three. The chapter will be summarised in section 
four. 
5.1: Theoretical foundations 
The literature review presented in chapter 2 contained anum ber of implicit and 
explicit references to the notion of system congruence. In the section on 
business strategy, for example, the concept of strategic control - using a firm's 
goal setting, performance measurement, feedback and reward systems to induce 
decision making and action consistent with its strategy - was introduced. 
Similarly in the section on organisational behaviour the notions of management 
control and performance management were discussed. 
Figure 5.1, which is drawn directly from figure 3.1, pictorially represents what 
is meant by system congruence in the context of this thesis. As has already 
been made apparent, however, the notion of system congruence is largely based 
on the work of organisational behaviourists, such as Child (1985), and 
business strategists, such as Bungay and Goold (1991), Hrebiniak and Joyce 
(1984) and Lorange et al. (1986). 
Figure 5.1: System congruence in the context of this thesis 
Goal Setting 
~ ~ Do the systems induce 
appropriate behaviour? 
Are they congruent with 
manufacturing task? 
Perfonnance 
Measurement 
Feedback 
Reward 
In the more specialist manufacturing strategy and operations management 
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literature the focus appears to be more uni-dimensional (Neely, 1993b; Neely et 
aI., 1993). Azzone et aI. (1991), for example, assert that companies which 
seek to employ time based competition should use the set of generic measures 
shown in table 5.1, but fail to mention that these measures have to be integrated 
with the wider strategic control system. Similarly Crawford and Cox (1990) 
present guidelines for developing performance measures appropriate for a Just-
In-Time manufacturing environment, but fail to acknowledge that the measures 
have to match the wider organisational infrastructure. 
Table 5.1: Measures for time-based competition (Azzone et al., 1991) 
Internal External 
Configuration Configuration 
Number of changes in Development time for 
R&D 
projects new products 
Engineering time A average time between 
subsequent innovations 
Adherence to due dates Outgoing quality 
Incoming quality Manufacturing cost 
Operations Distance travelled 
Throughput time 
Value-added time (% of 
total time) 
Schedule attainment 
Sales and 
Complexity of Cycle time 
procedures 
marketing 
Order processing Size of batches of Bid time 
lead time information 
Perhaps the most extreme example is provided by the work of Dixon, Nanni 
and Vollmann (1990). Despite the fact that they recognise that: 
"If a company has a strategic objective of achieving better quality, it is not only 
necessary to have action programmes that support quality, but the score-keeping 
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system in manufacturing must also connect to both the strategy and the actions. 
Performance measures must appraise, reinforce, and reward improvements in quality 
in the terms of the action programmes being used to pursue qUality" (Dixon, Nanni 
and Vollmann, 1990, 7). 
They fail to include any reference to the firm's goal setting, feedback or reward 
systems in the subsequent development of their performance measurement 
questionnaire. 
There are a host of possible reasons why the manufacturing and operations 
management research community has focussed on the performance 
measurement system as the primary means of inducing behaviour consistent 
with the manufacturing task and failed to acknowledge the importance of the 
wider strategic control system. One such reason is that performance 
measurement has received a massive amount of publicity through the work of 
authors such as Kaplan (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan, 1982, 1983, 
1984a, 1984b, 1986, 1988, 1990). Hence it is natural that performance 
measurement is uppermost in many researcher's minds. There is, however, 
another possible explanation which, if correct, would have great implications 
for this thesis. For while a strategic control system might be the appropriate 
mechanism for inducing consistency of de~ision making and action at the higher 
levels of an organisation, it may be inappropriate for the manufacturing 
function. That is, perhaps manufacturing managers really do use the 
performance measurement system as the primary means of inducing decision 
making and action consistent with the manufacturing task. For this reason it 
was decided that prior to the development of the system congruence audit the 
author should seek to identify which systems manufacturing managers really do 
use to influence the behaviour of their subordinates. Basically the research 
question that was being addressed in this sub-study was: 
-Is the model shown in figure 5.1 applicable to the 
manufacturing function? 
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5.2: Testing the model16 
There were two phases to this investigation. In the first, five managers from 
company A were shadowed for one working week and the stimuli they received 
recorded on a check sheet of the format shown in figure 5.2. In the second, 
managers from a further fou~en companies in both the U.K. and Japan were 
interviewed and asked about the operationalisation of the model. The data 
collected during both of these phases will be presented and discussed in this 
section. 
5.2.1: Shadowing study 
The shadowing exercise followed the piloting of the goal congruence audit 
described in section 4.5.1 and sought to address, through direct observation, 
the question of whether the model shown in figure 5.1 accurately reflects the 
strategic control process used in the manufacturing function of company A. 
During a week long investigation the production manager, the heads of two 
manufacturing departments, and their respective foremen were all shadowed for 
up to one working day. As far as possible the author collected data on the 
stimuli that these managers both sent and received using a check sheet of the 
format shown in figure 5.2. The full set of data, along with the author's diary, 
are presented in Appendix IV. The following comments are a distillation of 
both these data and the author's observations. 
During the shadowing exercise it became apparent that company A's 
manufacturing function was driven by the production schedule. The vast 
majority of stimuli both sent and received by the managers shadowed concerned 
progress to schedule. The production manager visited the five main 
manufacturing departments every morning and asked where production was 
versus the schedule. He even asked for the progress of one department to be 
formally monitored and displayed on a white board. During the course of each 
day progress to schedule was discussed during numerous phone conversations 
and at various face-to-face meetings. On a weekly basis all managers were 
16 This section is based on Neely and Wilson (l992b and e). 
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Figure 5.2: Example of the check sheet used for data collection during the shadowing exercise 
Time i Stimulus 1 SentlReceived ,Factor, Media 1 Comments 
••• - _. - - - - _. _. - - •• _. _ •• - __ Ow - -_ •••• - -~ _.-.- __ ..... 0_·· .. - - ••••• _. - _. -' - •• _. _ •• - _ •.• - " - - ••• - • - . _. - • _ •• - ..•••.. - - - .. : ................... 0 __ ••••• - ••• _ •••••• '" •••••• _'. - _ •• _. _. - • - _ •• _ .......... _ •• _0_. t _ ..... -_. -. 0- _ ••••••• - •. - _ ••• - _. - - - • -1-' . ---........... -_. _ .. ----.. ----"'"'' ~. ,,0- ........... 0_ - - _ •••• 0_ - - - 0- - - -- _ .. - --
"8.~Q.ul!Tf~~i2U;lCt2ryl~r2ri1.p.i2~~~~i2~tftiteri1.1Ii.~I~~~tQ-l~I: 
: Consistent message - where i manager, to heads of : external 1 : 
.............................. · ..... [ ........... are.wc.versus·the·p·iail···········i·········department·ancffo·remco·······r·······deiivery······T··································r······ .. ················· .. ········ 
····································i················· .......................................................... \ ..................................................................... ······1···································"(··········· ....................... -;-................................... . 
-. - - - - - - - - _. - - • - - _. _ .............. 0- _. ~ __ • - - - •• - - ••• - -. - - ••• _ •• _ •••• 0.'" _. _ ••• - _. _. _ •• _. - - _ •• _ •••• _ •• 0_' o. 0- - _ ••••• • i .. . 0_ •••••• ____ ••••• __________ .... ______ •••• _. ___ • ________ • __ •• _______ • __ .'.' __ ~ ___ ..... __ .. _____ .. ____ • _. _. _________ •• _ ~ ________ .. __ •••• ____________ • _____ ••• _! ____ . ___ . _____ . ____________ . ________ . 
10.35 - 10.361 I can't do that job. The 1 From foreman to production 1 Internal & 1 Face-to-face 1 
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, ..................................... : ............... " .......................................................... j .......................................... ·································:·········deiivery········r····································j············ ........................ . 
r_:W~~~t~~~~f)~&~;_J::~i~~i.;~lI~~iiij~~~g~il~~~~iIi~~~~~f~I:-::: 
: the end of today. : to foreman : external : : 
: : ::: 
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expected to forecast what level of manning they would need if they were to meet 
the following week's schedule. 
In terms of the model, then, the managers in company A were set goals relating 
to delivery on time (the weekly production schedule) and their performance was 
measured, albeit informally, by the production manager. While this 
undoubtedly focussed attention on working to schedule (figure 4.14 showed 
that six of the seven managers interviewed identified delivery on time as an 
internally important factor, while figure 4.16 showed that all seven of them 
believed that on time delivery to the end customer was externally important) the 
performance measures tended to be used in a negative way. That is, the 
production manager, the heads of the manufacturing departments and their 
foremen would not be asked by their supervisors and peers if they were behind 
schedule, but how far behind they were. The phrasing of the question implied 
that every one knew that the manager concerned always failed to meet the 
schedule. As a result of this "negative" measurement the heads of two of the 
manufacturing departments said that they thought they were likely to loose their 
jobs in the near future. A feeling reinforced by the manufacturing director when 
he put all the managers on one month's notice because the firm was failing to 
meet its delivery schedules efficiently. 
In the manufacturing function of company A, then, the control system which 
relates to the manufacturing mission17 - "we must ensure that we deliver on 
time" - can be seen to consist of; goal setting (the schedule), performance 
measurement (informal and negative), feedback (meetings with the production 
manager and manufacturing director) and sanction (threat of redundancy). No 
financial rewards were linked directly to the department's performance with 
regard to whether it met the weekly production schedule. Non-financial 
incentives, such as promotion, may have been. If they were, however, none of 
the managers shadowed appeared to have been aware of it. 
17 The term manufacturing mission is used in this thesis to refer to the individual elements or 
factors which together constitute the manufacturing task. 
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The second factor that was widely identified as internally important in company 
A was manufacturing cost (see figure 4.14). The importance of controlling the 
firm's costs was emphasised through the formal performance measurement 
system. This was based on traditional measures of efficiency such as; labour 
efficiency, percentage of time spent setting and percentage of time waiting for 
work. Many of the problems usually associated with such a system could be 
observed (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Hall et al., 1991). The head of one of 
the manufacturing departments, for example, explained how he ignored the 
schedule and just produced standard components in large batches to minimise 
the time his staff "wasted" setting up machines. The head of another said that 
as repair of defective parts was classified as non-productive work, he would 
often rectify defects himself so that his department's efficiency did not suffer. 
Financial incentives were also used to emphasise the importance of controlling 
manufacturing costs. Everyone in the firm was eligible for an annual bonus 
based on cost effective sales - a function of unit costs and the number of units 
sold. In addition the operatives were paid an individual incentive. Each job 
was a assigned a standard time by a work study engineer. An operative 
working at the standard rate, performance index (PI) 100, would be expected to 
complete the job in the standard time. Operatives that worked faster were paid a 
higher rate with no limit being applied to individual jobs. Payment for the 
week, however, was capped at 105PI. Hence the operatives could maximise 
their income by working at an average of 105PI for the entire week. If they 
worked any faster they would not benefit from any extra income and if they 
worked any slower their income would be reduced. Figure 5.3 shows the 
a~erage PIs achieved in the five main manufacturing departments for a two 
week period in June 1991. Note how the payment system is self-regulatory. 
The operatives tend to work harder at the beginning of the week and then relax 
on Friday. Effectively they were managing the payment system so that their 
income was maximised, while the effort they had to exert was minimised. 
Returning to the model shown in figure 5.1, then, the importance of controlling 
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Figure 5.3: Average performance indices in company A's main manufacturing departments 
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manufacturing costs was reinforced in company A through goal setting (target 
efficiency levels for departments and operatives), performance measurement 
(data on standard hours are formally collected), feedback (via various internal 
reports and the bonus systems), and reward (annual and weekly bonus 
payments). It should be noted that not all these systems actually do what they 
were designed to do. Take the departmental efficiency targets, for example. As 
discussed earlier, these encouraged the head of one department to rectify 
defective products himself. The control system not only made him do things 
that really should have been delegated and hence reduced the amount of time he 
spent on his real role, but also meant that he sent a signal to his subordinates 
which effectively said - producing defective product is acceptable in this 
department. 
5.2.2: Follow-up study 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the shadowing study. The first is 
that the model shown in figure 5.1 accurately reflects the control processes used 
in company A to reinforce the importance of two elements of the manufacturing 
task - delivery on time and control manufacturing costs. The second is that 
despite careful design control systems can stimulate undesirable behaviour. The 
objective of the follow-up study was to investigate how widely these findings 
apply. To do this semi-structured interviews were conducted with managers 
from fourteen different companies in both the U.K. and Japan, the actual 
sample being determined largely by ease of access18. Figure 5.4 shows a copy 
of the letter that was sent to each of the Japanese companies prior to the author's 
visit. Similar letters were also sent to all the U.K. firms. The questions 
contained in the letter formed the basis of each semi-structured interview. In the 
remainder of this section the data collected during these interviews will be 
documented and discussed. 
18 Tbe visits in Japan were arranged by Professor Katayama of Waseda University and 
Professor Nagamacbi of Hirosbima University. Although this imposed some constraints on 
the sample, it was still possible to visit fIrms from a variety of industrial sectors. 
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Figure 5.4: Copy of the letter sent to the Japanese companies 
THE INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL ERGONOMICS 
University of Nottingham 
Dept of Production Engineering 
and Production Management 
University Park 
Nottingham 
N072RD 
2nd July 1991 
To whom it may concern 
Study Tour in Japan 
I am writing to ask if it would be possible for me to visit your 
organisation when I visit Japan this autumn. I am currently working for 
the Institute of Occupational Ergonomics which is part of the 
Department of Manufacturing Engineering and Operations Management 
at the University of Nottingham. I am particularly interested in the 
communication of organisational goals and objectives and how the 
attainment of these is influenced by the following four systems. 
1 . The goal and target setting process. 
2. The monitoring (performance measurement) system. 
3. The feedback (reports, meetings, face-to-face contacts) 
processes. 
4. The reward (payment, recognition) criteria. 
An ideal plant visit, from my point of view, would have the following 
format: 
1. Discussion with senior manager(s) 
Typical questions would include: 
-what is the organisation's strategy? 
-can you derme your competitive advantage in terms of quality, 
time, cost and flexibility? 
-how do you define your competitive edge? 
-to what extent do the employees in the company understand the 
importance of the factors which form the basis of your 
competitive edge? 
-do you want to increase the level of their understanding? 
-if so, then how will you do this? 
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Figure 5.4 (continued): Copy of the letter sent to the Japanese companies 
To whom it may concern 
2. Plant tour 
Typical questions would include: 
-size and age of plant. 
2 2nd July 1991 
-number of employees, percent of direct and indirect staff. 
-performance of plant (inventory turns, market share, 
sales/employee, profit/employee). 
-quality standards (defect levels, scrap rates, methods used to 
improve qUality). _ 
-time based competition (delivery lead times, due-date 
performance, rate of product introduction). 
-cost of operation (inventory levels, value added, return on 
investment). 
-ability to cope with changing customer demands (set-up 
reduction, product mix, batch sizes). 
3. Discussion with a group of employees 
Typical questions would include: 
-what do you think the organisations goals are? 
-how do you defme quality, time, cost and flexibility? 
-how are your goals set? 
-how is your performance monitored? 
-what feedback do you receive? 
-what reward systems are used in this organisation? 
I am currently writing a PhD thesis and feel that visiting a number of 
world class Japanese companies will add a great deal to my research. I 
hope your organisation will be able to help me and I look forward to 
meeting you when I come to Japan. 
Yours faithfully, 
A. D. Neely 
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Table 5.2 summarises the data collected during each of the fourteen19 site visits. 
The sample of interviewees within each finn varied from one to eight managers 
and although the data are only cursory, and not directly comparable because of 
the difference in sizes of the firms, they raise some interesting issues. At the 
outset of the follow-up study .it was believed that all the finn's systems - goal 
setting, performance measurement, feedback and reward - should be designed 
so that they are congruent with the manufacturing task. This is not only what 
company A had tried to do, but also consistent with the business strategy and 
organisational behaviour literature. By the end of the follow-up study, 
however, the author had begun to question whether it was possible to adopt 
what could be called a neutral reward system; that is, a reward system 
which is not linked directly to the manufacturing task. This change in attitude 
was prompted by two things. First many of the managers interviewed in the 
U.K. companies reported that the reward systems used in their firms were 
inappropriate and often inhibited change. Figure 5.3 shows how company A's 
individual incentive scheme limits productivity. The production manager of 
company 4 explained how the introduction of new and more competitive 
working practices had been rejected by both the production engineers and 
designers as they believed it would reduce their productivity and hence their pay 
in the short term. In company 3 an individual incentive scheme was still being 
operated even though it conflicted with the team based manufacturing 
philosophy that had been adopted. When asked why this was the case, the 
personnel manager replied; "because our supervisors could not manage without 
the incentive scheme". 
The second thing that prompted the author's change in attitude was seeing a 
number of firms which were successfully operating neutral reward systems 
(companies 1, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 13). In all the Japanese firms visited salary was 
a function of past perfonnance, seniority and age (which because of the practice 
of lifetime employment is equivalent to length of service). Past performance 
19 The visits to company's 11 and 14 did not produce much data. In the fIrst case the 
management team were not particularly open. In the second the author's contact had been 
taken ill and hence there had been little preparation prior to the visit. 
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Table 5.2: Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 1 
Date of 20/8/91 interview 
Products Cars 
Location U.K., but a Japanese transplant. 
Number of 3000 
employees 
"As a company we aim to build profitably the 
Manufacturing highest quality car sold in Europe", through 
task people and team working. Quality is a function 
of aesthetics, reliability and technical durability. 
Daily output target displayed on a neon screen 
Goal setting above each production line. Total cost 
systems reduction action (TCRA) for indirect staff. 
observed and General objectives are cascaded down through 
discussed the organisation. Specific targets are set as a 
result of discussion/negotiation. 
Performance Extensive use of benchmarking among sister 
measurement plants. The firm has a standard Vehicle 
systems Evaluation System to ensure comparability of 
observed and 
discussed data. 
Extensive use of wall charts, including ones 
Feedback 
that presented data on safety, skills matrices, 
benchmarks of press productivity and company 
systems 1 's 1991 zero defect campaign. Morning 
observed and meetings where supervisors update the 
discussed incoming shift regarding recent quality 
problems. Plant director's biannual address. 
If production targets are achieved before the 
Reward end of a shift everyone stops work and goes on 
systems a training course. Payment is based on 
observed and standard scales and annual appraisal. No 
discussed company or individual incentive scheme.s are 
operated. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 2 
Date of 22/8/91 interview 
Products Automotive components 
Location U.K. 
Number of 400 
employees 
Minimise costs. Conform to customer's 
Manufacturing specification. Offer a short lead time and 
task reliable deliveries. Selling price is an issue, but 
not as important as the above four items. 
Goal setting Company 2 is owned by a well known U.K. holding company. The senior management 
systems team are set tight fmancial targets. These are 
observed and fed down to the shop floor in the form of discussed efficiency and output targets. 
Performance 
measurement Every operator has to fill in a job card. This is 
systems the basis for hislher bonus. The focus is on 
observed and speed of work. 
discussed 
The fmn used to have monthly feedback 
Feedback 
sessions where the line was stopped. These 
have now been replaced by a newsletter which 
systems usually contains something on current 
observed and production levels and the state of the market. 
discussed Last month's newsletter also had a report on 
company 2's recent safety record. 
Reward 
Company 2 has adopted a cellular layout and 
hence uses a group based incentive scheme. 
systems Bonuses are paid to all the members of a cell on 
observed and a weekly basis. The actual payment is a 
discussed function of standard hours earnt by the cell. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 3 
Date of 28/8/91 interview 
Products Tools for the drilling and mining industries 
Location U.K. 
Number of 400 
employees 
Product performance, delivery reliability and 
Manufacturing selling price are all important to the customer. 
task Profit (and hence costs) are the key drivers 
internally. 
Goal setting 
systems Primary goal setting system for manufacturing 
observed and is the production schedule - see later. 
discussed 
Performance The production manager uses adherence to 
measurement schedule (delivery performance) and value of 
systems arrears (cost/profit) to monitor his subordinates 
observed and 
discussed performance. 
Feedback 
The production manager identified the weekly 
production meetings and face-to-face 
systems discussions as the primary means of feedback. 
observed and He said that in both cases he would focus on 
discussed adherence to schedule and value of arrears. 
Reward Company 3 operates an individual incentive 
systems scheme. Payment is based on standard hours 
observed and earnt and capped at 130 PI. As with company 
discussed 2 the focus was on speed of production. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 4 
Date of 19/8/91 and 28/8/91 interviews 
Products Punches, engraved dies and marking machinery 
Location U.K. 
Number of 250 
employees 
Manufacturing Delivery lead time, delivery reliability and 
task longevity of the die are the key concerns of the 
customer. Low cost is the internal driver. 
Two main goal setting systems are used by the 
production manager of company 4 - the fIrst is 
Goal setting the annual appraisal, the second is the weekly 
systems production meeting. At the appraisal the 
observed and appraisee's targets for the next year are set. 
discussed Typically these would be things like achieve a 
cost saving of 10%. At the production meeting 
high value, late orders are usually discussed. 
Performance The production manager plots charts of % of orders delivered on time. He would like to 
measurement monitor other dimensions of performance, such 
systems as lead times, but the necessary data are 
observed and unavailable. All supervisors are issued reports discussed which show their departments PI. 
Feedback Little feedback other than through the weekly 
systems 
observed and 
production meeting. Some posters on the 
fIrm's suggestion scheme although this appears 
discussed to have fallen into disrepute. 
Reward Individual or group incentive based on output 
systems versus standard times. Small (10%) allowance 
observed and for quality. 
discussed 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 5 
Date of 2419/91 interviews 
Products Communications and audio systems 
Location Japan 
Number of 1600 
employees 
Manufacturing Delight/surprise the customer by providing 
task middle of the price range products which are 
easy to us and technologically advanced. 
President's vision fed down through a "creative 
Goal setting 
management system". Everyone is expected to 
continually seek creative ways in which they 
systems can improve their performance, or their 
observed and department's performance, in line with the 
discussed president's vision of the frrm' s future (kaizen). 
Note - kaizen is not dozen (natural). It has to 
be encouraged. This includes target setting. 
Performance Little data on performance measurement 
measurement available. Each department was, however, set 
systems a target of two suggestions/employee/period. 
observed and Achievement of this was formally monitored 
discussed and displayed on a wall chart. 
Feedback 
systems Wall charts used to feed back data on 
observed and performance. See comments above. 
discussed 
Basic salary is flat rate, but a biannual bonus 
Reward 
based on company profitability is also paid. 
Managers encouraged to award a special 
systems discretionary bonus if someone is particularly 
observed and creative. Payment is also made for all 
discussed suggestions received. A token payment of 100 
yen (£0.40) is made for poor ones. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 6 
Date of 25/9/91 interviews 
Products Heavy machine tools industry 
Location Japan 
Number of 2025 
employees 
Provide safe products which perform well, are 
Manufacturing easy to use and offer good value for money. In 
task the past the focus has been on quality, cost and delivery. In the future it will be on quality, 
price, delivery and furnishing (customisation). 
President's vision communicated via annual 
Goal setting briefmg. Everyone is then expected to develop 
systems their own action plan, including numerical 
observed and targets, for the coming twelve months. These 
discussed have ~ be approved by the employees 
sup en or. 
Performance versus targets is reviewed 
Performance biannually by the president, four times a year 
measurement by the vice-presidents and monthly by the 
systems department heads. Each target has a general 
observed and heading and then sub-headings. Hence the 
discussed different reviews deal with different levels of 
aggregation of performance data. 
Feedback 
Feedback is provided during two sets of 
meetings involving three levels of management 
systems The president, vice-presidents and department 
observed and heads meet biannually. The department heads, 
discussed section heads and supervisors meet more 
frequently. 
Basic salary is flat rate, but a biannual bonus 
Reward 
based on company profitability and individual 
performance is also paid. Individual 
systems performance is assessed during performance 
observed and appraisals, which focus on how well the 
discussed employee has met his personal targets derived 
from the breakdown of the president's vision. 
125 
Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 7 
Date of 26/9/91 interviews 
Products Cars 
Location Japan 
Number of 800 in the factory I visited, -28,000 in total 
employees 
Manufacturing 
"Develop cars and trucks of striking originality 
and value. They will be even safer vehicles, 
task more protective of both people and the earth's 
environment" . 
Goal setting Company personnel administration system used to evaluate and assess employee 
systems 
observed and performance. Linked into job classifications 
discussed based on skill requirements, the business plan and organisational climate. 
Performance evaluation is conducted biannually 
Perfonnance via an appraisal system. There are two types of 
measurement appraisal - performance and attitude. The 
systems performance appraisals deal with past 
observed and performance, targets for next six months and 
discussed other issues, e.g. training required. The 
attitude appraisal deals with service record. 
Feedback 
systems Feedback provided on an ongoing basis and 
observed and also during the biannual appraisals. 
discussed 
Basic salary is flat rate, but allowances are 
Reward 
provided for dependents, overtime, position in 
the hierarchy, special duties (summer/winter 
systems allowance), commuting and miscellaneous 
observed and items. Also a biannual bonus is paid. This is 
discussed based on company and individual performance, 
as assessed during the appraisal. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 8 
Date of 30/9/91 interviews 
Products Electric motors 
Location Japan 
Number of Not available 
employees 
Reliability and performance are the most 
Manufacturing important external dimensions, while cost 
task reduction and efficiency are the most important 
internally. 
Target 30 - the plant will be thirty years old 
soon, so the slogan target 30 has been coined 
Goal setting to encourage everyone to seek ways in which 
systems 30% improvements in customer satisfaction, 
observed and efficiency and cost can be achieved. These 
discussed three dimensions are translated into specific 
targets via the top-down, bottom-up strategic 
planning process known as hoshin kanri. 
Performance Annually the directors of each plant meet and 
measurement review progress towards their targets. 
systems Department and section heads are responsible 
observed and for monitoring performance and providing 
discussed feedback on it more frequently. 
Feedback on performance provided via 
Feedback 
morning meetings, newsletters, visual wall 
charts and leaflets/posters. Company 8 also 
systems identified priorities for certain periods. The 
observed and priority for October and November of 1991, 
discussed for example, had been identified as customer 
satisfaction. 
Reward 
Basic salary is flat rate, but a biannual bonus 
depending on company performance is paid. 
systems Most improvement activities are undertaken by 
observed and quality circles and a token payment is made to 
discussed each member of the team. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 9 
Date of 1/10/91 interviews 
Products Photographic fum 
Location Japan 
Number of 5,000 employees 
Manufacturing Reliability of product is of paramount 
task importance to the customers. Efficiency is the principal internal driver. 
Corporate planning department develops a plan 
based on last years sales, competitor actions 
Goal setting and predicted market growths. The plan is 
systems presented to the company's president who, in 
observed and tum, presents it to the site directors. As the 
discussed plan passes down through the hierarchy, detail 
is added and targets are set. The targets are 
then aggregated and fed back up the hierarchy. 
Product quality is largely detennined by the 
Perfonnance manufacturing process. Hence the targets and 
measurement perfonnance measures focus on cost reduction. 
systems Two indices are used to measure perfonnance -
observed and a corporate and an individual index. The 
discussed fonner is a function of sales, profit, yield and 
productivity. 
Meetings between the department and section 
heads to discuss perfonnance take place 
Feedback monthly. All operators are responsible for 
systems feeding back data on equipment perfonnance to 
observed and their section head on a daily basis. 
discussed Perfonnance appraisals are also used. These 
provide a forum for feeding back infonnation 
to individuals on their perfonnance. 
Basic salary is flat rate, but it is increased 
Reward biannually. The frrst increase is related to an individual's perfonnance. The second is a 
systems function of their length of service. The ratio of 
observed and increase is 30: 100, i.e. far more emphasis is 
discussed placed on length of service than on individual 
perfonnance. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 10 
Date of 2/10/91 interviews 
Products Oilrefming 
Location Japan 
Number of 300 
employees 
Manufacturing Quality and delivery are controlled by the 
task process. Hence the key driver, both internally 
and externally is cost. 
Top level objectives for 1991 defined as; safe and 
Goal setting 
stable operation - no injury, equipment downtime 
or pollution, effective plant operation - lowest 
systems cost and highest efficiency and manning 
observed and management - maximise labour utilisation. These 
discussed are fed down through the organisation. Even 
manufacturing engineers make weekly plans 
showing how their actions will contribute. 
All employees develop their own plans 
Performance showing how they are going to contribute to 
measurement the company's goals (e.g. I'm going to spend 
systems one day next week identifying and 
observed and implementing a cost saving scheme). At the 
discussed end of the week each employ is responsible for 
reviewing hislher progress versus hislher plan. 
Employees not only review their plans, but also 
Feedback feed the information back to their supervisors. 
systems Once a month each section head will call all his 
observed and subordinates together and review the group's 
discussed progress. The plant's progress is reviewed in 
the same way on a biannual basis. 
Reward Basic salary is flat rate, but biannual company 
systems bonus is paid. Payments are also made for 
observed and suggestions. These vary from 100,000 yen 
discussed (£400) to 5,000 yen (20). 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 11 
Date of 3/10/91 interviews 
Products Glass 
Location Japan 
Number of 2000 
employees 
Quality a function of the manufacturing 
Manufacturing process. President's vision of the future is that the fmn should seek to be more flexible, i.e. 
task reduce batch sizes and lead times, while 
maintaining/reducing the cost base. 
Goal setting President's vision of the future reiterated every 
systems six months. Targets set as this "vision" is 
observed and disaggregated and fed down through the 
discussed organisation. 
Performance 
measurement 
systems Not discussed. 
observed and 
discussed 
Feedback 
systems Not discussed. 
observed and 
discussed 
Reward 
systems 
observed and 
Not discussed. 
discussed -
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 12 
Date of 7/10/91 interviews 
Products Videos 
Location Japan 
Number of 1000 
employees 
Manufacturing Produce "high-quality, high-performance 
task products that meet the needs of our customers". 
Company. 12 asks its employees to document 
Goal setting their own personal challenge plans. In these an employee is expected to write down his/her 
systems 
observed and annual targets and discuss them with his/her 
discussed section chief. Typically the targets relate to daily jobs and how they will contribute the 
achievement of sectional/departmental targets. 
Individual performance is evaluated through 
Performance two systems, one for promotion and one for 
measurement wages. Promotion is based on; ability, 
systems personality, future or predicted ability and 
observed and motivation. Wages are based upon actual 
discussed performance in the previous period. 
Feedback provided via wall charts, instruction 
sheets above each work station and output 
Feedback targets at the end of the production line. 
systems Typically the wall charts would start by 
observed and defming the company's objectives and then 
discussed explain how specific improvement activities 
were directed toward them. Morning meetings 
were also used. 
Reward 
Basic salary is flat rate, but pay rises are related 
to individual performance and contribution to 
systems the company's goals. Payments are also made 
observed and for suggestions. These vary from 150,000 yen 
discussed (£600) to 200 yen (£0.80). 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 13 
Date of 8/10/91 interviews 
Products Batteries 
Location Japan 
Number of 2000 
employees 
Product performance, delivery reliability and 
Manufacturing selling price are the principal external drivers. Profit, satisfaction of employees, care for the 
task environment and the local community were 
identified as internally important 
The firm has a long term plan (the company 
Goal setting philosophy), a medium term plan (a five year horizon) and a short term plan (a one year 
systems horizon). Each of these plans are broken down 
observed and 
discussed into divisional, departmental and sectional targets. As one progresses down the hierarchy 
the abstractness of the targets decreases. 
Performance Individual performance is evaluated annually 
measurement according to; past performance, degree of 
systems speciality (knowledge, judgment, creativity, 
observed and personal skills and leadership ability), loyalty 
discussed and improvements activities undertaken. 
Feedback is provided through morning and 
Feedback 
evening meetings, visual displays on the shop 
floor. The company also operates a self-
systems analysis scheme. Each employee has to rate 
observed and 
discussed 
their own performance over the previous year 
versus; quantity of work done and quality of 
work done. 
Basic salary is flat rate, but a function of the 
Reward 
most recent employee evaluation, position in 
the hierarchy and length of service. The 
systems company also pays a biannual bonus. 
observed and Typically this amounts to between four and six 
discussed months extra salary. The actual amount paid is 
dependent on company performance. 
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Table 5.2 (continued): Data gathered during the follow-up study 
Company 14 
Date of 9/10/91 interviews 
Products Air conditioning units 
Location Japan 
Number of 2000 
employees 
Manufacturing Not discussed. task 
Goal setting Company has an eternal philosophy (trust, think ahead and open atmosphere) and an 
systems annual one. Both philosophies are reiterated by 
observed and the president annually and fed down through discussed the company as goal are set 
Performance 
measurement 
systems Not discussed. 
observed and 
discussed 
Feedback 
systems Not discussed. 
observed and 
discussed 
Reward 
systems 
observed and 
Not discussed. 
discussed 
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was determined through biannual appraisals which focussed on issues such as 
loyalty and attitude, as well as the quality and quantity of work done. All 
employees were also eligible for a biannual bonus, the size of which depended 
on the firm's performance. Typically this bonus amounted to between an extra 
four and six months salary per annum. Hence payment in Japan is largely a 
function of the firm's performance as a whole and is only superficially linked to 
specific dimensions of strategy. It should be noted that this is not entirely a 
cultural phenomena. Two of the firms visited in the U.K., companies 1 and 
D20, operated neutral reward systems, although neither of them paid a biannual 
bonus. 
Leaving aside reward, the firms visited used their goal setting, performance 
measurement and feedback systems to reinforce the importance of the 
manufacturing task in a variety of ways. Many of the Japanese companies, for 
example, operated a goal setting system known as hoshin kanri or strategy 
deployment (Akao, 1991). Short term targets for the organisation were derived 
from the annual financial objectives and the president's vision of the future. 
These targets were updated every six months and announced by the president at 
the start of the hoshin kanri planning process. The head of each plant would 
then ask his subordinates to explain how they thought their department could 
contribute to the attainment of the president's targets. In turn, the heads of 
department would ask the heads of the various sections how they believed their 
section could contribute. The first phase of the hoshin kanri process, then, 
involved the top-down devolution of a broad policy framework. In the second 
phase targets were defined at the lowest organisational levels. These targets 
then bubbled back up through the hierarchy so that the firm's president finally 
got an aggregated set of goals that everyone had helped to develop. This top-
down/bottom-up chaining process is designed to ensure that everyone 
understands what the business is trying to achieve. It is shown graphically in 
figure 5.5. 
20 See chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.5: The hoshin kanri planning process 
President 
Broad policy 
framework 
Plan t Directors 
Head of 
Department 
Head of 
Section 
Numerical 
targets 
Other ways of influencing behaviour through goal setting were also identified. 
The production manager of company 4, for example, used the weekly 
production meetings to set explicit short term goals for his subordinates. For 
the ftrst three weeks of every month the production manager would draw up an 
agenda which only featured those jobs which were behind schedule. The 
message that came from these meetings was clear - "we must progress these 
products because delivery on time is important to this ftrm". However for the 
fourth meeting of every month the production manager would draw up an 
agenda which only featured the most valuable jobs. Once again the message 
was clear - "we must maximise the monthly sales ftgures". When asked why 
he did th is the production manager explained that he knew that at- the end of the 
month he would have to tell the managing director how much the production 
function had shipped in terms of sales during the month. The production 
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manager believed that his performance was measured against the value of sales 
shipped, but knew that if the company delivered late then they were less likely 
to get repeat orders. Hence he was being influenced by the performance 
measures he was subject to, but was setting explicit goals to influence the 
actions of his subordinates. 
In Japan sectional performance was often evaluated using check sheets on 
which the head of the section would record his subjective opinion of how well 
his subordinates had performed. Usually these check sheets consisted of 
specific categories which reflected the current strategic thrusts of the business. 
The data generated were fed back to employees at regular monthly meetings and 
areas of poor performance were discussed. In fact feedback on performance 
was common in Japan and widely used at some of the companies visited in the 
U.K. In most of the Japanese plants brief meetings were held in each section 
on a daily basis. These were used to notify everyone of any problems that were 
likely to need special attention during that day. Monthly meetings involving 
everyone were also common. Typically these would be chaired by a plant 
director and consist of a presentation which emphasised the importance of both 
the manufacturing task and continual improvement. Other forms of feedback 
observed in both the U.K. and Japan include; posters, wall charts, digital 
displays, and benchmarking. At company 1, the output of the plant's presses 
was compared with that of its sister plants and plotted on a graph which was 
displayed on the shop floor. At companies 9 and 10 the key performance 
measures for manufacturing had been derived from the business strategy and 
the section heads held monthly feedback meetings with their subordinates at 
which performance versus the key measures was discussed. 
Figure 5.6 summarises the data generated during the follow-up study and 
shows that manufacturing managers do indeed try to influence behaviour of 
their subordinates through the goal setting, performance measurement, feedback 
and reward systems. Hence it seems reasonable to conclude that the model 
shown in figure 5.1 is applicable to the manufacturing function. Two additional 
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Figure 5.6: Summary of the data collected during the follow-up study 
Company Location Manufacturing 
Does this firm use its systems to induce appropriate behaviour? 
task Goal Setting Performance Meas. Feedback Reward 
U.K., but Conformance, Not explicitly, but 
1 Japanese product reliability Yes To an extent Yes some link provided 
transplant and low cost by appraisal system. 
Costs, conformance, Yes, but Yes, but Yes, but Yes, but 
2 U.K. lead time and with a strong with a strong with a strong with a strong 
delivery reliability fmancial focus fmanciaI focus fmancial focus fmancial focus 
Product perf, Yes, for Yes, for delivery Yes, for delivery Yes, but 3 U.K. delivery reliability with a strong delivery reliability reliability and cost reliability and cost and cost fmancial focus 
Delivery lead Yes, for delivery Yes, primarily 4 U.K. time, delivery Yes To an extent cost, but some 
reliability and cost reliability and cost emphasis on quality. 
Delight the customer 
5 Japan through creativity, Yes, hoshin kanri To an extent To an extent Not explicitly 
profit/cost internally 
Product perf, 
6 Japan cost/price Yes, hoshin kanri Yes Yes To an extent 
and delivery 
7 Japan Quality and cost Yes Yes To an extent To an extent 
---- -
Figure 5.6 (Continued): Summary of the data collected during the follow-up study 
- ---
Company Location Manufacturing 
Does this firm use il'i systems to induce appropriate behaviour? 
task Goal Setting Performance Meas. Feedback Reward 
Product perf, 
8 Japan reliability, cost Yes, hoshin kanri Yes Yes Not explicitly 
and efficiency 
9 Japan Reliability Yes, hoshin kanri Yes Yes Not explicitly 
and efficiency 
10 Japan Cost Yes, hoshin kanri Yes Yes Not explicitly 
11 Japan Cost, delivery lead Yes, hoshin kanri Not discussed Not discussed Not discussed time and flexibility 
12 Japan High quality, Yes Yes Yes To an extent high performance 
Product perf, 
13 Japan delivery reliability, Yes, hoshin kanri To an extent Yes Not explicitly 
profit & selling price 
14 Japan Not discussed Yes, hoshin kanri Not discussed Not discussed Not discussed 
points should be noted. The first is that despite careful design some systems 
actually encourage the firm's employees to take actions which conflict with the 
manufacturing task. Hence the system congruence audit needs to include a 
mechanism which can highlight this. Second, it is questionable whether reward 
should be directly linked to the manufacturing task. 
5.3: Operationalising the model21 
The pilot version of the system congruence audit was based on a modified 
version of the model shown in figure 5.1 and took account of the question of 
whether a firm's reward systems should be used explicitly to reinforce the 
importance of the manufacturing task (see figure 5.7). 
Figure 5.7: Modified stimulus-response model 
R d ewar 
.... 
.... Goal Setting ..... Performance -
-
..- Measurement ~ 
Feedback on Performance 
As mentioned in the introduction, auditing the level of system congruence 
involves examining the extent to which the firm's systems stimulate decision 
making and action consistent with the manufacturing task. To do this the 
manufacturing task must be defined, the firm's systems identified, and the 
extent to which they induce appropriate behaviour determined. The first step in 
this process - the definition of the manufacturing task - forms p art of the full 
congruence audit described in chapter 6. Hence there are two stages to the 
system congruence audit; (a) identifying what the firm's systems are and (b) 
determining whether they lead to appropriate behaviour. As with the goal 
congruence audit a structured interview was used to collect the relevant data. 
The format of this interview and the associated data collection techniques are 
21 This section is based on Neely and Wilson (1992c). 
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described in this section. 
5.3.1: Identifying the systems 
Following the standard first phase of the interview, described in the previous 
chapter, the stimUlus-response model shown in figure 5.7 was explained to the 
interviewee. Experience gained during the shadowing exercise and follow up 
study showed that the terms goal setting, performance measurement, feedback 
on performance and reward are often confused. Hence as the stimulus-
response model was being explained it was emphasised that; (a) goal setting 
referred to planned attainment targets; that is targets, or goals, that are set and 
pursued, (b) performance measurement referred to past action and is the 
mechanism used to monitor how successfully the planned actions were 
executed, (c) feedback on performance referred to information fed back to the 
individual either about their, the department's or the firm's performance and (d) 
reward referred to all forms of reward, some of which may be non-fmancial. 
Once the model had been explained, the interviewee was asked to identify 
which systems they were subject to. A hierarchy of probing questions was 
used. The frrst level of probe was an open question of the form; "what goal 
setting (performance measurement, information feedback, reward) systems are 
you subject to". As soon as the interviewee appeared to feel that they had 
identified all of the relevant systems they were prompted with a question of the 
form; "any others". The third level of probe involved asking the interviewee 
direct questions which sought to identify if there were subject to any other 
systems which related directly to the various elements of the manufacturing task 
(the manufacturing missions). Hence, at the third level of probe, questions of 
the following format were asked; "are you subject to any goal setting 
(performance measurement, information feedback, reward) systems which you 
have not yet identified and which relate to, for example, delivery of products on 
time". The output from the first stage of the interview, then, w~ a list of the 
systems the interviewee was subject to. A check sheet of the format shown in 
figure 5.8 was used to collect the data. 
140 
Figure 5.8: Check sheet used to record data on the organisation's systems 
Questions Goal Setting Performance Information Reward Measurement Feedback 
Open 
Prompt 
Manufacturing 
Mission A 
Manufacturing 
Mission B 
Manufacturing 
Mission C 
Manufacturing 
Mission D 
Manufacturing 
Mission E 
5.3.2: Determining the level of system congruence 
The next stage of the interview was designed to establish the extent to which the 
systems that had already been identified induced decision making and action 
consistent with the various elements of the manufacturing task (the 
manufacturing missions). There appear to be two dimensions to this problem. 
The first involves identifying what signals a particular system sends to the 
interviewee. The second relates to determining how much the system 
influences the interviewee. Take, for example, company A's goal setting 
system - the weekly production schedule. While this was explicitly related to 
the manufacturing mission "we must ensure that we deliver on time" the head of 
one department claimed that he ignored the schedule - hence the system appears 
to have had little influence over his actions. This is an important point as it 
emphasises that simply designing strategic control systems so that they send the 
right signals is insufficient. One also has to ensure that the appropriate level of 
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importance is attributed to the system. Figure 5.9 shows this diagrammatically. 
Figure 5.9: The Two Dimensions of Influence 
How much does 
the system 
influence your . 
behaviour? 
Extent to which the 
system induces decision 
making and action 
consistent with the 
manufacturing task. 
What does the 
system encourage 
you to do? 
In the second stage of the interview, then, two sets of questions had to be 
asked. First the interviewee had to be asked what each of the previously 
identified systems encouraged them to do. Next the interviewee had to be asked 
how strongly each system influenced them. The check sheet shown in figure 
5.10 was used to collect the data that were generated. 
In the first column the names of the systems identified in the first part of the 
interview were entered. To complete the second column the interviewee was 
asked how much each system influenced their actions. These data were 
generated using Saaty's pairwise comparison process (see chapter 4). Hence 
the interviewee was first asked which of two systems influenced their actions 
most and then to identify the number from Saaty's scale which most accurately 
reflected the strength of their feeling. The remaining columns were filled by 
asking the interviewee whether the system under examination encouraged them 
to take actions consistent with the various manufacturing missions. A scale of 
+2 to -2 was used for this. If the system strongly encouraged the interviewee to 
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take actions consistent with the mission a value of +2 was entered in the 
appropriate cell. If, however, the system had no relationship with the mission a 
value of zero was entered into the cell. And if the system strongly encouraged 
the interviewee to pursue a course of action which was inconsistent with the 
mission a value of -2 was entered into the cell. The values +1 and -1 were used 
to signify intermediate levels of encouragement 
Figure 5.10: Data collection check sheet for the second stage of the interview 
How Does the Does the 
strongly system system 
Systems does this 
encourage you encourage you 
system to take actions to take actions 
congruent with congruent with influence 
you? manufacturing manufacturing 
mission A? mission B? 
L=100 
Multiplying the second column by the entry in each of the remaining cells gave 
an indication of the extent to which the system under examination encouraged 
the interviewee to pursue a course of action congruent with a specific 
manufacturing mission. Summing the rows gave a measure of the total 
emphasis that the firm's systems placed on each mission. These calculations 
will be explored more fully in the next chapter, when the integrated audit is 
presented. The remainder of this section focuses on the data collection process 
as the pilot interviews showed that this needed to be enhanced. 
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5.3.3: Pilot study 
Once the pilot version of the system congruence audit had been developed it 
was briefly piloted in company C. As the concept of system congruence had 
already been explored during the testing of the stimulus-response model shown 
in figure 5.1 and the data collection techniques used in the pilot version of the 
audit were similar to those used in the goal congruence audit, it was decided that 
the methodology would only be piloted on a small scale. Hence two people, 
one foreman and one operative, were interviewed. During the interviews it 
quickly became apparent that asking the interviewees to identify the systems 
was a mistake because they were unable to remember all of them. Figures 5.11 
and 5.12 show the systems that the two interviewees were able to identify. 
Table 5.3 lists the systems that were identified by all the managers of 
manufacturing at their next monthly production meeting (see chapter 6). 
Figure 5.11: Systems identified by a foreman during an interview 
Questions Goal Setting Performance Information Reward Measurement Feedback 
Spot 
Open Target times Informal Not bonus, & due dates relevant flat rate, 
plus rate 
Prompt 
Manufacturing 
Mission A 
Manufacturing 
Mission B 
-
Manufacturing 
Mission C 
Manufacturing 
Mission D 
Manufacturing 
Mission E 
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Figure 5.12: Systems identified by an operative during an interview22 
Questions Goal Setting Perfonnance Infonnation Reward Measurement Feedback 
Spot 
Open Infonnal Infonnal bonus, 
flat rate 
Prompt Xmas 
turkey 
Manufacturing 
Mission A 
Manufacturing 
Mission B 
Manufacturing 
Mission C 
Manufacturing 
Mission D 
Manufacturing 
MissionE 
Because of the problems each interviewee experienced with defining the 
systems the remainder of the pilot interview had to be aborted. This, however, 
did not cause a problem because Saaty's pairwise comparison process had 
already been used in the goal congruence audit and discussion with the 
interviewees showed that they would be quite happy to use a +2 to -2 scale to 
say whether they thought the system under examination encouraged them to 
make decisions and take actions which were consistent or inconsistent with the 
manufacturing task, especially if the questions were incorporated into a 
questionnaire. As will be seen from the integrated congruence audit described 
in chapter six, then, the brief piloting of the system congruence audit enabled 
the author to identify two ways of enhancing it. The first was to ask the 
22 The manufacturing missions referred to in figures 5.11 and 5.12 had already been dermed by 
company C's management group and reviewed by the managing director as part of the 
integrated congruence audit. See chapter 6 for more detail. 
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management group to identify the relevant systems in advance. The second was 
to design a questionnaire to collect some of the necessary data. It should be 
noted that an additional benefit of the questionnaire was that it created more time 
for the author to analyse the data during the course of the interview. 
Table 5.3: Systems identified during the monthly production meeting 
Systems applying Systems applying 
to the foreman to the operatives 
Routing card 
Goal Setting 
Mthly prod meeting 
Wkly prod meeting Routing card 
Factory call off 
requirements sheet 
Perfonnance Cost report Measurement 
Feedback Informal feedback Informal feedback 
on performance on performance 
Basic weekly salary 
Basic salary Guaranteed bonus 
Reward Xmas bonus (turkey) Plus rate 
Annual cash bonus Spot bonus 
Xmas bonus (turkey) 
5.4: Summary 
In this chapter the testing and development of the system congruence audit has 
been described. The audit was designed to identify areas of system 
incongruence in firms. The preliminary investigations, involving a week long 
shadowing exercise and follow-up discussions with managers of fourteen 
companies, showed that when auditing system congruence one has to consider 
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all the elements of a traditional strategic control system, namely; goal setting, 
performance measurement, information feedback and reward. A pilot data 
collection methodology was presented and tested. Following this minor 
modifications to the methodology were proposed. The focus of the last two 
chapters has been on the development and testing of the isolated audits. In the 
next one an integrated version of these audits will be documented and it will be 
shown how this congruence audit can be used to identify some of the reasons 
why a fIrm may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONGRUENCE AUDIT 
6.0: Introduction 
Chapters four and five discussed phases one and two of this research - the 
development and testing of the pilot versions of the goal and system congruence 
audits. The main themes raised in those chapters can be summarised as 
follows: 
(a) The manufacturing task consists of a number of factors 
(manufacturing missions) which are themselves a function of both the 
company's objectives and the customer's requirements. 
(b) The lack of goal congruence is often due to the prioritisation of the 
manufacturing missions rather than their defmition. 
(c) Manufacturing managers use the goal setting, performance 
measurement, feedback and reward systems to encourage decision 
making and action consistent with the manufacturing missions. 
(d) Two things influence whether a given system induces appropriate 
behaviour; what the system encourages employees to do and how 
much the system influences their behaviour. 
A number of process points also emerged during the piloting of the goal and 
system congruence audits. These can be summarised as follows: 
(a) To minimise the length of the individual interviews the manufacturing 
missions should be defmed in advance. 
(b) To minimise the length of the individual interviews the systems used 
to induce decision making and action consistent with the 
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manufacturing missions should be identified in advance. 
(c) The reliability of the individual interviews can be enhanced by 
structuring them formally. 
(d) The validity of the individual interviews can be enhanced by using a 
computer to analyse the data gathered during them and then asking the 
interviewee to comment on the results. 
Together these themes and process points provide the guidelines which shaped 
the design of the congruence audit. Following its development this audit was 
applied to two firms to establish whether it could be used to identify some of the 
reasons why they might have been unable to realise their manufacturing 
strategies. The data gathered during these case studies and the structure of the 
congruence audit are documented in this chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter has been split into four sections. In section 6.1 
the congruence audit is described. In sections 6.2 and 6.3 the case studies are 
presented. In section 6.4 the chapter is summarised. 
6.1: The congruence audit 
The congruence audit consisted of two phases. The first involved a group 
discussion with a senior management team. The second comprised a series of 
structured interviews. During the group discussion the manufacturing missions 
were defined and prioritised, and the firm's systems were identified. In the 
structured interviews each interviewee was asked to prioritise the pre-defined 
manufacturing missions, to quantify the extent to which the firm's systems 
encouraged them to act in a manner consistent with the manufacturing missions, 
and to explain any discrepan.cies that emerged. The actual format of the 
management group discussion and individual interviews is detailed in sections 
6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively. 
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6.1.1: Management group discussion 
Figure 6.1 shows a flowchart which summarises the structure of the 
management group discussion. As can be seen the discussion consisted of 
seven stages. During the introduction the purpose of the discussion and its 
structure was explained. Following this the management group was asked to 
identify which product or customer they wished to focus on (Hill, 1985; 
Skinner, 1974a; Wheelwright, 1978). This was done to ensure that everyone 
adopted a common perspective. The product or customer chosen was formally 
recorded and the management group was reminded that they were focussing on 
product "XYZ" or customer "ABC" at regular intervals during the remainder of 
the discussion. 
As mentioned earlier a manufacturing task consists of a number of 
manufacturing missions which are themselves a function of a variety of internal 
and external factors. The purpose of the third stage of the management group 
discussion - brainstorming - was to identify these factors. The facilitator began 
the brainstorming session by presenting the framework shown in figure 6.2. 
The inclusion of the catch-all category "other" should be noted. While it might 
be possible to defme the manufacturing missions in terms of quality, time, price 
(cost) and flexibility, there are "other" factors which can be important to either a 
company or its customers. Take, for example, Western society's current 
concern for the environment. It is likely that manufacturing industry will come 
under increasing pressure from environmentalists during the next few years. 
The inclusion of the category "other" ensures that there is scope within the 
framework for the importance of such issues to be acknowledged. 
Once figure 6.2 had been explained the management group was asked what they 
thought would make people buy their fmn' s products rather than those of their 
competitors. The use of the conditional tense in this question should be noted. 
This encouraged the management team to identify both those factors that already 
offered the fmn a competitive advantage, as well as those that might do so in the 
future. 
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Figure 6.1: Structure of the management group discussion 
Introduction 
~ r 
Decide on 
the focus 
~, 
Brainstorming 
~r 
Refining and 
defming 
~ Ir 
Ranking 
and rating 
~ r 
Pairwise 
companson 
~ r 
Identifying 
the systems 
A series of probing questions were used to enhance the validity of the data 
collected during this stage. The first level of probe was an open question of the 
form; "what would make people buy your products rather than those of your 
competitors". The second was a prompt such as; "are there any other things 
that you can think of which might make people buy your products rather than 
those of your competitors". The third level of probe was a direct question of 
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the fonn; "do you think that people would buy your products rather than those 
of your competitors if they were more aesthetically pleasing". This third 
question was repeated for all the relevant dimensions of quality, time, cost, and 
tlexibility (see figure 4.23). Once the management team had identified those 
factors that were externally important they were asked to identify those that 
were internally important. A similar hierarchy of probing questions was used. 
Figure 6.2: Framework used to define the manufacturing missions 
External Manufacturing Internal 
Market ........ M·· -- Corporate .. lSSlOns ~ 
Requirements Objectives 
~ 
~ 
6 
~ 
.5 
~ 
-.. 
~ 
CI'.) 
0 
U 
--~ 
u 
.c: 
~ 
a 
s 
.0 
• ...-1 
~ 
ti: 
~ 
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In the fourth stage of the management group discussion the manufacturing 
missions were defined. This was an iterative process during which the 
management group was asked to answer the following question; "what are the 
implications for the manufacturing function of those factors that have been 
identified as internally and externally important". Figure 6.3 shows a 
completed version of the framework shown in figure 6.2. It summarises the 
manufacturing missions defined by directors of company B23 and shows how 
these relate to the factors that were previously identified as internally and 
externally important. Take, for example, the factors; value for money, 
profitable machine, profit, market share, improved liquidity, and project 
funding. Following much debate the directors of company B decided that the 
implication of these factors could best be summed up by two manufacturing 
missions; (a) project costs must be minimised and (b) idle work in progress 
must be minimised. 
During the next two stages of the group discussion the manufacturing missions 
were prioritised. This was done first by the individual members of the 
management group and then by the group as a whole. The reason that the 
managers were asked to prioritise the manufacturing missions individually was 
that this maximised the probability that any differences of opinion that existed 
within the group would emerge. To save time the managers were simply asked 
to individually rank and rate the manufacturing missions. The data generated 
were recorded on a check sheet of the format shown in figure 6.4 and any 
apparent differences of opinion explored. 
Next the group as a whole was asked to prioritise the missions. The pairwise 
comparison process described in section 4.3.3 was used to do this. The 
managers were first asked to say which of two missions was of greatest 
importance to the long run success of the firm an<i then to identify the number 
on Saaty' s scale that most accurately quantified the strength of their feeling. 
23 Following the piloting of the goal congruence audit the directors of company B decided that 
they wanted to develop a manufacturing strategy for the ftml. The author facilitated the ftrst 
stage of this process - the deftnition of the manufacturing missions - using the previously 
described methodology. Figure 6.3 shows the result of this. 
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This process ensured that any remaining differences of opinion were resolved 
as the management group had to reach a consensus before any data were entered 
into the pairwise comparison matrix. As usual the data were analysed 
immediately and fed back in the form of a pie-chart The consistency ratio (see 
Appendix II) provided an indication of the validity of the data that had been 
collected. 
Figure 6.3: Company B' s manufacturing missions 
Market ..... Manufacturini! _ Corporate 
Requirements Missions Objectives 
Quality, All products must be 
Company ~ reliability , manufactured so that 
~ servIce, they conform to the lmage, 
::s durability , customer's technological 0 development. aesthetics. specification. 
Time to 
All products must be customer, Q) deli vered to the ~ delivery on time. agreed schedule. 
Project costs must 
Profit, market -.. be minimised. Q) Value for share, improve ~ money, Idle work in liquidity, 
-- Profitable project .... progress must be CI) 0 machine. funding. U minimised. 
~ 
~ 
.0 
.~ 
ti: 
Innovation, 
Co-operative 
Support work involvement to $...I 
improve efficiency force, improve ~ customer relations, should be cohesion. 
safety. encouraged .. 
In the final stage of the discussion - identification of the firm's systems - the 
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check sheet shown in figure 5.8 was used. First the stimulus-response model 
shown in figure 5.7 was explained. Then the managers were asked to identify 
which systems were used to reinforce the importance of the manufacturing 
missions. The hierarchy of probing questions described in section 5.3.1 was 
employed to ensure that all the appropriate systems were identified. 
Figure 6.4: Check sheet used to record management rankings and ratings 
G 
r 
Name of Manager 0 
u 
p 
Mission 
Ratings 
Rankings 
Mission 
Ratings 
Rankings 
Mission 
Ratings 
Rankings 
Mission 
Ratings 
Rankings 
Mission 
Ratings 
Rankings 
At the end of the management group discussion, then, the fmn' s manufacturing 
missions had been defined and prioritised, and the systems used to induce 
decision making and action consistent with them had been identified. Together 
these two sets of data formed the basis for the next stage of the congruence 
audit, the individual interviews. 
6.1.2: Individual interviews 
Figure 6.5 shows a flow chart which summarises the structure of the individual 
interviews. As can be seen these interviews consisted of six stages. Initially 
the purpose of the study was explained and the interviewee was assured that 
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any data gathered during the interview would remain confidential. Next the 
interviewer asked background questions of the format suggested in section 
4.3.1. The data generated were recorded on the check sheet similar to the one 
shown in figure 4.6. As previously discussed, the purpose of this phase of the 
interview was to; help the interviewee relax and furnish the interviewer with 
information that may have proved relevant in the subsequent discussions. 
Figure 6.5: Structure of the individual interviews 
Introduction 
" 
Background 
information 
" Questionnaire 
~~ 
Influence of 
systems 
~, 
Prioritising the 
missions 
~r 
Discussion of 
discrepancies 
In the third stage of the interview data were collected which showed whether the 
previously identified goal setting, performance ,measurement, feedback and 
reward systems encouraged the interviewee to take actions congruent with the 
pre-defined manufacturing missions. These data were generated as the 
interviewee completed a company specific questionnaire. Each page of the 
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questionnaire dealt with a different system. Each question focussed on a 
different mission. Figure 6.6 shows the generic structure of each question. 
Figure 6.6: The generic structure of each question 
Q. The ''xyz system" encourages me to "abc 
manufacturing mission". 
o Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o No relationship 
o Disagree 
o Strongly disagree 
If the interviewee were to indicate that they strongly agreed with the statement in 
figure 6.6 then it would be assumed that the system under examination strongly 
encouraged them to take actions congruent with the manufacturing mission. If, 
on the other hand, they disagreed with the statement it would be assumed that 
the system actually encouraged them to pursue courses of action which 
conflicted with the manufacturing mission. It should be noted, however, that 
there are actually two reasons why an interviewee may disagree with the 
statement. The first is as described above, but the second is if the system does 
not relate to the manufacturing mission under examination. Take, for example, 
the statement "the management by results system encourages me to provide 
products that work the first time and thereafter for as long as required". An 
interviewee might disagree with this statement because the management by 
results system actively encourages him not to provide that work the first 
time and thereafter for as long as required. Alternatively he might disagree with 
the statement, quite simply, because the management by results system does 
not encourage him to provide that work the first time and thereafter for as 
long as required. For the purpose of this questionnaire, however, the 
appropriate response in the latter case is no relationship and not disagree. 
Hence whenever an interviewee disagreed with one of the statements he would 
be asked to confmn that the system actually encouraged him to pursue a course 
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of action which conflicted with the manufacturing mission under examination, 
rather than simply bearing no relationship to it 
The data collected in the third stage of the interview were entered directly onto a 
spreadsheet of the format shown in figure 6.7. To do this the responses were 
converted into a numerical scale. A value of +2 corresponded to a response of 
strongly agree, a value of 0 corresponded to a response of no relationship, and 
a value of -2 corresponded to the response strongly disagree. 
Figure 6.7: Check sheet for recording data generated during the interviews 
Manufacturing Missions 
System Influence A B C D E F G 
1 +1 +1 +1 0 +2 -1 +2 
2 -2 +2 0 +1 +1 +1 +2 
3 -1 +2 +2 0 +1 0 +2 
4 0 +1 +2 -1 +2 0 +2 
5 +1 +2 +2 +1 -1 +2 0 
Emphasis from 
systems 
Actual prioritisations 
Management Group 
The data shown in the first row of figure 6.7, then, suggest that system 1: 
-Encouraged the interviewee concerned to pursue courses of action which 
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were congruent with manufacturing missions A, B, and C. 
-Bore no relationship to manufacturing mission D. 
-Strongly encouraged the interviewee concerned to pursue courses of action 
which were congruent with manufacturing missions E and G. 
-Encouraged the interviewee concerned to pursue courses of action which 
conflicted with manufacturing mission F. 
This stage of the interview, then, generated data which showed what the finn's 
systems encouraged an interviewee to do. As mentioned earlier, however, the 
extent to which a specific system induces behaviour consistent with a given 
manufacturing mission is a function of what the system encourages someone to 
do and how strongly it encourages them to do it. Hence the fourth stage of the 
interview sought to collect data which quantified how much each system 
influenced the interviewee. These data were generated using the pairwise 
comparison process described in section 4.3.3. First the interviewee was asked 
which of two systems influenced their behaviour most. Second they were 
asked to identify the number from Saaty's scale which most accurately reflected 
the strength of their feeling. The resultant data were analysed immediately, 
presented to the interviewee on a pie-chart, and then entered onto the 
spreadsheet shown in figure 6.8 under the column headed influence. 
Once the third and fourth stages of the interview had been completed the extent 
to which the ftrm's systems induced behaviour consistent with each of the 
manufacturing missions could be calculated. Multiplying the influence the 
system had on the interviewee by what it encouraged them to do (the data 
gathered from the questionnaire) gave a measure of how much a given system 
reinforced the importance of a specific manufacturing mission. To calculate the 
total emphasis the systems placed on a given manufacturing mission, then, it 
was necessary to calculate the .emphasis that the individual systems placed on 
each manufacturing mission and sum the results. Take, for example, 
manufacturing mission A. The data in figure 6.8 show that: 
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(a) System 1 had a 25% influence over the interviewee's decisions and 
actions, and encouraged (+ 1) him to behaviour in a manner congruent 
with manufacturing mission A. Therefore system 1 induced 
behaviour consistent with manufacturing mission A to the tune of 25 
(1x25). 
(b) System 2 had a 10% influence over the interviewee's decisions and 
actions, but strongly encouraged (-2) him to behaviour in a manner 
incongruent with manufacturing mission A. Therefore system 2 
induced behaviour consistent with manufacturing mission A to the 
tune of -20 (-2xlO). 
(c) System 3 had a 10% influence over the interviewee's decisions and 
actions, and encouraged (1) him to behaviour in a manner congruent 
with manufacturing mission A. Therefore system 3 induced 
behaviour consistent with mission A to the tune of 10 (lxlO). 
(d) System 4 had a 15% influence over the interviewee's decisions and 
actions, but bears no relationship (0) to manufacturing mission A. 
Therefore system 4 induced behaviour consistent with mission A to 
the tune of 0 (OxI5). 
(e) System 5 had a 40% influence over the interviewee's decisions and 
actions, and encouraged (1) him to behaviour in a manner incongruent 
with manufacturing mission A. Therefore system 5 induced 
behaviour consistent with mission A to the tune of 40 (lx40). 
(0 Together the systems induced behaviour congruent with 
manufacturing missio.n A to the tune of 35 (25-20-10+0+40). 
Figure 6.8 shows the completed calculations. Once these data had been 
generated they were nonnalised and expressed as percentages (see figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.8: Calculating the extent to which the systems reinforce the missions 
Manufacturing Missions 
System Influence A B C D E F G 
1 25% +1 +1 +1 0 +2 -1 +2 
2 10% 
-2 +2 0 +1 +1 +1 +2 
3 10% 
-1 +2 +2 0 +1 0 +2 
4 15% 0 +1 +2 -1 +2 0 +2 
5 40% +1 +2 +2 +1 -1 +2 0 
Emphasis from 35 160 155 35 60 65 120 systems 
Actual prioritisations 
Management Group 
In the next stage of the interview the interviewee was shown the manufacturing 
missions defined by the management group and asked to prioritise them. 
Saaty's pairwise comparison process was used and each interviewee was asked 
questions of the form; "which do you think is more important to the long run 
success of the fmn - manufacturing mission A or manufacturing mission B". 
The data were analysed immediately and added to the spreadsheet to complete 
the row labelled "actual prioritisations". The last row, labelled "management 
group", contained a summary of the way in which the manufacturing missions 
had been previously prioritised by the management group. Figure 6.9 shows a 
completed version of the spreadsheet 
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Figure 6.9: Completed check sheet for the individual interviews 
Manufacturing Missions 
System Influence A B C D E F G 
1 25% +1 +1 +1 0 +2 -1 +2 
2 10% -2 +2 0 +1 +1 +1 +2 
3 10% -1 +2 +2 0 +1 0 +2 
4 15% 0 +1 +2 -1 +2 0 +2 
5 40% +1 +2 +2 +1 -1 +2 0 
Emphasis from 6% 25% 25% 6% 10% 10% 19% 
systems 
Actual prioritisations 4% 15% 24% 8% 5% 6% 38% 
Management Group 14% 5% 27% 10% 5% 13% 26% 
The fmal stage of the interview was the discussion. This involved examining 
two issues; (a) were there any discrepancies between the way in which the 
interviewee and the management group had prioritised the manufacturing 
missions and (b) were there any discrepancies between the way in which the 
interviewee had prioritised the manufacturing missions and the extent to which 
the systems induced decision making and action consistent with them. In both 
cases bar charts showing the relevant data were used to stimulate the 
discussion. Initially the interviewee was shown how their prioritisations related 
to those of the management group. Such a bar chart, based on the data in figure 
6.9, is shown in figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10: Comparing the interviewee's and management group's priorities 
40% 
35% 
P 30% 
e 
r 25% 
c 
e 20% 
n 
t 15% a 
g 
10% e 
5% 
0% 
Mission A Mission B Mission C Mission D Mission E Mission F Mission G 
Manufacturing missions 
II Actual Prioritisations D Management Group 
As figure 6.10 highlights the major areas of discrepancy in this instance were 
with regard to the prioritisation of mission's A, Band G. Hence the 
interviewee would be asked asked if they could think of any reasons that might 
explain why; (a) the management group felt that mission A was more important 
than them and (b) the management group felt that missions B and G were less 
important than them. Next the interviewee was shown a chart of the same 
format as the one in figure 6.11. This identifies that the systems place 
considerably more emphasis on mission B and considerable less on mission G 
than acknowledged in the interviewee's prioritisations. Once again the reasons 
for the discrepancies would be explored. As the data presented in the next two 
sections will show it is principally through these discussions that some of the 
reasons why a fmn may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy can be 
identified. 
6.2: Audit in company C 
In the introduction to this chapter it was explained that once the integrated 
congruence audit had been developed it was applied to two firms. This section 
presents the data gathered during the first of these cases. The next one 
documents the data collected during the second24. Together the two cases show 
how the congruence audit can be used. 
Company C designs, manufactures and installs a wide range of hardwood, 
timber, plastic laminate and solid surfacing material products for the 
construction and shop fitting industries. Following a demerger from its 
previous owners in 1985 the firm grew rapidly for five years. By 1990 its 
turnover had increased five fold, to £6 million, and it employed 120 people in 
the Midlands and a further 80 in London and the South. The data presented in 
this section were collected when the firm's factory and head office, both of 
which are situated in the East Midlands, were the subject of a congruence audit 
24 The raw data collected during both of these cases are presented in Appendix V. 
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Figure 6.11: Comparing the interviewee's priorities and the emphasis from the systems 
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6.2.1: Management group discussion - company C 
The audit began with a management group discussion. Those present included; 
the contracts manager, the scheduling manager, the production controller, the 
quality coordinator and the master scheduler. Following the introduction, the 
group decided to focus on the supply of door sets. Company C offers two 
types of service - supply, or supply and fit. The supply of door sets was 
widely acknowledged as company C's core product as it accounted for 40% of 
turnover. Figure 6.12 shows the market requirements and corporate objectives 
that were identified as relating to the supply of door sets during the 
brainstorming stage of the management group discussion. 
Once the requirements and objectives had been identified their implications for 
manufacturing were discussed. This can best be described as an iterative 
discussion because it involved the gradual refinement of the manufacturing 
missions. After much debate these were defined as shown in table 6.1. 
In the next stage of the group discussion the managers were asked to 
individually rank and rate the previously defined manufacturing missions. 
Ranking involved placing the missions in rank order of importance. Hence 
each manager was asked to assign a value of one to the most important mission 
and five to the least important mission. The rating was carried out using a 
numerical scale. Each manager was given a copy of the scale and asked to 
assign whatever rating they felt was appropriate to each mission. The scale was 
structured in the same way as Saaty's pairwise comparison scale. Hence: 
-1 was said to mean the manufacturing mission was unimportant. 
-3 was said to mean the manufacturing mission was of weak importance. 
-5 was said to mean the manufacturing mission was of strong importance. 
-7 was said to mean the manufacturing mission was of very strong 
importance. 
-9 was said to mean the manufacturing mission was of absolute importance. 
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Figure 6.12: Market requirements and company objectives for company C 
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concerns. 
Figures 6.13 and 6.14, respectively, show how the managers ranked and rated 
the missions. It should be noted that the quality controller was called away 
shortly after the manufacturing missions had been defined and hence did not 
participate in this or the subsequent stages of the discussion. 
Due to time constraints the graphs shown in figures 6.13 and 6.14 were not 
drawn during the discussion. The data they contain, however, were fed back 
using a matrix of the format shown in figure 6.15. As mentioned earlier the 
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purpose of asking the managers to rank and rate individually the manufacturing 
missions was to reveal any differences of opinion that existed within the group. 
The data shown in figure 6.15 highlight two points. First, the production 
controller, has rated everything as absolutely important (a nine on the scale) and 
simply ranked the missions in the same order in which they were defined. 
While these data might accurately reflect his opinion they suggest that it might 
be necessary to ask him direct questions during the pairwise comparison 
process if his true opinions are to be drawn out. Second, while there is 
widespread agreemen t that manufacturing missions A (delivery on time) and B 
(producing products which conform to the specifications) are the most 
im portant, there is less consistency with regard to the prioritisation of the 
remaining missions. Hence it is likely that these will need debating more fully. 
Table 6.1: The manufacturing missions as defined 
by the management group - company C 
Manufacturing Definitions Missions 
A Products must be delivered on time. 
Products must be made so that they 
B conform to the drawing specification 
the first time. 
C Products must be made with the 
minimum direct labour cost 
D The materials which provide the highest 
added value should be used. 
Employees should constantly be trained 
E so that they have the ability to do a 
variety of jobs. 
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Figure 6.14: Rating of company CiS manufacturing missions 
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In the next stage of the management group discussion the pairwise comparison 
process was used to prioritise the manufacturing missions. The process began 
as the managers were asked to answer the following question; "which do you 
think is more important to the long run success of this firm - manufacturing 
mission A or manufacturing mission B". Once the group had decided which of 
the two missions was the more important they were asked to identify the 
number on Saaty's scale which most accurately quantified the strength of their 
feeling. Figure 6.16 shows the way in which the managers of company C 
prioritised the manufacturing missions. The data generated during the pairwise 
comparison process were analysed immediately and each member of the 
management group confirmed that the resultant pie chart summarised the 
discussion and reflected their opinion. 
Figure 6.15: Check sheet used to feedback individual's rankings and ratings 
M 
n en ~ ~ n ~ ""'i 0 0 ::r ~ 0 ::3 ~ Q. ""'i f"* Q. ""'i 0 
3 \J'.l n ~ 3 n 0 '"0 
anufacturing fJQ fJQ ::r = ""'i ~ f"* 
""'i . . Q. mlSSlons 
Ratings 7 9 9 9 34 
A 
Rankings 2 1 1 1 1.25 
Ratings 9 9 8 9 35 
B 
Rankings 1 2 2 2 1.75 
Ratings 5 7 6 9 27 
C 
Rankings 3 4 4 3 3.5 
Ratings 5 7 8 9 29 
D 
Rankings 4 5 3 4 4 
Ratings 5 7 5 9 26 
E 
Rankings 5 3 5 5 4.5 
As both the supervisors and operatives of company C were to be included in the 
next stage of the congruence audit - the individual interviews - it was decided 
that the firm's systems would be identified during the next monthly production 
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Figure 6.16: Company CiS manufacturing missions as prioritised by the management group 
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meeting, rather than at the end of the discussion. Doing this meant that the 
managing director, the production manager, and all the supervisors, would all 
be able to participate in the process. In addition it also provided an opportunity 
for the author to review the manufacturing missions with the managing director 
before the systems used to induce behaviour consistent with them were 
identified. 
6.2.2: Discussion with managing director - company C 
Prior to the group discussion the managing director had suggested that it might 
be better if he did not attend the meeting as his presence might have inhibited the 
rest of the management team. Hence it was agreed that the manufacturing 
missions would first be defined and prioritised, and then verified by the 
managing director. Company C has a very flat organisational hierarchy and no 
manufacturing director. It was therefore important that the managing director 
played some part in the defmition of the manufacturing missions as this ensured 
that someone who was primarily concerned with strategic issues was involved 
in the process. 
As table 6.2 shows on reviewing the manufacturing missions the managing 
director made three changes. First he redefined mission C so that it focussed on 
the minimisation of total and not simply direct labour cost. Second he deleted 
mission D because he felt that although it was important it was not a mission for 
the manufacturing function. Third he added a new mission - one which related 
to teamwork. The fact that these changes were made immediately raised two 
issues. First there was the question of whose missions were the right ones -
i.e. whose should be used in the remainder of the audit? Second there was the 
question of why these differences of opinion existed. 
The first of these questions was relatively easy to answer. As mentioned earlier 
company C had a very flat organisational hierarchy and no manufacturing 
director. The managing director was the firm's principal strategist and hence it 
was decided to use the manufacturing missions that he had defined in the 
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remainder of the study. The answer to the second question was more complex. 
The first change - replacing direct cost by indirect cost - was understandable and 
a relatively minor one. The second change - deleting manufacturing mission D 
was also logical. The managing director saw mission D not as a manufacturing 
mission - manufacturing had little or no control over whether the materials that 
provided the highest added value were used - but as a commercial or contracts 
mission. And indeed one of the more dominant participants in the management 
group discussion was the contracts manager. Hence perhaps the inclusion of 
this manufacturing mission was due to him adopting a commercial perspective, 
rather than focussing on what manufacturing actually had to, and in fact could, 
do. The reason for the third change - the inclusion of a manufacturing mission 
that related to teamwork - was similar. As shown in figure 6.12 the 
management group identified "improve cohesion" as one of the company 
objectives, however, they did not see this primarily as manufacturing's role. 
The managing director, on the other hand, recognised that the majority of the 
fmn's resources were part of the manufacturing function and hence felt that if 
he could stimulate teamwork in manufacturing it would spread through the 
organisation. In answer to the second question, then, the differences appear to 
have been due to confusion over whether specific tasks were primarily the role 
of manufacturing. 
The definition of company C's manufacturing mlSSlons raises another 
interesting issue a it can be argued that missions D (teamwork) and E (training) 
are not manufacturing missions at all. Indeed the traditional model of 
manufacturing strategy is based on the assumption that the manufacturing task, 
and hence the manufacturing missions, state what manufacturing has to do. 
While the manufacturing policies state how it will do it. According to the 
traditional model missions D and E, then, are really policies. In the case of 
company C, however, they had been elevated to the status of manufacturing 
missions because they were concrete policies. That is, it had been decided that 
manufacturing must continually train the work force (mission E) and try to 
generate a team spirit (mission D), in the same way as it had been decided that 
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manufacturing must deliver high quality (mission B) products when promised 
(mission A) and minimise the cost base (mission C). This distinction between 
the manufacturing task and the policy decisions will be explored more fully in 
chapter 7. 
Table 6.2: Manufacturing missions as redefined by the managing director 
Manufacturing 
Definitions Missions 
A Products must be delivered on time. 
B 
Products must be made so that they 
confonn to the drawing specification 
the first time. 
C Products must be made with 
the minimum cost 
D A team spirit should be encouraged and 
maintained within the work force. 
Employees should constantly be trained 
E so that they have the ability to do a 
variety of jobs. 
As the manufacturing missions defined by the managing director were going to 
be used for the remainder of the audit the managing director was asked to 
prioritise them using Saaty's pairwise comparison process. Figure 6.17 shows 
the resultant pie chart. The data this contains suggest that one of the primary 
roles of company C's manufacturing function w~ to produce products which 
conformed to the specification (mission B). At the end of February 1992 the 
quality coordinator conducted an internal audit in which he examined company 
C's outgoing product quality. When the results of that study were made public 
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Figure 6.17: Manufacturing missions as prioritised by the managing director of company C 
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the managing director commented "in section 3 of [the] report, out of 12 
projects inspected, there are only 3 which have nil percent defects, there are a 
number where the percentage defects varies between 4% and 50% and even 
100% on one occasion - this is disgraceful". 
It appears, then, that in early 1992, company C was not realising its 
manufacturing strategy. As will be seen, the interviews detailed in section 
6.2.4, which were completed prior to the publication of the quality 
coordinator's study, identify some of the reasons why this was the case. 
6.2.3: Production meeting - company C 
Table 6.3 shows the systems that were identified as reinforcing the importance 
of the manufacturing missions during company C's monthly production 
meeting. Although the routing card system was primarily used for production 
control, it also emphasised the importance of producing products which 
conformed to the specification because before any job could be passed on it had 
to be signed it off on a routing card. The factory call off requirements sheet 
was equivalent to a production schedule and reinforced the importance of 
meeting delivery promises. The cost report, which documented the cost of each 
job, was only ever circulated when a job had made a loss. Hence it highlighted 
the importance of minimising the cost base. With the exception of the monthly 
and weekly production meetings, the remaining formal systems were reward 
based. The Xmas bonus (turkey) refers to the turkey which was given to each 
employee at Christmas. The supervisor's annual cash bonus was a variable and 
one-off discretionary payment which the managing director made to individual 
managers. The operative's guaranteed bonus was a union negotiated bonus and 
was awarded to all employees who worked in the construction industry. The 
plus rate was a merit award consolidated into the operative's weekly pay. The 
spot bonus was a discretiot;lary payment of approximately £10 which 
supervisors were allowed to award individuals on a weekly basis. Once these 
systems had been identified all the data required for the individual interviews 
were available. The next section describes these interviews. 
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Table 6.3: Systems used to reinforce the 
importance of the missions - company C 
Systems applying Systems applying 
to the foreman to the operatives 
Routing card 
Goal Setting 
Mthly prod meeting 
Wldy prod meeting Routing card 
Factory call off 
requirements sheet 
Performance Cost report Measurement 
Feedback Informal feedback Informal feedback 
on performance on performance 
Basic salary 
Basic weekly salary 
Guaranteed bonus 
Reward Xmas bonus (turkey) Plus rate 
Annual cash bonus Spot bonus 
Xmas bonus (turkey) 
6.2.4: Individual interviews - company C 
The first person to be interviewed was the production manager. Figure 6.18 
compares the way in which he and the managing director prioritised the 
manufacturing missions. The chart was drawn during the interview and shown 
to the production manager. Initially he expressed surprise at the differences in 
opinion. Then he said that the managing director's actions were inconsistent 
with his prioritisations. When prompted for more information the production 
manager explained that whenever the managing director came onto the shop 
floor he asked about the schedule and not quality, and hence he couldn't 
understand how the managing director could claim to care so much about 
quality. 
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Figure 6.18: Priorities of the managing director and the production manager - company C 
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Following this four first line supervisors and nine operatives were interviewed. 
Of these, one of the interviews with one of the operatives was aborted because, 
despite repeated probing, the consistency ratio (see Appendix II) generated 
during the pairwise comparison process remained extremely poor. Figures 
6.19 through to 6.30 show the data that were collected during each interview. 
The comments below summarise the reasons offered by each interviewee when 
asked to explain any major discrepancies between their prioritisations and: 
(a) Those of the managing director. 
(b) The extent to which the systems they were subject to induced decision 
making and action consistent with the manufacturing missions. 
Figure 6.19 - supervisor 1 
Figure 6.19 shows that supervisor 1 believed that manufacturing mission A 
(delivery) was far more important than the managing director. When asked if 
he could offer any reasons why this might be the case he explained that he was 
in charge of the first manufacturing operation and was very conscious that if he 
fell behind schedule he would hold up the rest of the shop. Similarly figure 
6.19 shows that supervisor 1 saw manufacturing mission B (quality) as much 
less important than the managing director. He argued that this was because 
some jobs were overspecified and his experience told him that he could often 
safely ignore the specifications. As an example, he explained that although it 
was company policy to scrap a piece of wood if it was knotted, it was possible 
to ensure that the knot would never be seen by using it on the underside of a 
bench or table. 
With regard to the systems figure 6.19 shows that supervisor 1 places more 
emphasis on the minimisation of cost than might be expected and less on 
manufacturing missions D (team spirit) and E (training). When asked why he 
thought cost was so important.he replied; cost minimisation is part of the job. 
Neil (the production manager) likes it when I identify ways in which we can do 
things more quickly and cheaply. Similarly when asked to explain why he 
thought missions D and E were less important than the systems suggested he 
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Figure 6.19: Data gathered during the interview with supervisor 1 - company C 
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said; for the business to survive you have to get everything else right first. 
Figure 6.20 - supervisor 2 
Figure 6.20 shows that supervisor 2 also believes that delivery on time was far 
more important than the managing director and that quality was far less 
important. When asked why he thought these differences of opinion existed 
supervisor 2 said that he was surprised at Alan's (the managing director) 
prioritisations because he always appeared to push for delivery, even if it was at 
the expense of qUality. 
With regard to the systems figure 6.20 shows that supervisor 2 placed more 
emphasis on delivery than might be expected and less on team spirit and 
training. When asked why he explained that both the production and contracts 
managers focussed on due dates. Hence delivery performance had to take 
precedence. As for team spirit and training, the former was expected and so he 
paid little attention to it, while he did not think the latter was taken particularly 
seriously in company C. 
Figure 6.21 - supervisor 3 
Figure 6.21 shows that the main difference in terms of priorities between 
supervisor 3 and the managing director was with regard to manufacturing 
mission C (minimise cost). When asked why he thought this was the case 
supervisor 3 explained that he paid a lot of attention to the cost reports. In fact 
during the entire interview supervisor 3 appeared to be very financially 
motivated. According to the pairwise comparison the systems that influenced 
his behaviour most were; his basic salary (28%), the annual cash bonus (25%) 
and the cost report (18%). 
As with the previous two interviewees, supervisor 3 placed less emphasis on 
manufacturing mission D (team spirit) than might be expected given how much 
he thought the firm's systems emphasised it When asked why he said; because 
you have to get the first three missions right first 
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Figure 6.20: Data gathered during the interview with supervisor 2 - company C 
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Figure 6.22 - supervisor 4 
Figure 6.22 shows that supervisor 4 thought that quality was more important 
than the managing director. When asked if he could think of any reasons to 
explain this supervisor 4 said that he was surprised that Alan (the managing 
director) had rated mission B so highly because he always "ranted and raved 
about getting the product out of the door and not about quality". 
Figure 6.22 also shows that supervisor 4 prioritised training more highly than 
the managing director and indeed he was the only supervisor to do this. When 
asked why he thought this was the case he said that he was strongly in favour 
of training and had raised it at a number of production meetings because he saw 
it as a prerequisite to achieving high product quality. It should be noted that 
supervisor 4 was responsible for managing company C's specialist joinery 
department where the jobs with the most exacting specifications were 
completed. 
With regard to the systems supervisor 4 put more emphasis on quality and less 
on delivery and cost minimisation than might be expected. His reason for this 
follows on from the point made previously. That is, supervisor 4 said he was 
primarily concerned with making "perfect" products and he could not "give a 
toss" if that meant that they cost too much or he had to deliver them late. 
Figure 6.23 - operative 1 
Figure 6.23 shows that operative 1 believed that manufacturing missions A 
(delivery) and D (team spirit) were more important than the managing director, 
while B (quality) and E (training) were less important. When asked why he 
thought these differences of opinion existed operative 1 said that he believed 
that delivery was important because company C was subject to penalty clauses 
on many of its contracts and hence the foreman would often come and ask when 
a particular job would be ready. With regard to team spirit and training, 
operative 1 said that the fonner was important because it helped get jobs done, 
but that he ignored the latter because he was no longer an apprentice. 
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Figure 6.23: Data gathered during the interview with operative 1 - company C 
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For operative 1 quality was an interesting issue because although he saw it as 
less important than the managing director, he placed more emphasis on it than 
might be expected from the systems. When asked why, operative 1 explained 
that he thought quality was important because if you got it right then everything 
else, including cost, fell into place. In addition he said that he knew that Alan 
(the managing director) cared about quality because when he had been working 
on company C's new office block Alan had frequently visited the site to check 
that everyone was doing a good job. 
Figure 6.24 - operative 2 
Figure 6.24 shows that operative 2' s priorities were virtually the same as those 
of the managing director. The major questions that remained, however, were; 
(a) why did operative 2 believe that quality was so important given that he 
thought the fmn's systems placed so little emphasis on it, and (b) why did he 
think that missions C (minimise cost) and D (team spirit) were so unimportant 
given that he believed that the systems placed so much emphasis on them? In 
response to the fITst of these questions operative 2 said that he thought that if the 
fmn provided high quality products it would get a good reputation in the market 
place and therefore win more orders. In response to the second he said that he 
would spend extra time and money on a job to ensure it was of high quality. 
Operative 2, however, could not explain why he thought team spirit was so 
unimportant. 
Figure 6.25 - operative 3 
Figure 6.25 shows that the main difference between the operative's and 
managing director's prioritisations were with regard to manufacturing missions 
A (delivery) and B (quality). In response to the question; "why do you think 
you place more emphasis on delivery than the managing director", operative 3 
explained that he saw a lot of routing cards which had due dates on them and 
hence he knew that on time delivery was important 
As with operative 1, quality for operative 3 was an interesting issue because 
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Figure 6.25: Data gathered during the interview with operative 3 - company C 
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although he saw it as less important than the managing director he placed more 
emphasis on it than might be expected. When asked why he said that he 
believed that by getting the quality of the product right you not only satisfied the 
customer, but also reduced the cost. With regard to mission E operative 3 said 
that he did not think that any of the firm's systems emphasised the importance 
of training, but even so he was conscious that it was necessary. 
Figure 6.26 - operative 4 
Figure 6.26 shows that once again the operative's and managing director's 
prioritisations were very similar. With regard to the systems the main 
discrepancy was over quality. When asked why he thought quality was so 
important operative 4 explained that his philosophy was that if you make the job 
exactly as the drawing says then you can not be blamed if something goes 
wrong. It should be noted operative 4 had recently been made redundant by his 
previous employer and had only been with company C for two months. Hence 
his philosophy may have been driven largely by a natural desire to protect both 
himself and his job. 
Figure 6.27 - operative 5 
Operative 5 experienced more difficult than the remainder of the sample 
explaining why the differences in priorities shown in figure 6.27 existed. 
Basically his thesis was that delivery and quality were the key choices for the 
customer and hence they must be of approximately equal importance, but he 
was unable to provide any further explanations for his opinions. 
Figure 6.28 - operative 7 
Operative 7 believed that most of the firm's systems placed some emphasis on 
the importance of training and this explains the major discrepancy with regard to 
manufacturing mission E. It should be noted, however, that operative 7 had 
just finished a three year apprenticeship and had probably been subject to 
continual stimuli emphasising the importance of training. Indeed when asked 
what he now needed most, he said; "experience, not more training". 
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Figure 6.26: Data gathered during the interview with operative 4 - company C 
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Figure 6.27: Data gathered during the interview with operative 5 - company C 
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Figure 6.28: Data gathered during the interview with operative 7 - company C 
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The other major discrepancy shown on figure 6.28 was with regard to quality. 
Operative 7 said that the firm's systems put very little emphasis on quality, but 
still he saw it as very important. When asked why he explained that he had 
recently received a written warning because he was not producing products of 
an appropriate quality. Operative 7 was also asked to explain why he thought 
the systems emphasised team spirit so much. In response he said that a number 
of new people had recently joined his section and hence his supervisor had 
spent a lot of time talking about team spirit. In addition operative 7' s pay had 
been reduced by the discontinuation of his plus rate because it was thought that 
he had not been contributing to the team. He therefore believed that there was a 
strong correlation between team work and bonus payments. 
Figure 6.29 • operative 8 
Figure 6.29 shows that the main differences of opinion between the managing 
director and operative 8 were with regard to delivery and qUality. When asked 
why he thought this was the case operative 8 said that it was probably a 
functional difference. He pointed out that he was about to become a manager 
and currently came under a lot of pressure from the production manager to 
ensure that he was meeting the deli very schedule. 
With regard to the systems figure 6.29 shows that operative 8 believes that team 
spirit is more important than might be expected, while training is less important. 
Operative 8 was unable to explain either of these discrepancies, although it 
should be noted that he was doing an HNC at the time and hence it was not 
surprising that he received a lot of stimuli reinforcing the importance of training. 
Figure 6.30 • operative 9 
Figure 6.30 shows that the major discrepancies between operative 9' s 
prioritisations and those of the managing directo~ were with regard to quality. 
When asked if he could explain why this might be operative 9 said that his 
supervisor emphasised delivery at the expense of quality through the spot bonus 
system. That is, spot bonuses were only paid when a rush job had been 
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Figure 6.29: Data gathered during the interview with operative 8 - company C 
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Figure 6.30: Data gathered during the interview with operative 9 - company C 
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completed. It should also be noted that the pairwise comparisons showed that 
the spot bonus system influenced operative 9 far more than anything else 
(45%). Hence as he related payment of a spot bonus to delivery rather than 
quality, it is not surprising that the systems appear to over emphasise delivery 
and under emphasise qUality. 
Figures 6.31 through to 6.33 present aggregate versions of these data. The fIrst 
shows how the various groups of interviewees at the different levels of the 
organisation's hierarchy prioritised the fIve manufacturing missions. There are 
two points to note about this chart. First the level of goal congruence appears to 
be highest between the managing director and the operatives as a group. 
Second the major area of dispute is with regard to the manufacturing missions; 
(a) products must be delivered on time and (b) products must be made so that 
they conform to the drawing specifIcation the fIrst time. As has been seen a 
number of the individual interviewees, especially the production manager and 
supervisors, commented that the managing director's profile seemed wrong. 
That is, he claimed that the most important manufacturing mission was 
producing products which conformed to the specification and yet his daily 
actions suggested that what he really cared about was delivering the products 
when promised. 
Figures 6.32 and 6.33 show what the supervisors and operatives believed the 
systems emphasised. As in fIgure 6.31 the data shown are the average values 
for the groups. Figure 6.32 suggests that the importance of delivering products 
on time was strongly emphasised at the weekly production meeting which was 
chaired by the production manager. Interestingly the routing card system, 
which was supposed to act as a production control device, actually placed more 
emphasis on "conformance to specification" than it did on "delivery on time". 
During the discussions at the end of the interviews two reasons for this 
emerged. Firstly due dates were rarely recorded on the routing cards and even 
when they were they were often wrong. Second the managers had to sign off 
each job on its routing card before it could be passed on to the next department. 
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So, although the routing card system had been designed as a production control 
tool it was actually being used to monitor qUality. 
Figure 6.33 shows that the operatives related their basic salary most closely to 
manufacturing mission A, delivery on time. This may be because they linked 
the delivery of a product to the fact that the company was still winning orders 
and hence would be able to pay their wages. Two points, however, should be 
noted about this chart. First the operatives appear to have.been less influenced 
by the finn's non-financial systems than the supervisors. Second when asked 
to say which system influenced their actions the majority of the operatives 
rationalised their answer by saying; "my basic salary is worth more to me than 
the spot bonus, therefore my basic salary must influence my actions more". It 
is was if the operatives in company C had been motivated by financial rewards 
for so long that they had become like Pavlov's dogs. The more they were 
offered, in fmancial terms, the higher they jumped. 
In summary, then, it would appear that the production manager communicated 
to the supervisors the fact that he believed that delivery on time was the most 
important manufacturing mission primarily through the weekly production 
meeting. The supervisors acknowledged this message, but because they were 
subject to other systems realised that other things, such as quality were 
important. The operatives, who are one step removed from the production 
manager, paid less attention to the systems, especially the non-financial ones. 
Interestingly this meant that their prioritisations more closely matched those of 
the managing director. Hence the key problem in company C appeared to be 
communication between the managing director and the production manager. 
That is the managing director was sending the production manager signals 
which said "delivery on time is important" and the production manager, in turn, 
was trying to push this message down through the firm. This resulted in a 
prevailing attitude which one of the interviewees summed up by saying; "we'll 
often rush stuff here. We'll send product out to the customer before we get it 
right". Even though the managing director believed that the manufacturing 
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strategy the firm should have been pursuing was one based on high product 
qUality. 
6.3: Audit in company D 
Company D designs and manufactures electronic control equipment. It is part 
of a large U.S. multi-national group and its U.K. manufacturing facility is 
situated close to Leicester. The congruence audit described in this section was 
conducted in June 1992. The managers present at the group discussion 
included the manufacturing director, production manager, personnel manager, 
planning manager, customer order manager, management accountant, senior 
systems analyst and one internal customer. Company D supplies product to 
other parts of the group - hence the production manager had suggested that the 
presence of an internal customer might be beneficial. Following the group 
discussion two first line supervisors, eight operatives and two "other" members 
of staff (one production and one materials controller) were interviewed. In 
sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 the data generated during this case are presented and 
discussed. 
6.3.1: Management group discussion - company D 
Company D only has one major product family - electronic control units. 
Hence this provided the focus for the group discussion. Following the 
brainstorming session the manufacturing missions were defined as shown in 
table 6.4. It can be seen that company language featured heavily in the 
definitions. Take, for example, loss prevention. In company D the phrase loss 
prevention was used to refer not only to "waste elimination" but also to things 
such as accidents. 
Once the manufacturing missions had been defined the individual members of 
the management group were ask to rank and rate them. The data generated were 
summarised on a check sheet shown in figure 6.34. Doing this indicated that 
the biggest area of disagreement was with regard to the importance of loss 
prevention. The senior systems analyst thought it was the most important 
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manufacturing mission, while both the management accountant and personnel 
manager thought it was the least important. The next stage of the discussion 
involved the managers as a group prioritising the missions using Saaty's 
pairwise comparison process. As expected mission F (loss prevention) was the 
subject of greatest debate, but figure 6.35 shows it ultimately received a 
relatively high prioritisation. 
Table 6.4: Manufacturing missions defmed 
by the management group - company D 
Manufacturing 
Defmitions Missions 
A Products must work first time and for as long as required. 
B Products must be delivered 
on time to the customer. 
C Non value added processes and 
materials must be reduced/eliminated. 
D Design for manufacture. 
E Quality parts must be supplied 
on time to company D. 
F Loss prevention. 
G People should understand the company objectives. 
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Figure 6.34: Check sheet used to feedback rankings and ratings 
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""1 M 
mISSIons 
A 
Ratings 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 8 
Rankings 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
B 
Ratings 9 9 7 9 9 9 7 7 
Rankings 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 3 
C 
Ratings 8 7 7 7 9 7 5 5 
Rankings 3 4 3 3 6 3 3 6 
D 
Ratings 7 8 7 5 9 7 5 6 
Rankings 7 5 4 7 4 5 5 5 
E 
Ratings 7 9 5 5 9 7 5 6 
Rankings 6 2 6 6 7 4 6 4 
F 
Ratings 7 6 5 5 9 5 5 8 
Rankings 5 6 7 4 3 6 7 1 
G 
Ratings 8 7 5 5 7 5 5 5 
Rankings 4 7 5 5 7 7 4 7 
In the [mal stage of the group discussion the managers were asked to identify 
which systems they used to try and ensure that their subordinates acted in a 
manner which was consistent with the manufacturing missions. To do this the 
hierarchy of probing questions proposed in section 5.3.1 was used. Table 6.5 
summarises the systems that were identified. The management by results 
system, the formal appraisals and the merit system were all standard systems. 
The strategy sessions and the manufacturing communications meetings were 
both chaired by the manufacturing director and involved groups of employees. 
At the former the employees were invited to gi~e their views as to what the 
firm's strategy should be. At the later the manufacturing director provided 
feedback on the company's performance. The quality attribute measurement 
system consisted of a cascaded set of measures of manufacturing's 
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perfonnance, each of which had been derived from the business strategy. At 
the monthly quality meetings current quality problems were discussed. At the 
weekly group/area meetings the head of each section fed back data on the 
section's perfonnance to its members. Company D also made extensive use of 
visual feedback and there were a variety of wall charts in each of the 
manufacturing departments. Similarly all visitors to company D were 
encouraged to talk to operatives. The production manager specifically asked for 
a system labelled "visitors" to be included to see what the operatives thought of 
such conversations. 
Table 6.5: Systems used to reinforce the 
importance of the missions - company D 
Systems applying to the 
interviewees in company D 
Management by results 
Goal setting Formal appraisal 
Strategy sessions 
Performance Quality attribute measurement system 
measurement 
Monthly quality meeting 
Manufacturing communications meeting 
Feedback Group/area meetings Visual measures and notice boards 
Informal feedback 
Visitors to company D 
Reward Merit system 
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Following the management group discussion all the data required for the 
individual interviews were available. There was no need to review these data as 
the manufacturing director had been involved in the group discussion and hence 
the next stage of the investigation - the individual interviews - began. 
6.3.2: Individual Interviews - company D 
As mentioned earlier 12 individual interviews were conducted in company D 
using the methodology described in section 6.2.1. One of the interviews with 
one of the operatives was aborted because, despite repeated probing, the 
consistency ratio generated during the pairwise comparison process remained 
extremely poor. The data gathered during the remaining 11 interviews are 
summarised in this section. 
Figure 6.36 - supervisor 1 
Figure 6.36 shows that the major areas of discrepancy between the priorities of 
supervisor 1 and the management group were with regard to manufacturing 
missions A (product reliability), F (loss prevention) and G (understand 
company objectives). When asked if he could think of any reasons why this 
should be the case supervisor 1 explained that personal experience had shown 
him that explaining the company's objectives to the operatives could save time, 
reduce cost and improve qUality. And he added that he saw the supervisor's 
role as largely one of translating the management team's strategies into 
meaningful objectives that the "shop floor workers could buy into". 
While these comments explained the discrepancies between the prioritisations of 
manufacturing missions A and G, they did not account for the mismatch with 
regard to mission F (loss prevention). This was further complicated by the fact 
that supervisor 1 also thought that the systems emphasised it more strongly than 
he did. When asked about this supervisor 1 pointed out that there was often a 
conflict between loss prevention and the other activities. Basically the problem 
was that the company existed to make money through the sale of products and 
loss prevention did not particularly help it do this. 
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Figure 6.36: Data gathered during the interview with supervisor 1 - company D 
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Figure 6.37 - supervisor 2 
Figure 6.37 shows that supervisor 2 believed that manufacturing missions B 
(delivery), C (minimise cost) and G (understand company objectives) were 
more important than the management group and that missions A (product 
reliability) and F (loss prevention) were less important. When discussing the 
discrepancies between missions A and B supervisor 2 explained that on a day to 
day basis he came under more pressure regarding delivery than quality, and 
questioned whether the management group's priorities were an expression of 
what they would like to see, rather than what actually happened. Whilst on this 
theme supervisor 2 also commented that the reason he had placed less emphasis 
on manufacturing mission F than the management team was that although they 
talked about loss prevention, they did very little. Hence he did not think that the 
flrm took it very seriously. 
As with supervisor 1, supervisor 2 saw part of his role as translating the 
management team's strategies into objectives for the shop floor and argued that 
this was the reason that he thought mission G (understand company objectives) 
was more important than the management team. Similarly supervisor 2 had run 
company D's training sessions on waste elimination and suggested that the 
emphasis he put on mission C (minimise cost) was probably a function of this. 
When companng what the systems emphasised with superVIsor 2's 
prioritisations the biggest discrepancy occurred with regard to manufacturing 
mission D (design for manufacture). When asked why he thought design for 
manufacture was so important supervisor 2 simply said; "I see the problems that 
result when manufacturing is not considered at the design stage". 
Figure 6.38 - production controller 
Figure 6.38 shows that the main differences in the prioritisations of the 
management group and the production controller were with regard to missions 
A (product reliability) and E (supplier quality). When asked if he could explain 
these differences the production controller said that for him mission E was just 
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Figure 6.37: Data gathered during the interview with supervisor 2 - company D 
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Figure 6.38: Data gathered during the interview with the production controller - company D 
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as important as mission A, because unless he could arrange for high quality 
goods to be supplied to they company the rest of manufacturing could not be 
expected to provide a reliable product. 
Comparing the production controller's priorities with what he believed the 
systems emphasised showed that the production controller had assigned more 
importance than would be expected to mission E (supplier quality) and less to 
missions C (minimise cost) and G (understand company objectives). As 
already discussed the production controller explained that he thought the first 
mismatch was probably due to his functional role. When asked about the others 
he said; "we do not have much waste, and therefore scope for reducing costs in 
my department" and "information on the company's objectives is nice, but I 
don't think I need it to do my job". 
Figure 6.39 - material's controller 
Figure 6.39 shows how the material's controller prioritised the manufacturing 
missions and what he believed the firm's systems emphasised. As with the 
production controller, the material's controller suggested that most of the 
differences that could be observed between his priorities and those of the 
management group were a function of his organisational role. He argued that 
his job revolved around ensuring that company D received high quality products 
from its suppliers (mission E) and said that if he got this right then things like 
product reliability (mission A) would follow. With regard to the systems the 
major discrepancy concerned mission F (loss prevention). The material's 
controller offered no explanation as to why this might be. 
Figure 6.40 - operative 1 
Figure 6.40 shows that the operative 1 believed that manufacturing missions A 
(product reliability) and B (delivery on time) were less important than the 
management group, while manufacturing missions E (supplier quality) and G 
(understand company objectives) were more important. When asked to explain 
these differences, operative 1 said that she believed if people knew more clearly 
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what they were doing then the other missions, including A and B, would be 
achieved. She also pointed out that supplier quality was important to her 
personally as it affected how well she could do her job. 
When comparing what operative 1 thought the systems emphasised with how 
she had prioritised the missions, the main differences were that she had perhaps 
over prioritised supplier quality and design for manufacturing, and under 
prioritised loss prevention. The reason for the first of these discrepancies has 
already been explored and as company D was in the process of implementing 
design for manufacture it was not surprising that the existing systems placed 
little emphasis on it. As far as loss prevention was concerned, however, 
operative 1 said; "losses exist and the managers don't do anything about them 
so they can't be important". 
Figure 6.41 . operative 2 
As figure 6.41 shows operatives 2's prioritisations were very similar to those of 
the management group, although there was some minor discrepancy with regard 
to manufacturing missions D (design for manufacture), E (supplier quality) and 
F (loss prevention). When asked if she could think of any reasons why these 
differences of opinion might exist, operative 2 said that both design for 
manufacture and supplier quality not only had a direct affect on her ability to do 
her job, but that they also reduced the need for loss prevention. 
Operative 2 was not able to explain the differences between her prioritisations 
and what she believed the systems emphasised. 
Figure 6.42 - operative 3 
Figure 6.42 shows that operative 3 believed that manufacturing mission E 
(supplier quality) was more Important than the management group, while 
manufacturing mission F (loss prevention) was less important. When asked if 
she could think of any reasons why this might have been the case operative 3 
said that she thought it was less important to get loss prevention right than 
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Figure 6.41: Data gathered during the interview with operative 2 - company D 
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Figure 6.42: Data gathered during the interview with operative 3 - company D 
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everything else, and pointed out that if company D did not get good quality 
parts from its suppliers it could not achieve manufacturing missions A, B or C. 
Comparing what operative 3 believed the finn's systems emphasised with her 
prioritisations suggests that she had attributed more importance to product 
reliability than would be expected and less to loss prevention. The reason for 
the second of these mismatches has already been explored. When asked about 
the first operative 3 simply said; "quality is what gives the customer his first 
impression. Hence it must be important". 
Figure 6.43 - operative 4 
Figure 6.43 shows that operative 4 prioritised manufacturing missions E 
(supplier quality) and 0 (understand company objectives) more highly than the 
management group, and manufacturing mission A (product reliability) less 
highly. When asked if he could explain these differences operative 4 said that 
he had not realised the management group thought product reliability was so 
importan~ especially as they had just disbanded the Quality Assurance (QA) 
department and were now expecting staff on the line, who were less well 
qualified, to look after their own quality. With regard to mission 0, operative 4 
pointed out that company D had undergone a massive amount of change in the 
last ten years and he was not sure that many people understood why. Hence he 
thought it was important that the management group made more effort to explain 
the company's objectives. 
Operative 4 not only attributed more importance to mission E than the 
management group, but also more than would be expected considering how 
much he thought the systems emphasised the importance of supplier quality. 
When asked to explain this, operative 4 said that before he could build high 
quality boards he had to have high quality parts. 
Figure 6.44 - operative 5 
Figure 6.44 shows that operative 5' s prioritisations differed widely from both 
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the management group and what might be expected, given what he thought the 
systems emphasised, with regard to missions A (product reliability), B 
(delivery), E (supplier quality) and F (loss prevention). When asked if he could 
think of any reasons to explain these discrepancies operative 5 said that 
manufacturing mission A focussed on external, not internal quality, and that as 
far as he was concerned the firm's systems only emphasised internal qUality. In 
addition he also pointed out that company D had recently had some problems 
with its suppliers and this had shown that if high quality components were not 
being supplied then it was impossible for the operatives to product reliable 
products. Operative 5 was unable to offer any logical explanations for the 
remaining discrepancies. 
Figure 6.45 - operative 6 
Figure 6.45 shows that operative 6' s prioritisations differed from those of the 
management group mainly with regard to manufacturing missions E (supplier 
quality) and F (loss prevention). When discussing supplier quality operative 6 
said that it was important to her because she dealt with a lot of bought out parts 
and hence could not produce reliable products unless her suppliers gave her 
high quality parts. As for mission F, operative 6 argued that, despite what the 
management team said, they did not take loss prevention as seriously as the 
other manufacturing missions. When discussing the systems operative 6 
mentioned that she often received feedback directly from the customer and 
hence she knew that product reliability important. 
Figure 6.46 - operative 7 
Figure 6.46 shows that operative 7's prioritisations are broadly similar to those 
of the management group, although there is some discrepancy with regard to 
manufacturing mission E (supplier quality). Operative 7 said that this was due 
to the fact that he was at the sharp end and if there. was a problem with supplier 
quality he was one of the people who suffered most. 
With regard to the differences between what operative 7 thought the systems 
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emphasised and his prioritisations the most interesting point that emerged was 
that he did not feel he had to understand the company's objectives in order to do 
his job. 
Figure 6.47 shows in aggregate the way in which the various groups of 
interviewees and managers prioritised the manufacturing missions. Once again 
it can be seen that there is a higher level of goal congruence between the 
operatives as a group and the managers on most of the missions, and that there 
is broad agreement with respect to the importance of missions B and D. The 
"other staff' (the materials and production controller) place slightly more 
emphasis on mission B than the rest but, as already discussed, this is probably 
a reflection of their functional role. The supervisors appear to see their task as 
balancing outgoing product quality (mission A), delivery (mission B) and 
reduction of non-value added activities (mission C). They also appear to 
strongly believe that if they are to be successful at this then it is important that 
they explain the company's objectives to the operatives (mission G). 
The operatives see their job as making sure that high quality products (mission 
A) are delivered on time (mission B). Note how they shift the emphasis slightly 
from outgoing quality (mission A) to incoming quality (mission E). As has 
already been seen a number of the operatives interviewed complained that they 
were let down by poor quality of incoming parts. Hence once again this 
emphasis may be a function of their role. 
Mission F (loss prevention) raises some interesting issues. In the management 
group's discussion it was the mission about which there was most debate and 
least agreement. As far as both the supervisors and the shop floor workers 
were concerned they received a lot of information about loss prevention but 
many of them said that little was done about it and, hence they felt it was one of 
the less important missions. Furthermore a number of people pointed out that if 
missions A (product reliability) and B (delivery) were not achieved then there 
was no point in having mission F (loss prevention). 
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Figure 6.48 and 4.49 show what the operatives and supervisors as separate 
groups believed the firm's systems emphasised. From figure 6.48 it can be 
seen that the two supervisors thought that the management by results systems 
and the group/area meetings had the greatest influence on them, while the 
manufacturing communications meetings meant little to them. Similarly figure 
6.49 shows that the operatives believed that both the management by results 
system and the group/area meetings had quite a strong influence on them, while 
the quality attributes measurement system and the monthly quality meetings had 
little affect on them. Both the supervisors and operatives reported that the fact 
that visitors were encouraged to talk to them was relatively uninfluential. 
In summary, then, it appeared that there were two reasons why company D 
might have been. unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. The first, as 
shown by figure 6.47, was that the company was not receiving high quality 
components from its suppliers. The fact that so many of the operatives 
prioritised manufacturing mission E (supplier quality) so highly indicated that 
this was currently of concern to them. The fact that the management group did 
not prioritise supplier quality so highly suggested that perhaps they were 
unaware of the severity of the problem. Having said this, however, the fact that 
both the production and material's controllers rated manufacturing mission E so 
highly indicates that company D was taking steps to solve this problem. 
The second reason that company D might have been unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy was that loss prevention (mission F) was not being 
taken seriously. Figure 6.47 shows that the management group rated this 
mission more highly than the supervisors and operatives. And as discovered in 
the interviews the principle reason for this was that although the management 
team talked about loss prevention they put little effort into making it happen. 
An obvious parallel can be drawn with companyC here, for in both cases the 
managers were failing to support there words with actions. 
In chapter 3 it was pointed out that sometimes goal incongruence can be the 
228 
0.60 
E 0.50 
m 0.40 p 
h 0.30 
a 
~ 0.20 
1 
s 0.10 
0.00 
Figure 6.48: What the supervisors of company D believe the systems emphasise 
Mgmtby 
Results 
Strategy Quality Att Mnthly Manuf 
Sessions Meas Qual Meet Comms 
Grp/ Area Visual Inf Flback Visitors Merit Pay 
Meets Measures 
Systems 
m:s Product reliablity o Delivery on time 
m Supplier quality ~ Loss prevention 
III Minimise cost 
~ Understand company 
objectives 
III Design for manufacture 
0.45 
0.40 
E 0.35 
m p 0.30 
h 0.25 
a 0.20 
s 
. 0.15 
1 
s 0.10 
0.05 
0.00 
Figure 6.49: What the operatives of company D as a group believe the systems emphasise 
Mgmt by Strategy Quality Att Mnthly Manuf Grp/ Area Visual Inf Flback Visitors Merit Pay 
Results Sessions Meas Qual Meet Comms Meets Measures 
1m! Product reliability o Delivery on time 
m Supplier quality ~ Loss prevention 
Systems 
II Minimise cost 
~ Understand company 
objectives 
III Design for manufacture 
result of someone' s functional role and not necessarily a case for concern. 
Company D provides two excellent examples of this. The first - supplier 
quality - has already been discussed. The second relates to mission G 
(understand the company objectives). At first sight the fact that the supervisors 
prioritised mission G so highly in comparison to everyone else might be seen as 
a problem. When feeding back the data gathered during the study to company 
D, however, this goal incongruence was discussed. And as a result it became 
apparent that the two supervisors had correctly interpreted their role in the 
organisation. That is, the management team agreed that one of the primary 
tasks of the supervisors was to translate the finn's manufacturing strategy into a 
set of meaningful objectives that the "shop floor workers could buy into". 
6.4: Summary 
This chapter has described the third and final phase of this research - the 
integration of the goal and system congruence audits and the application of the 
resultant congruence audit. In both case studies the congruence audit was able 
to identify some of the reasons why the firms concerned might have been 
unable to realise their manufacturing strategies. In company C the data that 
were gathered suggested that the managing director's actions were encouraging 
the production manager, among others, to pursue a strategy based on delivery 
performance rather than one based on product quality as was intended. 
Evidence to support the accuracy of this observation was provided both by the 
quality coordinator's independent study which found that outgoing product 
quality was very poor, and subsequent discussions with the managing director. 
Indeed shortly after the study was completed the managing director asked the 
author to feed back the results of the study to everyone involved and, at that 
meeting, publicly declared that he wanted the firm to pursue a manufacturing 
strategy based on product quality in the future. 
In the case of company D the congruence audit identified two areas where the 
ftrm was unlikely to be able to realise its manufacturing strategy. The first was 
with regard to the supply of high quality components. The second was with 
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respect to loss prevention. Upon completion of the study these observations 
were fed back to company D. Since then the author has spoken to the personnel 
manager and he has confirmed that the management team now acknowledges 
the importance of both of these issues. This having been said, however, 
company D is currently being merged with another organisation and hence 
although the management team are actively reviewing the performance of their 
suppliers, they have been unable to resolve the issue of whether loss prevention 
really is important for them to date. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
7.0: Introduction 
In chapter 3 it was stated that the key assumptions underlying the research 
reported in this thesis are that consistency of decision making and action, and 
hence realisation of strategies, might best be achieved if: 
(a) The manufacturing task, defined in terms of quality, 
delivery speed, delivery reliability, price (cost) and 
flexibility, is widely understood by those employees who 
affect whether the task is achieved. 
(b) The firm's goal setting, performance measurement, 
feedback and reward systems are used to induce decision 
making and action consistent with the manufacturing task. 
This chapter critically appraises these assumptions as the framework shown in 
figure 3.1 and the congruence audit which they underpin are reviewed. 
The remainder of the chapter has been divided into three sections. In the first 
the strengths and weaknesses of the congruence audit are discussed. In the 
second the conceptual framework on which the research was based is reviewed 
and a modified version of it is presented. In the third the chapter is 
summarised. 
7.1: Critique of the congruence audit 
As described in chapter 6 the congruence audit developed during the course of 
this research consisted of three main phases: 
-management group discussion; 
-individual interviews; 
-data analysis and feedback. 
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Data were collected on the strengths and weaknesses of each of these phases by 
the author through his participant observation. These data are summarised in 
table 7.1 and discussed in detail in the reminder of this section. 
7.1.1: Management group discussion 
The management group discussion involved three main stages; the definition of 
the manufacturing task, the prioritisation of the manufacturing missions, and the 
identification of the firm's systems. One of the strength~ of the management 
group discussion is that it acts as a team building exercise and forces the people 
involved to air and debate, if not resolve, any differences of opinion they might 
have with regard to the manufacturing task. In addition the data produced 
during the group discussion provide a structure for the subsequent interviews 
and data analyses, which simplifies the congruence audit as a whole. 
In terms of weaknesses the discussion was time consuming and required the 
participation of most of a firm's senior managers for between three and four 
hours. The time taken by the discussion was lengthened by the presence of the 
external facilitator, for two reasons. First because the management group had 
to explain more to the facilitator. Second because the facilitator had to tread 
warily as he did not have any prior knowledge or understanding of either the 
group dynamics or the organisational politics. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness with the discussion, however, was the fact that it 
was based on the assumption that the firms being audited would have, or would 
wish to develop, manufacturing strategies which matched the traditional 
academic model. Initially it was assumed that each management group would 
define their firm's manufacturing task solely in terms of quality, time, price 
(cost) and flexibility 25. In both companies C and D, however, the managers 
present at the group discussions wanted to include other factors such as; 
education and training (company C), elimination of non value added processes 
25 The category other was included in the framework shown in figure 6.2 so that the 
importance of factors such as concern for the environment could be included without having to 
force them under one of the traditional categories. 
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Group 
Discussion 
Individual 
Interviews 
Data Analysis 
and Feedback 
Overall 
Table 7.1: Strengths and weaknesses of the congruence audit 
Strengths 
-A team building exercise which ensures that the management group 
develops a shared view of the manufacturing missions. 
-Highlights differences of opinion and forces them to be debated. 
-Gives the facilitator an opportunity to learn the company language. 
-Provides a structure for the rest of the process thereby simplifying the 
data analysis. 
-Rapid (one hour), self contained interview. 
-Visual feedback used to stimulate discussion and to check the validity 
and reliability of the data that have been collected. 
-Combination of simple data collection techniques, the majority of 
which focus on quantitative data. 
-External facilitator who offers confidentiality. 
-Multiple inputs to the data collection process (discussion and 
interviews) enable the facilitator to paint a rich picture. 
-All employees who participate in the study can be invited to a 
feedback session, which provides an opportunity to build a wider team. 
-The feedback session gives the management group with an 
opportunity to reinforce the importance of specific missions. 
-Provides insight by offering a novel means of exploring why a finn 
might be unable to realise a strategy. 
-Identifies how widely the manufacturing missions are understood. 
-Determines which systems reinforce which manufacturing missions. 
-Can be completed rapidly. (Total elapsed time for company D, 
including data analysis and feedback, was five working days). 
Weaknesses 
-Confusion over strategy, the issue of what versus how. 
-The facilitator does not know, or understand, the group dynamics or 
politics at' the outset. 
-Potentially a time consuming process which involves the senior 
management team for three to four hours. 
-An unknown interviewer needs to gain the interviewee's trust at the 
start of the interview. 
-Although the data that are collected are quantitative they are based on 
the interviewee's opinions and not on facts. 
-The questionnaire scale can encourage invalid responses. 
-System congruence is an abstract concept and difficult to explain. 
-Data analysis is based on averages. Hence detail is lost and some of 
the more extreme opinions can be missed. 
-The facilitator's interpretation of the data, particularly that gathered 
during the discussions at the end of the individual interviews, might be 
incorrect. 
-The data are based on opinions and recollections, not observations. 
-The process requires a skilled external facilitator. 
-It can raise individual's expectations (i.e. the feedback session), but 
does not produce a specific action plan. 
and materials, and design for manufacture (company D). As mentioned in the 
previous chapter these missions caused considerable debate, with the author 
being keen to emphasise that they were solutions or ways of achieving specific 
parts of the manufacturing task, i.e. policy decisions, rather than elements of 
the task itself. The managers, however, did not wish to make this distinction. 
They argued that if they had decided that an essential part of manufacturing's 
role was, for example, the elimination of non-value added processes and 
materials (company D), then this became part of the task rather than a means of 
achieving it 
In terms of the application of the congruence audit the confusion over the 
manufacturing task and policy decisions could have caused problems in the 
second stage of the management group discussion - the prioritisation of the 
manufacturing missions. Take, for example, company D. Manufacturing 
mission B (delivery on time) can be seen as a short term activity, whereas 
manufacturing mission F (loss prevention) can be seen as a long term activity. 
This difference in time scale makes the comparison and prioritisation of the 
missions difficult. Having said this, however, the question used to gather the 
data during the pairwise comparison process, namely "which is more important 
to the long run success of the firm - manufacturing mission B or 
manufacturing mission F', provides some context, thereby reducing the 
problem. 
The confusion over the manufacturing task and the policy decisions also has 
implications for manufacturing strategy research in general, for it leads one to 
question the validity of the traditional academic model of manufacturing 
strategy. Quinn (1980) has suggested that strategies are developed and realised 
through a process of logical incrementalism. That is, managers have a vision of 
where they want their firm to be, and take small evolutionary steps until they 
realise their vision. This description accurately reflects the management 
processes used in companies C and D. When prompted, either during a 
structured interview or as part of the group discussion, each manager could 
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state what the manufacturing function ought to do, but they could not, in 
general, explain how it should do it. It was as if each manager had an implicit 
definition of the manufacturing task in terms of quality, time, cost and 
flexibility. To this they added the policy decisions that had already been made, 
but they left all other policy decisions open. 
On retlection this appears to be a logical way of managing. During the process 
of trying to realise their manufacturing strategies the managers will learn what 
works and what does not work. Hence, at one level, to suggest that all the 
policy decisions should be made during the strategy formulation process is 
naive, because this assumes that it is possible for a group of people to predict all 
eventualities, and, perhaps more importantly, it ignores the fact that they will 
learn during the strategy realisation process. On the other hand, however, there 
is a danger that if the managers are not pushed to consider all the options open 
to them during the strategy formulation process they may end up pursuing a 
course of action (a policy decision) which is less than optimal. 
In terms of research on manufacturing strategy, then, there appears to be a need 
to explore the strategy development and implementation processes more fully. 
This will involve examining issues such as: 
-How are the manufacturing strategy policy decisions made in firms? 
-Should all policy decisions be made at the same point in time and then 
revisited after a fIXed period? 
_ How can one ensure that a management group explores all the various 
strategic options that are open to them at a point in time? 
In terms of the research reported in this thesis the fact that the firms involved in 
the study did not have manufacturing strategies which matched the traditional 
academic model leads one to question how it was possible to test the second of 
the propositions listed in chapter 3, namely that the congruence audit can be 
used to identify some of the reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. However, just because the firms involved in the 
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research did not have manufacturing strategies which corresponded to an 
academic model does not mean that they did not have manufacturing strategies 
at all. As far as the managers were concerned their manufacturing strategies 
were summarised by the manufacturing missions which had been formally 
defined during the group discussion. Their plan for achieving these strategies 
was incrementally to test out various strategic options until they identified those 
that were most appropriate. As was shown in chapter 6 the congruence audit 
identified areas of incongruence which might have inhibited the realisation of 
these manufacturing strategies, either because certain groups of employees did 
not know what they were meant to be doing, or because the firm's systems sent 
them signals which encouraged them to pursue courses of action which were 
inconsistent with the manufacturing missions and hence manufacturing's task. 
7.1.2: Individual interviews 
The individual interviews consisted of three main stages; the prioritisation of the 
pre-defined manufacturing missions, the identification of what the firm's 
systems encouraged people to do, and a structured discussion. In terms of 
strengths these interviews were rapid - they could be completed in under one 
hour - and they were conducted by an external facilitator who offered 
confidentiality and therefore the opportunity for the interviewees to express 
views and opinions that otherwise might not have been aired. 
Perhaps the greatest strength of the individual interviews, however, was the use 
of computer generated graphics to stimulate discussion. At the outset the 
interviews were designed so that simple data collection techniques could be 
used to gather data which were predominately quantitative. This was done so 
that the data could be analysed immediately and fed back to the interviewee 
during the course of the interview. This not only gave the interviewer an 
opportunity to check that the data he was collecting were both valid and reliable, 
but also allowed him to probe, in a non-threatening way, any apparent 
discrepancies between the interviewee's perceptions and those of the 
management group. As chapter 6 showed this procedure considerably enriched 
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the data collection process and enabled the interviewer to ask very focussed 
questions during the discussion. As an aside, it should be noted that a number 
of the interviewees commented that the provision of immediate feedback made 
the interview more personally satisfying as it helped them understand the study 
more fully. 
At a more detailed level the majority of people interviewed found it easier to 
relate to the graph which showed how their opinions compared to those of the 
management group (see figure 6.10), than they did to the one which showed 
how their opinions related to what the firm's systems emphasised (see figure 
6.11). In itself this is not an unexpected observation as the latter graph is based 
on a more complex set of relationships and analyses. It did, however, have 
im plications for the discussion as it meant that any questions regarding the 
relationship between the manufacturing missions and the firm's systems had to 
be phrased in terms of practical examples rather than abstract concepts. 
In terms of weaknesses the second stage of the interview sometimes caused 
problems. In this each interviewee was asked to say what the firm's systems 
encouraged them to do and how much they influenced their actions. A 
questionnaire of the format described section 6.1.2. was used to collect the first 
set of data, but as discussed earlier the problem with it was that the format of 
the question and the scale used (strongly agree through to strongly disagree) led 
to some of the interviewees giving invalid responses. That is, sometimes they 
ticked the box labelled "disagree", when they should have ticked the box 
labelled "no relationship". 
To overcome this problem the author double checked with each interviewee 
whether they really meant disagree when their first response suggested that they 
did. Not only did this ensure that the data that were collected were valid, but it 
also provided extra information when an interviewee disagreed with one of the 
statements in the questionnaire. Take, for example, the routing card system 
operated by company C. This goal setting system was supposed to provide the 
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foremen with target delivery dates for each batch of work. However one of the 
foremen disagreed with the statement "the routing card system emphasises the 
importance of delivering products on time" and when asked why, he said; 
"because even when the routing cards have delivery dates on them they are 
wrong. This suggests that the firm does not really care about delivery on time". 
7.1.3 Data analysis and feedback 
The fmal phase of the congruence audit involved data analysis and feedback. In 
both of the case studies described in chapter 6 the author was invited to present 
the findings of his investigation to everyone who had participated in the study. 
This feedback phase was important because: 
-It ensured that the company benefited from the research. 
-It provided the management team with an opportunity to reinforce publicly 
their commitment to specific manufacturing missions. 
-It enabled the author to qualitatively assess the accuracy of the data 
analyses described in chapter 6. 
In tenns of strengths, the structure of the audit provided a lot of data from 
different sources and hence enabled the facilitator to paint a rich picture of what 
appeared to be happening in a firm. On the other hand, the fact that the data 
were subjective and based on people's opinions and recollections, rather than 
on direct observation of their behaviour, meant that the validity of any data 
which were not confirmed by multiple sources could be questioned. As far as 
the feedback to the companies was concerned the data that were presented were 
disguised because individual confidentiality had been assured during the 
interviews and hence, out of necessity, some detail was lost. In addition the 
analyses were based on the author's interpretations of the data, particularly 
those gathered during the discussion stage of the individual interviews, and 
hence could have been subject io his bias. Despite these reservations, however, 
the analyses presented in chapter 6 were confirmed as accurate reflections of 
what was happening in companies C and D, both by the individuals present at 
the feedback sessions and by the subsequent actions of the managers. 
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In the next section the strengths and weaknesses of the congruence audit as a 
whole will be summarised. These observations will then be coupled with what 
the author learnt during the research to provide a basis for a critique of the 
conceptual framework which underpins the research. 
7.1.4: Strengths and weaknesses of the congruence audit 
The greatest weakness of the congruence audit, as it has been described, was 
that all the data that were collected during it were based on people's perceptions 
rather than actual observations of their behaviour. LaPiere (1934) was perhaps 
the first to report how important this distinction is. Between 1930 and 1932 he 
toured the U.S. with a young Chinese student and his wife. During that time 
they stayed at 66 different hotels, or auto camps, and ate at 184 different 
restaurants. Despite the supposed US racism they were turned away only once 
in 250 instances. Six months after the tour had finished LaPiere surveyed all 
the establishments they had visited asking; "will you accept members of the 
Chinese race as guests in your establishment". Of the 120 responses he 
received, 81 (92%) restaurants and cafes, and 47 (91 %) hotels and auto camps, 
said no. Of the remainder, all but one said it would depend on the 
circumstances. From this LaPiere (1934) concluded that the models that 
humans use to predict how they will behave when faced with an abstract 
situation are not necessarily accurate. 
The data gathered during the congruence audits were based on such abstract 
situations. In the group discussion the managers were asked to say which of 
the manufacturing missions they believed were the most important. In the 
individual interviews the interviewees were not only asked the same question, 
but also whether they thought the firm's systems reinforced the importance of 
the manufacturing missions. Hence it could be argued that the data gathered 
during the course of the audit were of dubious validity. 
The fact that the audit involved multiple interviews all of which focussed on the 
same issue, however, negates this criticism because as the cases described in 
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chapter 6 showed, the data that were collected actually highlighted the difference 
between what the managers think they do and what they actually do. The 
reason that the audit is able to highlight such discrepancies is because it involves 
the collection of data from multiple sources which can be cross referenced. 
The greatest strength of the congruence audit, however, becomes apparent 
when it is viewed as a process or a means of analysis. For then it can be seen 
that the congruence audit provides a novel means of: 
-Defining what a management group believes manufacturing should be 
doing. 
-Identifying what other employees think manufacturing actually is doing. 
-Establishing whether any mismatches in perception occur. 
-Determining whether such mismatches in perception are a function of the 
organisation's goal setting, performance measurement, feedback or reward 
systems. 
-Provoking debate so that the issues raised can be resolved. 
7.2: Conceptual underpinnings 
The conceptual framework shown in figure 3.1 underpinned the pilot versions 
of the goal and systems congruence audits. During the course of this research, 
however, three improvements that could be made directly to figure 3.1 were 
identified. One other particularly relevant issue also arose. The purpose of this 
section is to discuss these. 
The frrst improvement that could be made to figure 3.1 emerged during the 
development and testing of the goal congruence audit as it became apparent that 
the generic terms quality, time, cost (price) and flexibility were inadequate if 
one wanted to precisely define the manufacturing task. Hence in the pilot 
studies the generic terms quality, time, cost (price,) and flexibility were broken 
down into their constituent elements (see figure 4.1). The data gathered in 
companies A and B indicated that the lack of goal congruence was largely due to 
the prioritisation of the factors which together constituted the manufacturing 
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task rather than their defmition. Furthennore these data suggested that even the 
list of factors in figure 4.1 was incomplete (see figure 4.23). Hence it was 
decided that in the full congruence audit a management group would be asked to 
identify and define the manufacturing missions at the outset of the congruence 
audit using the framework shown in figure 6.2. As shown in figure 7.1 this 
framework has therefore replaced the contents of the top box of the original 
version of figure 3.1. 
The second improvement that could be made to the model emerged during the 
development and testing of the system congruence audit, although further 
evidence to support it was found during the subsequent congruence audits. As 
discussed in chapters 3 and 5 the concept of system congruence is based on the 
organisational behaviour literature which talks about management control and 
perfonnance management, and the business strategy literature which discusses 
strategic control. Implicit in both of these literatures is that consistency of 
decision making and action can be induced through appropriately designed goal 
setting, performance measurement, feedback and reward systems. Hence at the 
outset of this research it was believed that the goal setting, performance 
measurement, feedback and reward systems used in the manufacturing function 
should be directly related to the manufacturing task. Discussions and 
interviews with managers in a number of U.K. finns, however, suggested that 
explicitly linking reward systems to the manufacturing task can hinder a firm's 
ability to introduce new working practices, as those who have to implement or 
accept the changes may have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 
Further interviews and discussions, with managers in both Japan and the U.K., 
provided a number of examples of firms which had no explicit link between 
their reward systems and the manufacturing task, but were still apparently 
managing to realise their strategies. 
Interestingly the issue of whether a firm should use its reward systems to 
reinforce the importance of the manufacturing task appears to be related to the 
organisation's culture. Table 7.2 shows those systems that the operatives of 
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companies C and D believed had the greatest influence on their actions. Note 
how in company C all the most influential systems were reward based, while in 
company D two of the three most influential systems relied on feedback. This 
suggests that companies C and D employ reward and feedback respectively to 
encourage their employees to pursue courses of action congruent with their 
manufacturing task. In addition the logic that the interviewees in company C 
used when deciding which systems influenced them the most was interesting. 
When asked for example; "which influences your actio~s more - your basic 
salary or the spot bonus" most of the operatives in company C replied; "my 
basic salary is worth more to me than the spot bonus, hence it must influence 
me more". And as a result the perceived influence of each of the systems used 
in company C correlates with its fmancial worth. This suggests that the way to 
encourage the operatives of company C to do something is to offer them a 
financial incentive. In company D, however, fmancial incentives were not seen 
as so important. And given the earlier discussion regarding the problems with 
reward systems (see chapter five), a key question for the managers of company 
C is how can the process of changing the organisation's culture from one based 
on reward to one based on feedback best be managed? 
Table 7.2: The systems reported as influencing the operatives the most 
CompanyC CompanyD 
Basic 30% Group/area 22% 
salary meetings 
Plus 16% Management 20% 
rate by results 
Spot 13% Merit 15% bonus pay 
In terms of the framework underpinning this research the above observations 
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relate to the bottom box shown in figure 3.1 and the second of the assumptions 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, namely that all of the firm's systems 
should be used to reinforce the importance of the manufacturing missions. As 
figure 7.1 shows, this research has raised, but not sought to answer, the 
question of whether this is indeed the case, or whether the firm's reward 
systems should remain neutral, i.e. unrelated to any of the manufacturing 
mlSSlons. 
The third improvement that could be made to figure 3.1 relates to the middle 
box of the framework and the first of the assumptions stated at the beginning of 
this chapter. Implicit in both of these is the notion that goal congruence is 
good. It has, however, been suggested that too high a level of goal congruence 
might inhibit creativity (Pascale, 1990). Furthermore the case studies reported 
in chapter 6 showed that some differences of opinion in a firm are desirable. 
Take, for example, figure 6.47. This showed that the supervisors of company 
D believed that mission G - "people should understand the company objectives" 
- was far more important than anyone else. During the feedback session there 
was considerable debate as to whether this mismatch in priorities was a function 
of tP-e role of the supervisors or an area for concern. On the one hand, the 
supervisors argued that if they ensured that everyone who worked for them 
understood the company's objectives, then their jobs would be made far easier. 
On the other, it was pointed out that if the management team did not think that 
explaining the company's objectives to the supervisors was important, then they 
would not spend time doing so, and hence one could question whether the 
supervisors fully understood the company's objectives and therefore whether 
they should be trying to explain them to the operatives. Following this debate, 
however, it was decided that the lack of goal congruence over mission G was 
indeed a function of the supervisor's role. That is, the management team agreed 
that a major part of the supervisor's job was, to explain the company's 
objectives and hence it was decided that this was a natural and desirable area of 
goal incongruence. 
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This raises the question of what the appropriate level of goal congruence for a 
firm is. The previous discussion has already shown that it is role specific. In 
addition it is likely to be a function of the industrial sector within which a firm 
competes. Take, for example, the electronics industry. Innovation and 
creativity are the lifeblood of many companies in this industry. Hence if a high 
level of congruence does indeed inhibit creativity, then perhaps electronics 
companies should seek to operate with lower levels of goal congruence. On the 
other hand, take a high volume process company, such as a glass manufacturer. 
Here, due to the high capital and equipment costs one wants to maximise plant 
utilisation. Innovation and creativity are likely to be less important than cost 
minimisation, and hence, in this industry, perhaps a higher level of congruence 
should be pursued. 
During one of the feedback sessions the manufacturing director of company D 
asked the author what he thought the appropriate level of goal congruence for 
company D was. The author responded by saying that he believed this was a 
decision that the company's management had to make for themselves! In a way 
asking this question belies a lack of understanding of the purpose of the 
congruence audit. While there might be academic merit in exploring the 
appropriateness of different levels of congruence for different firms, the 
purpose of this research was to show that a process which identified areas of 
incongruence in a frrm could provide a novel way of examining why firms may 
be unable to realise their manufacturing strategies. One of the strengths of the 
congruence audit was that it did not attempt to be prescriptive. The audit was 
designed to identify areas of incongruence, but once this had been done it was 
then up to the management team to decide whether such incongruence was 
desirable or not 
In terms of the middle box shown in figure 3.1, then, it cannot be assumed that 
simply because someone affects whether the manufacturing task can be 
achieved they should necessarily have goals that are highly congruent with it. 
Indeed as figure 7.1 shows the issue is not; is there a high level of goal 
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congruence, but is there an appropriate level of goal congruence. 
Figure 7.1: Modified theoretical framework 
Market Manufacturing Corporate 
Requirements Missions Obiectives 
Quality ..... ~ .... 
-
Time .... ~ --... 
-
Cost .... ~ --... 
-
Flexibility ..... ~ --... 
-
Other ..... ...... .... .... 
~ (j 
Is there an appropriate = = 
level of goal congruence? ~ 
(JQ 
., 
= = ~ ~ 
-~r = ~ 
~ ~ 
Employees who 
affect whether the 
manufacturing task 
is achieved. 
~~ ~ (j 
Do the systems induce = =~ 
appropriate behaviour? ~ (JQ C'IJ ., Are they congruent with = ~ ~ 
manufacturing task? = :3 ~ 
~ ~ 
... 
Performance Goal Setting ~ 
....... 
Measurement ~ 
J~ 
Feedback 
There is one other extremely important issue that is not referred to in either 
figures 3.1 or 7.1, namely the time dimension. The problem here is quite 
simple - what is important now may not be important next year. As an example 
let us consider the U.K. television market. Initially the dominant order winning 
criterion was price and hence the manufacturing task would be cost related. 
However, in the 1970s the Japanese joined the fray and started to offer higher 
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quality television sets. Over time, this led to a change in customer perception 
and quality bec arne the dominant order winning criterion. To respond all the 
companies who decided, or were able, to remain in the market had to improve 
the quality of their products. Hence the customer's need for higher quality was 
satisfied and so the market began to compete on price once again, but a high 
level of product quality remained an order qualifying criterion (Hill, 1980). 
Richardson and Gordon (1980) make the same point, albeit from a slightly 
different perspective, when they argue that as products move through their life 
cycle the manufacturing task changes. When a product is first introduced, 
innovation, the ability to cope with frequent design changes, and 
responsiveness to customer needs will be important. Once the product has 
become established and the demand for it is increasing then maximising capacity 
utilisation and minimising lost sales is likely to be important. Finally, once the 
product reaches maturity it becomes a cash cow and hence the manufacturing 
task becomes minimise costs. 
These observations raise an important question for the research reported in this 
thesis, namely that if the manufacturing task is likely to change over a period of 
time, then should effort be expended on ensuring that everyone understands the 
importance of a specific manufacturing task? It can be argued that not only 
would this be a waste of resources, but also that there is a danger that if too 
high a level of congruence exists in a firm no one will question whether the 
manufacturing task needs to be redefined and hence the company might end up 
pursuing a strategy which was becoming increasingly inappropriate over time. 
Alternatively, it can be argued that if one does not try to induce a certain level of 
congruence in the firm then it is likely that each individual's actions will be 
directionless and hence the company will be unable to realise any strategy. To 
an extent these points link back to the question that was discussed earlier, 
namely what is the appropriate level of goal congruence for a firm, but they also 
have implications for the manufacturing strategy development process. First 
they emphasise the importance of ensuring that the management group regularly 
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re-examine whether the prioritisations that they have assigned to the 
manufacturing missions are still appropriate. Second they reiterate that one 
should only attempt to define and prioritise the manufacturing missions by 
product family or customer group. Third they lend support to the thesis that 
one should not seek to reinforce the importance of the manufacturing missions 
through the reward systems, because as the manufacturing task changes the 
systems that the firm uses will have to be modified, and as discussed in chapter 
five managers would be well advised to avoid having to .change their reward 
systems. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for this research, as the 
manufacturing task will change over time the results of the congruence audit 
will only be valid for a limited period and hence perhaps the audit should be 
repeated at regular intervals. 
7.4: Summary 
This chapter has explored the assumptions underpinning the research reported 
in this thesis by reviewing both the strengths and weaknesses of the congruence 
audit and the conceptual framework which underlies it. Doing this has 
highlighted three points. First rather than seeking a high level of goal 
congruence, firms should seek an appropriate level of goal congruence. Second 
a strong case can be made for not using the firm's systems to reinforce the 
importance of the manufacturing task. Third the results of any congruence audit 
have a limited life. Hence perhaps there is a need to repeat it on a regular basis. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.0: Introduction 
This research reported in this thesis set out to test the two propositions: 
(a) That a process which can be used to identify areas of 
either goal or system incongruence (a congruence audit) 
can be developed. 
(b) That such a process can be used to identify some of the 
reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. 
In chapter three the conceptual underpinnings of the congruence audit were 
documented and it was shown how these were grounded in the manufacturing 
strategy, business strategy, organisational behaviour and organisational culture 
literature. Chapters four and five described the the development and testing of 
the goal and system congruence audits. In chapter six the full congruence audit 
was presented and it was established that this could be used to identify some of 
the reasons why a firm may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. 
Hence the research aims, documented in chapter 1, were achieved. In chapter 
seven some of the other issues research raised by this research were discussed 
and the assumptions underlying the congruence audit were reviewed. The 
purpose of this chapter is tie together those that have gone before by 
summarising the findings of the research and identifying areas that require 
further work. 
8.1: Research findings 
The main outcome of this research has been to show that the concept of 
congruence can be; operationalised and used to identify some of the reasons 
why a firm may be unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. Having said 
this, however, the research also led to a number of other findings. These are 
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summarised below. 
Development and testing of the goal congruence audit 
1. The manufacturing task cannot be defmed precisely by using the generic 
terms quality, time, price (cost) and flexibility as each of these consist of 
a number of SUb-dimensions. 
2. The manufacturing task is made up of a number of factors 
(manufacturing missions) which are themselves a function of both the 
company's objectives and the customer's requirements. 
3. Goal incongruence is largely due to the prioritisation of the 
manufacturing missions rather than their definition. 
4. The priorities that an individual attaches to the various manufacturing 
missions do not vary considerably, even over an extended period of 
time, unless the interviewee has been subject to a major stimulus, such 
as company A's management development scheme. 
Development and testing of the system congruence audit 
5. Managers use the goal setting, performance measurement, feedback and 
reward systems to reinforce the importance of the manufacturing 
missions, although it is debatable whether a firm's reward systems 
should be used. 
6. There are two factors which determine to extent to which a given system 
reinforces the importance of a manufacturing mission; what the system 
encourages employees to do and how much the system influences their 
behaviour. 
Application of the congruence audit 
7 . The managers of the small to medium sized companies involved in this 
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research did not wish to make a distinction between the manufacturing 
task and the policy decisions. Instead they wanted to make the policy 
decisions only when the need arose and then define a manufacturing 
mission which supported their decision. 
8. Achieving the shorter term manufacturing missions, such as delivering 
products on time, was often seen as more important than realising the 
longer term ones, such as eliminate waste (company D). 
9. The level of goal congruence was highest between a firm's senior 
managers and those employees who worked on the shop floor 
(companies C and D). 
10. The most common reason for a firm being unable to realise its 
manufacturing strategy was that the actions of the senior managers did 
not support the manufacturing task (companies C and D). 
11. Goal incongruence is not always undesirable. Indeed it can be a 
function of an individual's role (company D) or their position in the 
organisation. 
12. The firm's non-financial systems have less influence on the priorities of 
the operatives than they do on those of the supervisors (company C). 
13. Relying on financial incentives to motivate people leads to barriers 
which may inhibit the introduction of future changes in the firm's 
working practices (companies A, 3 and 4). 
14. Firms which do not rely on financial incentives to motivate their 
employees tend to have a culture based on information sharing and 
feedback (companies D, 1, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 13). 
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It should be noted that as this research focuses on the development of a process, 
the congruence audit, then there are also some findings which relate specifically 
to the process. These are summarised below. 
Process points 
1. The definition and prioritisation of the manufacturing missions proved 
to be a useful team building exercise. 
2. The pairwise comparison process provides a suitable technique for 
prioritising sets of factors (the manufacturing missions and the influence 
of the finn's systems). 
3. The reliability of the data collection process can be enhanced by 
structuring it fonnally. This also increases its efficiency. 
4. The validity of the data collected can be enhanced through the discussion 
that can be provoked by immediate visual feedback. This increases it 
effectiveness. 
5. U sing questionnaires in an interview provides a means of rapidly 
collecting a large amount of data while maintaining the flexibility the 
interview provides. 
6. Visual feedback, especially if it compares one person's opinions with 
those of another, is a powerful way of provoking discussion. 
7 . The individual interviews are widely understandable. Of the twenty six 
conducted in companies C and D only two had to be aborted. 
8. The consistency ratio generated during the pairwise comparison process 
provides a useful and independent means of checking the validity of the 
data that have been collected. 
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9. The interviewees found it easier to relate to the concept of goal 
congruence than they did to the more abstract one of system 
congruence. 
10. An external facilitator is necessary as they offer confidentiality, which is 
a prerequisite given the individual interviewees are going to be asked to 
explain why their opinions differ from those of the management group. 
11. An effective congruence audit can be completed rapidly. Half a days 
management group discussion and two days interviewing (one hour per 
interviewee) provides the necessary data. Multiple inputs (either several 
interviews or a few interviews backed up with other data) enhance one's 
confidence in the reliability and validity of the process as they enable the 
facilitator to iron out individual bias. 
12. The congruence audit provides a novel means of; (a) defining what a 
management group believes manufacturing should be doing, (b) 
identifying what other employees think manufacturing actually is doing, 
(c) establishing whether any mismatches in perception occur, (d) 
determining whether such mismatches in perception are a function of the 
organisation's goal setting, performance measurement, feedback or 
reward systems, and (e) provoking debate so that the issues raised can 
be resolved. 
8.2: Areas requiring further work 
The work reported in this thesis provides the foundations for a variety of future 
research projects. These are summarised below. 
1. Although this work haS shown that the concept of congruence can be 
operationalised and exploited the process that has been developed still 
requires a skilled facilitator. In some subsequent work, then, it would 
be useful if the congruence audit could be converted into a more widely 
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usable process. 
2. The findings reported above are based on a limited sample of 
companies. Due to time constraints it was impossible to apply the 
congruence audit to a larger sample. Hence there is a need to seek 
confrrmation of some of the findings through further research. 
3 . The research reported in this thesis focuses on identifying areas of goal 
and system incongruence which may inhibit a firm's ability to realise its 
manufacturing strategy. A major topic for future study, then, is the 
question of how areas of goal and system incongruence which are 
deemed inappropriate can be reduced or eliminated. 
4. One of the questions that the author was often asked during the course 
of this research was; what is the appropriate level of congruence for a 
firm. In chapter seven it was suggested that the appropriate level of 
congruence for a firm might be industry, or even context specific. 
Future research could seek to explore this. 
5. Current developments in the field of Production/Operations Management 
include the concepts of organisational learning and core competencies. 
The congruence audit may form the basis of a tool which could be used 
to further explore both of these concepts. Indeed future research should 
seek to exploit the generic nature of the process presented in this thesis. 
8.3: Summary 
This chapter sought to integrate and summarise the work presented in the rest of 
this thesis. In it both the research findings and areas requiring further work 
have been discussed. 
The objective of this research was to show that the concept of congruence could 
be operationalised and used to identify some of the reasons why a firm may be 
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unable to realise its manufacturing strategy. This chapter has shown that not 
only has this objective been achieved, but also that the research reported in this 
thesis opens a potentially rich seam of future research topics. 
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APPENDIX I 
Production/Operations Management: 
Research Process and Content During the 1980S1 
Abstract 
It has been argued that P/OM only emerged as a true functional 
field of management during the 1980s. If this is the case then 
one can hypothesise that P/OM research must have changed 
considerable during the last decade. To test this hypothesis all 
the articles that were published in the first ten volumes of the 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management 
were categorised using a framework based on both the content 
and process of the research reported. The development of this 
framework is explained and the data generated from the 
categorisation process are presented. These data clearly show 
that during the 1980s the content P/OM research became 
increasingly of a macro and soft nature. 
1 This paper was publisbed in the International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 
Volume 13, Number 1, pp. 5-18. 
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Introduction 
Production/Operations Management (P/OM), as a functional field of 
management, has developed rapidly during the last fIfteen years. As consumers 
have become more discerning and competition more intense, manufacturing 
organisations have been presented with a wide variety of panaceas including; 
Just-In-Time (JIT), Total Quality Management (TQM), Manufacturing 
Resources Planning (MRP II), Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) and 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), all of which appear to fall in and 
out of favour with alarming regularity. In the late 1970s the future for the 
P/OM community looked bleak and many prominent US business schools were 
closing down their P/OM courses [1]. By the mid 1980s the new industrial 
competition, particularly that from Japan, had heightened industrial interest in 
P/OM to the extent that it was only the lack of qualified teachers which was 
constraining business schools from offering new P/OM courses [1, 2]. 
What has happened, then, to the academic discipline of P/OM in the last fifteen 
years? How has the field developed? Why has it developed so rapidly? What 
effect has this had on research conducted by the members of the P/OM 
community? How has their research changed and how is it likely to change in 
the future? After addressing some of these questions and reviewing some of the 
papers, from both sides of the Atlantic, that purport to provide research 
frameworks for P/OM, all the papers published in the first ten volumes of the 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management (IJOPM) are 
categorised according to their research content and process. The results of this 
categorisation exercise are used to highlight some of the interesting trends 
apparent in the P/OM research conducted during the 1980s. 
The Evolution of P/OM 
In 1982 Buffa [3] suggested that three overlapping phases of evolutionary 
development in the field of Production/Operations Management (P/OM) could 
be identified. These are shown in figure 1. 
In the mid 1950s, whilst in its descriptive phase, P/OM was effectively 
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synonymous with the entire field of industrial management and elements from 
functional disciplines as widely diverse as finance, marketing and personnel 
management were all included under the P/OM umbrella. By 1961, the year in 
which P/OM's descriptive phase ended [3], the P/OM community was 
beginning to disintegrate with some of its members leaving to establish their 
own functional fields of management. As functional specialisation became 
more popular those members of the P/OM community who remained found 
themselves fighting for the survival of a discipline which had been stripped of 
all but a few techniques: "time and motion study, plant layout, Gantt's 
production control boards, the simple EOQ model, and simplistic descriptions 
of how production systems worked" [3, pp. 1]. 
Between 1960 and the late 1970s Management Science/Operations Research 
(MS/OR) proved to be P/OM's saviour. Indeed when the first twenty five years 
of the Management Science Journal were reviewed it was found that production 
management problems were consistently the most studied area (27 percent), 
followed by finance (8 percent) and marketing (6 percent) [4]. However 
MS/OR is not, in itself, P/OM and has, to a certain extent, proved to be a false 
prophet for the field. By the mid 1970s most of the MS/OR techniques that had 
been developed to solve traditional P/OM type problems were being applied to 
problems in all the functional fields of management and as these MS/OR 
techniques became general management tools the members of the P/OM 
community found that once again they had lost their distinctive competence. 
By the early 1980s the future for P/OM was looking much brighter. New 
P/OM journals, on both sides of the Atlantic, the Journal of Operations 
Management in the US and the International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management in the UK, were first published in 1980. Miller et al. 
[1] observed that in the US the decline in manufacturing competitiveness, 
particularly the shortcomings in productivity and technological innovation, had 
lead to a rapid increase in the level of interest expressed in the field and that it 
was the lack of suitably qualified teachers that was the limiting factor when 
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setting up a new P/OM Course. In the UK a similar optimism seemed to sweep 
through the higher educational establishments and Voss [2] also argued that this 
was principally due to the now widely recognised new industrial competition, 
particularly that from Japan. 
At about the same time companies that had been hard hit by foreign competition 
were publicising early results, which later proved to be major turn arounds, that 
had been achieved through the application of modern production and operations 
management techniques. For example, in 1983 Harley-Davidson held only 23 
percent of the North American market share for the super heavyweight 
motorcycle. The company had lost almost 77 percent of its market share in 
fifteen years because of intense competition from Honda, Yamaha, Suzuki and 
Kawasaki. By the end of 1989 Hadey-Davidson's market share was reported 
as 59 percent and still rising. This impressive turn around has been attributed to 
three basic operations management principles; employee involvement, statistical 
operator control and material-as-needed, the Harley-Davidson version of Just-
In-Time (JIT) material supply [5]. 
Buffa's third phase of evolution for operations management, then, began in the 
early 1980s and he argues that this was when P/OM found itself emerging as a 
true functional field of management [3]. Since then advanced manufacturing 
technologies such as; Just-In-Time (JIT), Total Quality Management (TQM), 
Manufacturing Resources Planning (MRP IT), Flexible Manufacturing Systems 
(FMS) and Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), to name but a few, have 
all been subject to wide scrutiny. Voss [2], points out, that 
Production/Operations Management is often confused with either Operations 
Research or with technology but that it is now really "concerned with the 
effective selection, application and management of new technologies." 
Accepting that this is an accurate description of the true functional nature of 
P/OM then one can hypothesise that research conducted in the field should have 
changed considerably since P/OM's MS/OR phase. That is not to say that 
MS/OR techniques will no longer be used but that MS/OR is now a functional 
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discipline in its own right and simply provides one set of tools that a P/OM 
researcher can use. One of the objectives of this paper is to test this hypothesis 
by examining all the research published in the first ten volumes of the 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management. In order to do 
this it is first necessary to identify what changes in P/OM research one would 
expect and then to develop a categorisation framework which can be used to 
identify if such changes actually occurred. In the next section some of the 
P/OM research frameworks that were published in the early to mid 1980s will 
be reviewed and the major issues they raise identified. A research 
categorisation framework, based on the reviewed papers, will then be proposed 
and used to categorise all the articles that were published in the first ten volumes 
of the International Journal of Operations and Production Management. The 
results of the categorisation process will form the basis for a discussion of how 
both the content and process of P/OM research has changed since the late 
1970s. 
Figure 1: Evolutionary Development of Production/Operations Management 
P/OM's 
Descriptive Phase 
• 
P/OM as a functional 
field of management 
P/OM's Management 
Science/Operations Research Phase 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
P/OM Research Frameworks 
• 
Time 
In the first edition of the J ouma! of Operations Management a superb paper with 
which to begin a review of P/OM research since the end of its MS/OR phase is 
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presented by Chase [4]. He examined and categorised the 134 P/OM type 
papers which had been published in volumes 9 and 10 of Decision Sciences, 
volumes 10 and 11 of AIlE Transactions, volumes 24 and 25 of Management 
Science and volumes 15, 16 and 17 of the International Journal of Production 
Research using a framework, based on the two dimensions of research 
orientation and research emphasis, similar to the one shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2: P/OM Research Categorisation Framework Used by Chase 
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The research orientation dimension refers to the perspective the researchers have 
adopted. Chase argues that there are two basic categories within research 
orientation. Either the research focuses on a narrow, well defined, problem and 
is micro in orientation or it focuses on a larger and usually less well-structured 
problem and is macro in orientation. The research emphasis dimension, on the 
other hand, is used to describe to the mechanisation continuum. Chase argues 
that because all production systems must consist of some combination of 
people, in terms of their physiological, sociological and physical characteristics, 
and tangible production equipment (facilities, machines, inventories, 
transportation devices, etc.) then so must all P/OM research. In his 
categorisation framework Chase merely uses the end points of the 
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mechanisation continuum and is simply trying to answer the question: does this 
research focus predominantly on people or equipment? 
Of the 134 articles that Chase reviewed and categorised he found that less than 
19 per cent described research in which a people emphasis had been adopted. 
By far the majority of papers, 76 per cent, were based on research that had an 
equipment emphasis and a micro orientation. The actual breakdown of the 
categorisations are shown in figure 3. 
Figure 3: Results from Chase's Categorisation Exercise 
Research Orientation 
Micro Macro 
0 
til ....... 
..... 0.. 
til 8 ~ 
..c: ~ 
16 articles 9 articles 
(11.9 per cent) (6.7 per cent) 
c.. 
e 
~ 
..c: () 
... .-
~ c: 
QJ 0 
til 8 QJ 0.. 
= 
...... 
::s $ 
102 articles 7 articles 
(76 per cent) (5.2 per cent) 
Chase [4, pp. 10] argues that these results and the data that he had gathered 
while reviewing and categorising the papers suggest that the "dominant research 
strategy [up to that time] was problem identification, model formulation, and 
mathematical and/or computer manipulation of the model." In many ways this 
is not an unexpected finding, particularly when one considers that Chase was 
reviewing articles that had been published in 1979 but that were probably based 
on work conducted between 1975 and 1978, a period that falls well within 
P/OM's MS/OR phase. What is more relevant to this discussion are Chase's 
thoughts on both topics for future P/OM research and how the imbalance 
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toward an equipment emphasis and a micro orientation could be redressed. 
Firstly Chase suggests that in the future P/OM researchers should consider 
people in tenns of their psycho-social attributes rather than merely as machine 
minders. Second he argues that more research with a macro orientation should 
be undertaken. He points out that studies of inventory control and scheduling, 
which made up 22 per cent and 37 per cent of reported research respectively, 
were frequently micro in orientation and that they focussed on local rather than 
global optimisation. Third Chase points out that there appears to be a-.lack of 
field based research, particularly studies of a longitudinal nature. Fourth that he 
found no articles which reported research on purchasing and fifth that papers on 
manufacturing policy, one of the earliest P/OM subjects [6], rarely appeared 
outside the Harvard Business Review. Basically, then, Chase appears to have 
been arguing that increased effort should be expended on research that is macro 
in orientation, that incorporates the psycho-social attributes of people and that is 
conducted in the field. How do these recommendations compare with the 
thoughts of other authors at that time? 
Miller et al. [1] say that technology, managing fundamentals and strategic 
orientation, were the three predominant themes that emerged during a P/OM 
workshop held in 1980. With respect to technology it was claimed that research 
seemed to lag behind the industrial state-of-the-art hardware and that software, 
or thoughtware, such as MRP, Kanban and management developments in the 
service sector were all poorly understood. It was suggested that one way of 
rectifying this would be for academics to conduct systematic field based 
research with an emphasis on collecting, generalising and disseminating 
information on industrial best practice. An integral part of such research would 
include investigation of both how to implement new technologies and what 
benefits could be expected following the implementation. 
The second major area that was highlighted was managing fundamentals, or, as 
Peters and Watennan [7] later called it, sticking to the knitting. As Miller et al. 
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[1, pp. 566] point out "contrary to popular belief ... Japanese auto plants are 
more productive not because they are highly automated compared to ours but 
because the Japanese have learned to achieve maximum performance from all 
system components: equipment, information, and, most of all, people." Once 
again the emphasis is on field based research, particularly that focussing on 
both people issues and system integration. 
The third and final theme that was identified as important at the workshop was 
strategic orientation. In support of Skinner [6] and those who have followed 
him, Miller et al. [1, pp. 567] say that: "manufacturing capabilities, dependent 
as they are on long lead times and major organisational upheavals, are more 
important determinants of strategic options than the availability of capital 
resources. The way things are done is not just a matter of style or even cost 
effectiveness; it defines the product." Hence they argue that management 
decisions concerning capacity planning, facilities location and multi-plant 
production need to be examined to determine their strategic influence. In this 
case there is a need for field based research with a macro orientation. 
Basically, then, both Chase and Miller et al. seem to have a very similar view of 
how P/OM research should have developed during the 1980s. The predominant 
themes in the US appear to have been; increased field based research, both in 
terms of industrial collaboration and exploitation or implementation of existing 
theory, increased emphasis on the human element, increased research scope, 
increased research on both purchasing and service operations and the 
development of a strategic framework for P/OM. If these were the key US 
themes at the beginning of the 1980s how do they compare with the thoughts of 
authors based in the UK? 
In 1980 the UK's Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) provided 
funding for research into manufacturing through its Efficiency of Production 
System (EPS) panel. Waterlow [8] reports that one of the aims of EPS 
programme was to encourage research which examined the relationship between 
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various manufacturing sub-systems rather than examining isolated elements. 
He also explains that the members of the EPS panel regarded working with 
collaborating companies to be of fundamental importance and that the 
exploitation and implementation of existing ideas was seen to be more important 
than the development of entirely new ones. Hence in the early 1980s the SERC 
were forcing researchers, at least those that wanted funding for their efforts, to 
explore real macro rather than micro issues in conjunction with industry. 
Waterlow [8, pp. 49] defines a manufacturing system as "comprising the 
equipment, its layout and relationship to the products produced, work practices, 
planning and control routines, order generation methods, and interfaces with 
design, marketing and finance." Hence, although similar trends to those 
observed in the US can be identified, namely the emphasis on collaborative 
macro research, the parallel issue of increased research on soft systems does not 
appear to have been explicitly included in the EPS programme. Indeed 
Waterlow [8, pp. 55] actually says: "research on soft systems in the Programme 
is likely to concentrate on how to handle variety with short lead times, and to 
relate more closely to new process and computer technologies (including 
software) in order to overcome some of the inherent difficulties in this type of 
research. Topics which will be covered superficially, or not at all, which are of 
potential interest to P/OM researchers, are manufacturing policies, management 
styles, organisational structures, and performance measurement." Of course, it 
may be that members of the SERC assumed that such subjects were funded 
under research programmes sponsored by the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC), formerly the Social Science Research Council. 
In 1982 the UK's Social Science Research Council (SSRC) commissioned a 
review of current P/OM research. Lawrence [9] was given the task of studying 
research on the man management aspects of P/OM, particularly in terms of who 
became production managers, what their expected career path was and what 
qualifications they had, etc. While Voss [2] examined the wider P/OM issues. 
As part of his study Voss organised a two day workshop which was attended 
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by over fifty P/OM researchers and teachers, and where a variety of papers on 
current research interests were presented. Coupling information collected 
during discussions at the workshop with the results of a wider survey Voss 
identified the ten major P/OM topic areas that were of interest to UK academics 
in the early 1980s. These were; manufacturing policy, measurement of 
performance, international comparisons, technology (e.g. CAD/CAM, FMS, 
robotics, CIM), management of technological change, application of computers, 
production planning and inventory control, quality management, quantitative 
approaches and service operations management In his paper Voss was keen to 
emphasise the managerial nature of P/OM. Specifically, he argued, that P/OM 
research was required in the following areas; manufacturing policy, 
management of technology, foreign manufacturing practices, service 
operations, purchasing and qUality. 
In summary, then, one can identify a number of parallel themes in the papers 
from both the US and the UK that were published in the early 1980' s and that 
purported to present P/OM research frameworks. The major theme seems to 
have been that P/OM was now emerging as a functional field of management in 
its own right. Because of this research on manufacturing policy, which could 
provide an integrative theme for all P/OM research, was seen as fundamentally 
important. In terms of the content of research, that is the question of what 
should be examined, the major themes appear to have been that emphasis on the 
softer elements of P/OM should be increased and that more research of a macro 
nature should be undertaken. When one considers the research process, that is 
how should the work be conducted, the principal themes appear to be more 
collaboration with industry and an increase in emphasis on implementation and 
exploitation of existing ideas, rather than development of entirely new ones. In 
the next section the research dimensions of content and process are used to 
develop categorisation frameworks. These frameworks were used to categorise 
all the articles that were published in the first ten volumes of the International 
Journal of Operations and Production Management (UOPM) in an attempt to see 
if the P/OM community has lived up to those early challenges which were laid 
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down in the research frameworks which have been reviewed. The results of the 
categorisation process follow sections on the development and use of the 
cate gorisation frameworks. 
Development of the Categorisation Frameworks 
The major themes identified in the previous section can be split into two 
categories. The first, which reflects the research scope or content, addresses 
the issue of what is being studied? Is it macro or micro in orientation? Does it 
emphasise the hard or soft elements of P/OM? This question of research scope 
can be examined using a categorisation framework similar to the one developed 
by Chase [4]. One of the major advantages of using such a framework is that 
an approximate comparison can be made between the two studies. However it 
is acknowledged that because different individuals have categorised the different 
papers one cannot assume that the results are directly comparable. 
The second set of themes can be categorised according to the research process, 
or style, adopted. In this case the question that is being addressed is how (and 
why) was this research conducted? Was it collaborative? Was the research 
designed to produce new theories or to identify ways of exploiting existing 
ideas? Figure 4 shows both of these categorisation frameworks with their 
associated keys. 
Use of the Categorisation Frameworks 
As can be seen in figure 4 each quadrant of the categorisation frameworks has 
been labelled 1, 2, 3 or 4. The quadrant labelled 4 is the one which most 
closely represents the MS/OR type research philosophies identified by Chase 
[4]. The quadrant labelled 1 is the one into which an increasing amount of 
P/OM research should fall if the predictions made by the authors of the P/OM 
research frameworks that have been reviewed have come true. As far as was 
possible the following guidelines were followed when categorising each article. 
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Figure 4: Categorisation Frameworks Used for this Research 
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Research Scope Categorisation Framework 
Research Orientation: 
The research orientation is either macro or micro. All papers that referred to an 
isolated problem, such as how to schedule a manufacturing cell, or how to 
select a computer aided design (CAD) system, were categorised as having a 
micro orientation. An example of a paper having a macro orientation would be 
one which focussed on issues such as how will the implementation of a CAD 
system help integrate the design and manufacturing functions? 
Research Emphasis: 
Papers based primarily on managerial issues, such as the JIT manufacturing 
philosophy, job design and quality circles were categorised as having a soft 
emphasis. At the other extreme reports which focussed on machine tools, 
layout of plant and statistical process control were classified as hard. 
Research Style Categorisation Framework 
Research Purpose: 
If the objective of the research was to produce a new scheduling algorithm or to 
design a new method of manufacture then the research purpose was classified 
as developmental. If, on the other hand, the research reported studies of 
existing technology or industrial practice and the emphasis was on exploitation 
of the ideas then the research was categorised as exploitative. 
Research Team: 
If the research was conducted in partnership with industry then it was classified 
as collaborative. If it were conducted in a laboratory with little or no external 
input then it was categorised as isolated. 
Basically then during the categorisation process the following four questions 
were being addressed: 
-Does the research have a broad or narrow orientation? 
-Does the research predominantly focus on the soft or hard P/OM issues? 
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-Is the research pure or does it produce some practical conclusions that will 
help industrialists implement advanced manufacturing technologies? 
-Is the research team multi-disciplinary? 
Because of the inherent subjectivity of this method justifications for the 
categorisation of all the papers in volume 1, number 1 of the International 
J oumal of Operatio ns and Production Management have been provided below. 
It is hoped that this will offer the reader some insight into the thought processes 
that accompanied the categorisation of the papers. 
Justification For Categorisations 
Paper 1: Hill [10] 
The title of this paper, Manufacturing Implications in Determining Corporate 
Policy, suggests that the research will have a macro orientation. In the first 
section of the paper, Hill explains that he asked two groups of senior managers 
what they understood by the phrase manufacturing policy. Hence one can 
conclude that the research team is multi-disciplinary, that is it involves both 
academics and industrialists. By scanning through the rest of the paper it can be 
seen that Hill goes on to examine why manufacturing directors do not get 
involved with the development of manufacturing policy and ultimately a 
framework showing how manufacturing policy issues are related to corporate 
decisions is presented. This framework lies towards the soft end of the 
mechanisation continuum and is certainly designed for exploitation. Hence 
Hill's paper is categorised as 1 for both research scope and research style. 
Paper 2: Ray [11] 
This paper, entitled Assessing UK Industry's Inventory Management 
Performance, immediately suggests collaborative or multi-disciplinary research, 
possibly through the use of surveys. On reviewing the paper, however, it 
becomes apparent that Ray has based his paper on a variety of publicly available 
reports. The topic is micro in perspective, in that Ray considers inventory 
alone. The emphasis of the research, inventory management, is relatively hard 
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and while Ray presents a convincing case which emphasises the importance of 
good inventory management there are few practical suggestions as to what one 
should do. Therefore this paper is categorised as a 4 for both research scope 
and research style. 
Paper 3: Sassani and Rathmill [12] 
The title of this paper is An Evaluation of the Effects of Skill Variety and 
Labour Mobility in the Operation of Industrial ManlMachine Groups Using a 
Simulation Model. The synopsis specifically mentions collaboration with a 
company and operator skills. Hence one's immediate reaction is that the 
research team is multi-disciplinary and the research emphasis is soft. However 
the research was actually based on a simulation in which it has been assumed 
that the humans are merely machine minders. So the initial research emphasis 
categorisation of soft is changed to hard. Sassani and Rathmill say that their 
simulation model was useful for the managers in the firm, but that a high level 
of skill was required before one could use it. Hence the research purpose 
appears to have been developmental rather than exploitative. Finally the 
problem addressed was that of how to assign workers to machines which in 
itself is a fairly specific and hence micro problem. The final categorisations for 
Sassani and Rathmill' s paper, then, are a 4 for research scope and a 2 for 
research style. 
Paper 4: Wright [13] 
In his paper, Wright argues that purchasing is a somewhat neglected function 
that has been ignored by both academics and industrialists. The paper is 
abstract, developmental and the research is isolated. Hence it is categorised as a 
4 for research style. In terms of research scope the paper is macro in orientation 
and fairly soft, and hence categorised as a 1. 
Paper 5: Fortuin [14] 
Fortuin's paper, The All-Time Requirement of Spare Parts for Service After 
Sales - Theoretical Analysis and Practical Results, focuses on the, fairly narrow 
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or micro, problem of identifying the all-time requirement for replacement 
components. He develops a mathematical model and presents data from an 
"average case". The paper is categorised as 4 for both research scope and 
research sty Ie. 
Paper 6: Hollier [15] 
The title of this paper, The Grouping Concept in manufacturing, suggests that 
the research emphasis will be hard and this proves to be the case. In his 
conclusions Hollier suggests that "a wider view should be taken of the concept 
of grouping in the design and operation of production systems as a major step 
in simplifying their complexity" [15, pp. 77]. Hence the orientation of the 
research is macro. This gives a final classification for the research scope of 3. 
The research style is categorised as a 3. It is isolated because Hollier is using 
his own opinions to explain the concept of grouping and exploitative because 
the paper is written in a style which explains the concepts and benefits of 
groupIng. 
Results from the Categorisation Process 
Figures 5 and 6 show the broad trends during the 1980s in terms of both the 
content and process of the P/OM research published in the International Journal 
of Operations and Production Management (IJOPM). At the beginning of the 
decade as Chase [4] suggests there was a tendency to conduct, or at least report, 
research on hard topics with a micro orientation. (73% of papers published in 
volume 1 of the IJOPM fell into this category. This is comparable with the 
figure 76% that Chase reports.) However over the following few years more 
research on softer and macro topics was reported and by the middle of the 
decade articles which focussed on the macro/soft P/OM topics were more 
common in the IJOPM than those that focussed on microlhard issues. 
With respect to the research process the picture is somewhat less clear. 
Isolated/developmental research appears to be the most common. In fact over 
the ten year period 41 % of papers published in the IJOPM fell into this 
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Figure 5: Research Content of Papers Published in the IJOPM 
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category. Next most common is collaborative/developmental research (25%), 
followed by collaborativelexploitative (18%) and finally isolated/exploitative 
(16%). However, as can be seen in figure 6 the research processes vary 
substantially on an annual basis and it appears that the choice of research 
process has not been subject to the same pressures as research content Perhaps 
this is because the research process adopted is a question of personal 
preference, while the research content is subject to the current mindset of the 
members of a research community. It is, of course, unrealistic to suggest that 
anyone research process is better than any other. It is vital that as a community 
P/OM researchers develop techniques which can be exploited but at the same 
time if there were no new pure research then no new techniques would be 
generated. In fact if there were no pure research the role of the members of the 
P/OM community would be to report and disseminate information on existing 
best practice, a role that one could argue might be better suited to journalists 
than academics. 
Conclusions 
The principal purpose of this paper was to examine how the radical changes that 
have taken place in the P/OM field during the last fifteen years have affected 
both the content and process of the P/OM research reported in the IJOPM. 
After describing P/OM's evolutionary development and identifying the predicted 
changes in P/OM research all of the papers published in the first ten volumes of 
the International Journal of Operations and Production Management were 
categorised according to the research they reported. The data generated from 
this exercise showed that while there was a steady trend during the 1980s 
towards increased macrolsoft research and decreased microlhard research, there 
were no similar trends with respect to the research processes used. 
One issue that has not yet been' addressed is the question of the future of P/OM 
research. In 1980 Chase [4] wrote: 
"research on research is often a perilous undertaking, with the list of caveats 
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exceeding the list of results. This paper is no exception. Small sample sizes and 
judgment calls do not provide a feeling of security, and proposing what an entire field 
"should" consider smacks of hubris and perhaps a little glue sniffmg." 
It is freely acknowledged that these comments apply to this paper. Practical 
results are limited, as is the sample size, because only papers published in the 
IJOPM have been included. Because of this one could argue that the results 
reported reflect the editorial policy of the journal and do not relate to 
developments in the P/OM field as a whole. As a counter arguement one could 
suggest that the papers published in the IJOPM should be reasonably 
representative of P/OM research as a whole and that little, if anything, would be 
gained by repeating the same process with different journals. In the end, 
however, the important point is not so much the results reported but the issue 
they raise. During the 1980s the amount of research with a macrolsoft content 
appears to have increased at the expense of that with a microlhard content as 
predicted in the PIOM research frameworks reviewed. Why then has the same 
not happened with respect to the collaborative/exploitative research process? Is 
it because the choice of research process is a function of personal preference? 
Is it because conferences, papers and seminars often focus on the issue of 
research content rather than the process used? Perhaps one of the key questions 
for the 1990s is not only what but also how PIOM research should be 
conducted? 
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APPENDIX II 
Analysis of pairwise comparison data 
Introduction 
This appendix explains how the raw data collected during the pairwise 
comparison process are converted into; a set of preference weightings and a 
consistency ratio. The data used in the example were gathered during an 
interview with the manufacturing director of company A. The matrix shown in 
figure 1 was produced as a result of the pairwise comparison process. 
Figure 1: Data Produced During the Pairwise Comparison Process 
= 
8 ~ 
.g 
~ :.= u 
~ ~ t 
.... ~ .~ ,CJ ~ ~ .~ cI.l co ~ :.= u = ~ .~ co 8 Q. .... .- .- ~ i ~ 00 g u = := cI.l ~ :.= ! I 'E ~ .~ -u u ~ en en g ~ ~ c.. 0 0 ~ ~ 
Perceived quality 1 113 3 1 2 2 3 1 
Performance quality 3 1 3 1 2 2 4 1 
Due date performance 113 113 1 112 114 1 1 112 
Selling price 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 
New product flexibility 112 112 4 1 1 3 1 1 
Ra te of product introduction 112 112 1 112 1/3 1 1 112 
Serviceability 1/3 114 1 112 1 1 1 112 
Aesthetics 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 
Step 1: Normalise the data in each column 
Calculate the sum of each column and then divide every entry in the column by 
the appropriate sum. This results in the matrix shown in figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Normalised Pairwise Comparison Matrix 
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Perceived quality 0.13 0.07 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.2 0.15 
Performance quality 0.39 0.2 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.27 0.15 
Due date petformance 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Selling price 0.13 0.2 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 
New product flexibility 0.07 0.1 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.07 0.15 
Ra te of product introduction 0.07 0.1 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Serviceability 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Aesthetics 0.13 0.2 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.15 
Step 2: Calculate the preference weightings for each factor 
Calculate the relative importance of each factor by working averaging each row. 
Table 1 shows these values for the factors which the manufacturing director of 
company A identified as externally important 
Table 1: The Preference Weightings for each of the Factors 
Factors Importance Percentage 
Perceived quality 0.157 15.7% 
Performance quality 0.215 21.5% 
Due date performance 0.061 6.1% 
Selling price 0.144 14.4% 
New product flexibility 0.138 13.8% 
Rate of product introduction 0.070 7.0% 
Serviceability 0.070 7.0% 
Aesthetics 0.144 14.4% 
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Step 3: Multiply the calculated preference weighting by the 
values in the original pairwise comparison matrix 
In this example the original pairwise comparison matrix, figure 1, was an eight 
by eight matrix. Multiplying this by the matrix in table 1 gives the data shown 
in table 2. 
Table 2: Original Pairwise Comparison Multiplied by the Weightings 
Factors Value 
Perceived quality 1.328 
Performance quality 1.856 
Due date performance 0.504 
Selling price 1.201 
New product flexibility 1.137 
Rate of product introduction 0.578 
Serviceability 0.590 
Aesthetics 1.201 
Step 4: Divide each entry in table 2 by the corresponding entry in 
table 3 
The next step is to divide each element in table 2 by the corresponding element 
in table 1. The new data that this step generates is shown in table 3. 
Table 3: Data in Table 2 Divided by Appropriate Factor Weighting 
Factors Value 
Perceived quality 8.442 
Performance quality 8.626 
Due date perfonnance 8.208 
Selling price 8.343 
New product flexibility 8.215 
Rate of product introduction 8.302 
Serviceability 8.402 
Aesthetics 8.343 
Step 5: Calculate the consistency index 
The consistency index is calculated by taking the average of the one by eight 
matrix shown in table 3, that is 8.360 and using it in the following formula: 
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Consistency index = (Ayera~e - n) 
(n-l) 
where n is the number of factors in the original matrix, in this case eight. 
Hence for this example, the consistency index is 0.051. 
Step 6: Calculate the consistency ratio 
Saaty (1980) provides a table of consistency indices calculated from randomly 
generated matrices. Dividing the calculated consistency index by the Saaty's 
average random index (R.I.) gives the consistency ratio, which Saaty suggests 
should be less than ten percent to avoid any risk of rank reversal!. In this 
example the consistency ratio is actually 3.65% which suggests that the 
interviewee had .provided very consistent responses during the pairwise 
com panson process. 
1 Rank reversal is where the order of two or more factors are reversed because of inconsistency 
in the decision maker's pairwise comparisons. 
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APPENDIX III 
Data collected in companies A and B 
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..................... ~ ................................................ ; ..................... ; ......................................... : ........................................ . 
Conformance i Q! : j 
·TechiricafDiirnbili····························l········QS···· ... ( ..................................... (" ..................................... . 
~~i0~~~~tY~·~~·lQ5I~Tj%L·~··~.%~~~· 
Aesthetics j QJ: 5% i 3% 
.~~~.~~y.~ ... ~.~!Y. ............... : ...................... ·.·.··.·.·.·.·.·.·J.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.Qf ..... ·.·.T.·.· ... ·.· ... ·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.~·~·%· ............. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T ......... ·.·.· ............... ~.~.%. ............................  
Humani~ : ~ : j value······· .................................................. : ... ·····~·······1·········································t········································· 
Maniifacttirifli.·Lerul"Thiie········T······Tf·····T······································r································ ...... . 
·Rate··o{Pmd~ct·IntrOduction···:········Ti········[·······································T················· .. ····· .............. . 
·P.~~y.~.·~·.t~~·.· ....... ·.· ... ·.· ............................ T.· ....... · .. ·P ..... ·.·:::T: .. ·.·.: .. : .. : ...·: ....... · ....................... ·.· ........... · ....... L ..... · ....................... ~.% ....... ·.· ......................  
Due Date Perform~~~ .................. i ........ I1 ....... j .............. ).~.% ............... i ................. §.% ................ . 
~~~;~fg~;i:JgJ~~~.L.~~·~ 
, C2 ' . li~!:~u:~~:~:uu~~;u~~ulu~ig!::ur~u~u:~:~~~~Juu::~u:~~:u~u 
M 'al~ : Fl : : ~~!~~iY::::·::.i'ij::·t:.:::t:::::::::: 
, F3 ' ' ~~~ .. ~24~~~ ........................................ L ... ··················;·················8~················.~ ........................................ . 
Modification i F4 .1... .................... l? ............... .L ....................................... . 
Deii~embiliiY··············· ..... · ...· ...· ...·.· ............... · ....... ·.· ... T·.·.·.· .. · ... ~j.·.·.· ..... j ....................................... ) ........................................ . 
.............................. ................ : F6 : : 
.y2~~~.~ ........................................... ···········f······················~ .. ······· .. ······7···iii.· ............... i-....................................... . 
Product Mix ' F7' 70 : Resource' Mji ............................................................. · ... i,l::,·.·.· ....... · ... fM ..... ~.·.·.·.· .... j:~::·.· ......... ·.· ................................................................ J,;;; .................................................................................  
......... __ .... __ ... --------_ ...... - .............. . 
Safety 
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g~ii~~~~~~~~~:j...~~ijQhj&QJ~~~~ 
.. . 
. 
................................................................... · ..· ..·[······ .. ··· .. ·········[·······Poreman·i·· .. ··j····· ................................... . 
~~o~~~~:::~u~~~~l~:~~~t~~~ii]:i:i~:ii~~~i 
Features : ~ j i 
·R~iiabil.i~················································[········Q3·······!···············iO%··············!· ....................................... . 
. ¢Q~9.~~~.~ ........................................................................... J .............. ~ ........ ·.·.·.L.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .... :: ...............................................  
Technical Durabili j Q5 j i _ §~~~~~WtY.:TQiT~·~·~%.~l~·~~~ 
Aesthetics ! rn i i .~~~~y~ .. ~.~.~ ......................................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~·.·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T~%·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T .......... : ................................................................ :: 
Humani~ : Q!. i i . 
y~~~::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::~:::::::r:::::::::::::::t!.:%::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 
Manufacturing Lead Time i T1 i i 
~~rr.~~~~~~~~~~I:~g:]:~~~::::F:::::: 
Due Date Petformance : T 4] .. 1.~.%. .............. .L. ..................................... .. 
~!ii~~~~y.·.·9.(p·~~h~~ry·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·,tj.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.C.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ................................. ~ ........................................ . 
'M f: . C t : C 1 ! : if~~g;i~O~s:::~:r~~:I~l~~:~:I:~~~~~::~-~:~~~ 
.................... ............. i C5 i 12% i 
Safety j j : 
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G2.~~~.~~~~~yJ~~~.~2; ............................................. .1......... 12% ! 14% 
P.~~.: ................................................ ······ .......................... I ......... ::::::X§j~!2X:::::::::::::r:::::::::::::X1.i.Q2X:::::::::::::: 
: : 
...................................................... ·······································i·············i\1arketiilg···········t······Man·UfactUriiig······· ::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::"::'::::::::;::::::':::::.::P:~~2i .. ::::::::::::r::::::::::::::~~2i::::: .. ::::::: 
'PrOduct'Peffo~ance""""""""""""""""""'"·(··················25%··················t············ .................................... . 
·PrOd~ci"i~eaniies·················································T··············································T················································ 
~;~~t:t!~t~l:::~~r-_-
Conformance i 14% i 
I~~~~fp~~wiY:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::J:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Technolo~cal Durabili~: : 
'SefViceabili~"""""""""""" ·································f·················································r························ ........................ . 
...... _ ... ___ . __ ......... __ ..... ':l.. __ ...... _____________ __________ ... __________ .. __________ ... :. ____ .. __________ ................... ___ ........ __ ....... _ .... -:,. .... _ ... ___ .. ____ .......... _._ .. __ .... _ .... __ . __ ....... __ ..... .. 
A~.~~~~~~ ................................................................... 1 ................................................. 1 ................................................ . 
. ~~.~.~~ .. ~.~g~ ........................................................ l ................................................. l ................................................ . 
Company Image ! 16% : 
·C~sto~er"i{eiatio~s··········································T··············································T ............................................... . 
~~p~~y~~:~~~~~2~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::·::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
.Y~.~.~ . .f9.~.M~~~Y .................................................. l ................................................. l ................................................ . 
Manufacturing Lead Time! i 10% 
Rate·of"PrOduct"tntrOdiicti"o~·····················r···············································r·········· .. ····· ............................. . 
. p~~i~·.~.·.t~~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.· ......................................................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ................. ~.Q% .....................................  
Internal Due Date Performance! ! 26% 
. . , , 
Resource"MiXj:iiexiiJility i i () 
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~9.~.~~.~~~~~Y}~:~~9; ...... ,.............................. i 9% ! 16% 
J:)a1l::. ............. .... ..:.j1lV2I·:::r:::::J§b!?I 
' ... ' ........ .-......... ' ... ' . .-' ......................... .-.............. , ...... '.' .... ,' ... '.' .. ,'.' ..... ' ..................... , .. ' ..... ',.,.,., ............... , .......... '.·.·.t.·.-.·.·.'.·,·.· ... ri9.4ij~·~.g,~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·I._.·.'.·.·.·.·._.'.',·._.·,·~~.~~{2(·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.'.' 
i Manager i Dept 1 
~~~t~~~~==~~::::·L:::I:: 
·PrOdiici·Features········································· ..... , ..-r ...................... , ....................... -r." ..................... , .......... ,., .. , ...... . 
~~~~~t:&!~i~·:·:·:::··::T·::-:····:::i:::?!~ 
Conformance i 1 6% 
I~~~~fp~~Wtr:::::::::::::: ...... : .. ::·:·:·:::::::::::J:::::::'::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
T echnolo~ca1 Durabili!y i 1 
·SeNi"ceabili"iY'·'····,···,············ ····,····················,·······r·····'··,················,··,,··················r··············,·········· ................ , ..... . 
·A~~ili.~~~·~._,·._._._ .. ._._._._._._._,·.·.·.·.·.·.·._.·._.·.·.·._._.',',.,','._._ .. ._._ ............ ._._._ .. ._ .. ._ ................ ._._._._._._._r._.·.·.·.·.·._.·.·._._.·.·.·._ ______ .·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ____ ._ __ ._.'.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ____ .'.·.· __ .·,I.·.·._ ____ .·.' __ .·.· __ ,· __ .· .... __ .... ____ ... ' ...... __ , ....... ______ .'.' ...... __ ........... '.'.' 
.~~~.~~.~~g~ ...... "' .......... , ................ , ................... l .... ,', ............. 2.%. ..................... l ................... ~~% .................. . 
. GQ~P~.y. .. ~~.g~ ........ ,., ................................ ", ..... .! ... ,." ........... " ..................... "', ..... l .......... ,", .. , ............................... . 
. G~.~~~.~~~.,~~.~~~9.~,~ .... , .......... "., ................. , ... , .. 1 .... , ............ , ............ , ................. .l ................................................ . 
~~p~gY..~~.~.~1~~9P.:~, .. , ...................................... ,; .. , .... ,., ........... ~% .................... l ...................... ,., ....................... . 
. y~,~.~.J9!.M9P.:~Y.. ................... , ............................ ,.l ...... , ..................................... , .... l ................................................ . 
M~.¢~~~g.~~.I~~ ....... , .................... l .............. , ................... , .............. 1 .......................................... , .. , .. . 
Rate of Product Introduction! ! 2 % 
.P~~y.iY);;;~~;.(t~~.-----------.·--------------.·--------------,'----.·.·------.·----------------,·--.'.·L'--.·.·.·----------.·.'--------,·,I~·%·.·----.·.·--.·.·----------.·----.·.T------.·--------.·.·.·.·.·.·------.·--.·----.·.·--.............................. --.............. . 
Internal Due Date Perfonnance 1 17% ! 11 % 
·E~iernaf·DUejjate·Peifonnance···············f···················22%··················r··················ii%····· ............. . 
~~~~~~~~:E::::::I:::::::;~~:::::I::::.:::;%.:· .. 
Added i i 
r~~lii~;::::·:E::::::i%:::::::F:::::::::::: 
!J~~~ .. ~~.B.~~~W~ .................................. j ... ·····,········································l·····················2~·· .. ················· 
Resource Mix Flexibility ! () 
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g~~i~~ll~Y~~·~4:):iil~f:J~% 
. ------............................................. -- -- .. -- .................. -- ............ j. -- ........... -- .... . ! .. /~-- ........ -- .. .. ) ................ !.~! !!2Q .............. . 
...................................................... ·······································:.:Headofr·Foremani 
..... - ................... _--_ ................................ _-_.-......... , 
-- .. -- .... --"--r" .... -- .. -- .. Dep.t~--i·············r······· .. ····· .... · ..--· .. --.. -- ... --......... . 
.................. .-.... .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.. .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.. .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.... .-.-.... .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.......... .-.. .-.-.... .-.-.-.·.-.·.-.-.-.·.1.-.-.-.-.·.-.-.·.-.-.-.-.·.·.·.-.·.-.·.·.-.-.. .-.-.-.-.-.·._._._._ .. ._._._ .. ._._ .. ._._._._ .. J ....... ._ ...... ._ .. ._ .... ._ .. ._._ .... ._ .... ._._._._ ........ ._._ ...... ._ .............. ._._._._._ ..  
Product Performance : : 
............ --.--- .......................... ------ ........... _ .._......... i i 
E~~~ti~~~:fiiui::·iii~]iiiiii 
Conformance i 19% j 10% 
f~~~~~~wij·~~r~~·:·::::~:~~F. 
Serviceabili~ 1 1 
·A~.~ili~~~·~._._.·.·._ .. ._._._._.·._.·._._._._.·._.·._._.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.·._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._.r._._._._._._._._.·._._._._.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-._.·._._._._._._._.·._._.·._._._._._._.r._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._ .. ._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._._ .. ._._._._._._._ 
Product Image 1 i 
:¢9~P~Y.:~~g~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::t::::::.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
G~.~~g.~~t.g~.~~~2~.~ ........................................... 1 ................................................. 1 ................................................ . 
~~P~.~y~~.~.~~~~Q~~ ........................................... 1 ................................................ .1 ................................................ . 
. y.~~~.JQ~.MQ~~y .................................................. t ................................................. l ................................................ . 
M~.~~~~g.~.I~~ ........................... j ................... .!.?.% .................. .l ................................................ . 
Rate of Product Introduction i i 
.P~~y.~·._~._.t~~.·.·.·.·.·._.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·._.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·.·.· ................................ -.... .-................. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·IQ·%·.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
Internal Due Date Perfonnance j 16% j 15% 
·E·~iernafDuetjate·Peiforinance .... ··--· .. --T ........ m .......................... · ...... ··Tm .... m ..................................... . 
R~~~~~~Y.::~{p~~y.~iY:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::C:::::::::::::::::tt%:::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
M~~f~~.~g .. GQ~~ ........................................... l ................... !}% ................... l ................... ~~% .................. . 
'Value Added i j 
:$.:~!~g)~ii~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
~:~:~~~~~::~":::J::::::::::L:':::::::' 
i~;~~~£~:::t~::~:'~~:::l:~::~:~~:: 
......... '7: ......................................... 'ion i 7% i 12% 
;!a~~~t:·:~r::~:!~~:::::J.:::::~~::::::: 
Fl °bili . : .y2~~~ ....... ~.~ ........ ~ ............................................. + ................................................ + ................................................ . 
Prexiuct Mix Flexibili~ ................................. 1 ................................................. 1 ........................ """""""""""'" Resource' Mji'F1exi6iliiY i 5% 1 8% 
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G2.~.~~.~~~~~yJ~:~.~9: .............................................. : .................. ).1.% ................... 1... ................. .4.% ................... . 
Date: : 16/1/91 : 17/1/91 
....... ". '" ......... ' ..... -.................. -.......... --....... -...................... _ .. _ ..... -. -. -- ~ -... _. ---... _ ..... " ........................ _ .......... _ ........... _ ................................................ -... " .. -...... " _ ........ "" .... _ .. " -.. " 
..................................................................................•.........................................•.....••••.•.•.•.•••.•.•.•............. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.t.·.·.·.·.··.·.·.· .. ·.M~~~.g.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.t.·.·.·.·.·.M.~~~~g·.·.·.·.·.·.· 
i Director i Director 
.--- ... _ ... -- ................................ _ ............ ·····--·.··---····.··.···--··----.····I·.··--··.··.··.··_······························-I"·--·-_······ __ · __ · ............... ------_ .. ---.- .. -
·PrQdiict··Perro~ruice······································T·················-41"%·················--:-·················-22%··················· 
·PrQd·iici·Features····················· ···························T···············································r································ .............. . 
~~ci·Re"iiabiii"~··············································]·········· .. ·········5%···················r···· .......................................... . 
·Com~any····Reliabili~·········································r···············································r ............................................... . 
........ _ .... r ... _._ .. -- .... --.---.---.----.':,! ........................................ --.- ....... l- ... -......... - ..... --.- ......... ---- __ •...•.• - ..... -.. --.l---.--.- .. -------- .. - ..... ---- ... --- ... - .. ------_ •.. __ _ 
Confonnance : 16% : TechIiica!·I:>mabiif··············································r················································!· ............................................... . 
............................................. ~ .......................................... ~ ................................................. ~ ................................................ . 
. I~~9~~~~~ .. P~~W~ .............................. .L ............................................... .L ............................................... . 
SeIViceabili~ : : 7 % 
·Aesthetic·s····· ...................................................... ······r···············································--:-·················-1"4%··················· 
.~~.~~ ... ~~g.~ .............................................................................................. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ....................................................... ·.·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·."X.·§·%.·.·.· ..............................  
i.G9~P~Y.~~g~ ................................................... L .................. ~.?% ................. ..L ............................................... . 
I Customer Relations : : 
g~pfgy:~~:~~~~~~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
.Y.~~~..fQ~.MQ~~y' .................................................. l ............................................... J ............................................... . 
~~~~f:1t~~Q~-!:::::-::-J:j%_:-:: 
Deliv~.~.~.I~~ ........................................... 1. ............................................... 1. ............................................... . ~~~e~!eP~!f~~uuuuutuuuU5-%UUUuuuutuuuUUU6%UUUUUUu 
~~~~~.~ ....................................................................... ; ................................................. ; ................................................ . 
f~~~~~s~y.gf..P.~gy.~ry ..................................... j ................................................. ) ................................................ . 
¥~~fl~~~~t~~:u:uu:u_juuu_uu::;%-uu:u:u:ru:~:u~i%:uu-u:u 
~:~~~~=~rf:-:-T-:::::::::::t::-:::: 
Eta;;~j~~~::~l::~:~:--:u-::~:L::l~~:::::~ 
~u~~c~tio~(;g~~-T:::::i_:::-:::__ 
~~r~~:~~~t:~:::E:-~~::::L::_::::::-: 
~~~~~iWltY-T~~~~r~~~~~~~~ 
Safety : i 
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G9.~.~~.~~~.~~y.g~.~~; .................................... _ ---.--.-l .. --- .. -.. --.- ...... .4.% ......... _ ......... .L ................ }4.%._ ................ . 
Date: : 17/1/91 1 16/1/91 
.................................................... __ .. -- ................................... __ .-!-_ ........ __ ._- ................................ _-;._---_ .... __ . __ ......... _- ..................... -. 
...................................................... ·······································r···········PiOduc·rlon···········r···············Heacfo{············· 
...................................................... ······································:··············Manager·············l················Dept··i··············· 
~~~~~~~~~=~~····T~~~·+~·~5~·· 
••• _0 ••• - ••••••••• _----------_ ••••• _---- •• _--- •• ---- •• ••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••••••••• __ .t-_ .................. ---.--- ...... ---- ............ :. .. -- ............... ,_,_0 _____ .----_ •• -.----.-._.-
~~~~.~.~.~~~.~ ....................... -.... -.... -.. -.. -.......... : ................................................. : ................................................ . 
. ~~~~.g~~.a.~iJ~!J. ................. _ ..... ________ ................ c .................. J.§.%. .................. .-.................. J.~%. .................. . 
. G~~p~y.~~~~~W.~ ........................................ j ................................................. l .. ~ ............................................. . 
Conformance i i 
I~~~:~:p~~W~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::C::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::L:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Technolow-cal Durabili~ i i 
·SeIViceabiliiY.························ ·································f················································r························· ...................... . 
'Aesfuerlc's"'" ...................................................... ·····r·················································f················································· 
.~.~.~~ . -~~g.~ ................................... .-..... '.'.'.'.''-.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.''-'-'-.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.-.·.·.·.·.T·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~.%.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T·.·.·.·.·.-.-.· ...................... .-.. .-............................................ .-.-.-.. . 
. G~~.P~.y.~~g~ .................................................... l ................................................. l ................................................ . 
Customer Relations i i 
~~pIgy~~:t{~~~~Q~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
~~~~i~Iful~·J··.·~~·~·~~~.~·t .. ·.~.· .. ~·· 
~ilfy~~~f~~~~~~~~u~ut··~··uuuj.u~~~.u\Q%uuu 
'lnternal Due Date Performance ......... ; ................................................ 1.. .............................................. . 
=~!i~~=:L.:.::::::l:::::::~~~:·: 
New Product introductIon .: ................................................. : ................................................ . 
~~~iiii~~~~~ri:::::::::::::::::············::::::::::·1·····················?%····················l·········· ...................................... . 
. F1 ·bili· , , .P~My.~ ...... ~~ ......... ~ ............................................. ~ ................................................ + ........................................... ",." 
.y2~~ .. B~~~~ ............................................. ~ ................................................ + ................................................ . 
~~~~t~t:ill'iY.r··~~~.·~~.·.~..~·I~~.~.~~~~~·~~ 
Safety :' : 
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G9.~.~~.~~~~~Y}~~~.~~9; ............................................ : ..................... ~% ................... J .................. J.4.%. .................. . 
Date: : 27/2/91 i 16/1/90 
...................................•...•.•.•.•.•...................••........................................................................................................ ~ .......................................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.····.·.·.1.·.· •..................•.......•................•.............................................. 
. Head of i Foreman 1 
............................................................ ································:············ .. ·Dep···t .. 2: ............... \" ............................................... . 
............................................................................................ ; ....................... ····· .. ·················1························· .. ···· ................. . 
------.---.----.-------._-------------------- .. -.--.- .. ---.- ... --.- .. -.--.-.--.-.- .... -... --.~ .. -- .. -- .... -.---.- .. -.... --... --.. -............ --~--- ...... -.................. - ................. -.- ... . 
Product Performance ! 1 36% 
·:PIl:XluciFea~s···················································r·············································· .. .;. ................................................ . 
. ~~~~)~~4~~i.~~· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ............................................ r. .................................. ~.~.% ................................... T ....... ~ .......................... j.~.% ................... ._ ................  
Company Reliabili!y : 1 
·Confomanc·C;·············· ···········································r·················································f·············· .................................. . 
Techflica!·Diirnbiif··············································j·················································r ............................................... . 
............................................. ~ .......................................... : ................................................. : ................................................ . 
. I~~~~.~.~~~ .. P~~~.~ ................................ l ................................................. l ................................................ . 
Serviceabili~ 1 17 % j 9% 
·Aesthetic·s· .. ·· ...................................................... ······j······ .. ·············S·%······ .. ···········-r····· ............... 2'% ................... .. 
. ~~.~i)~~g~·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.·._.·.·.·._.·.·.·.·._.·.· .. ._.·.·.-........................................ .-.................. r. ........................................................ ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.· ....... ·.· ... · ............... ~.~.% .....................................  
Company Image : 1 
·6is·tomer·Relatio~;················· .. ·············· .. ·········r················ .. ······················· .. ····T· .............................................. . 
g~p~~y~:~~~~~Q~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
.y..~~~ .. f~.M9~~Y ................................................... l ................................................ .L ............................................... . 
M~.~~~g.~.I~~ ............................ l ................................................. l ................................................ . 
Product ServIce Cost : .. . .............. .;. ................................................ . ·~~~i·.W.~.~.·.~~·~! ... ·.·._ ... ·.·._ ... · ... ·.·.·.·.· ........... ·.·.· .... .-.· ... ·.·.·.-.·T ....... ·.-.· ........... · ............. · ....... · ................................ j ................................................ . 
~g~~=:::L-:::::T::::::::::-:::: 
New Product introductIon : ............................................... J... ............................................. . 
~~~::M~~:~~2~::::::::::::::::::::::·:::::::: ......... ! ....... · .... ··· ...... ~% .. ··· .......... · .... I .............. · .......... ·· .... · ................ · 
.P~My.~.B~~.QW~ ............................................. ~ ................................................. ~ ................................................ . 
~~~f:~~tY-T--:j~:::::l:::::-::::-
Mix F1 'bil' , , Resource eXI I~ ......... L ................................................ .;. ................................................ . 
·SafetY .... ···· .. · ........ ·· ...... ·· .... ··· .... ·· ........................ i 1 
324 
Factors Identified as Externally Important by the Managers of Company A 
Taking their Definitions into Account 
G.g.~.~~.~~~~~y'.~~.~9.; .............................................. 1.. .................. .7% .................... j ................................................ . 
Date: ! 30/11/90 i -~-------~~-----~--~r--~~===;:-:r::: 
~L~:~e~()==c~J-:~::::.:::::::::-::::I::_:::: 
.~~~~ ... ~.~~~.~ .................................................................................................. "f. ............................ '.'''''.'''' .. ''''''.',., .. ',', .. ',', .. '.',., .. ',.,.,' ...... ,'.' ... 1" .. , ... ,.,.,., ... ,', .. ' ..... '.'.'.'.' ... '.' ... ' ............ , ... , ......... ,., .. ',',.,.,.,.,.,', ..  
,~~~~,g~~~~~,~~.".".,."."' ... , ... " ...... , ......... "." .. l, ..... " .... , .." ..~.Q%,."'."" ...... j ...... ".,', .......... ' ..... ,." ... , ... ,.,.,',',. 
Comnany Reliabilitv i i ·,¢.9.~~.~.~~,~~~',',','.·.'.·.'.'.·.',·,'.~~'.',',·,'.',','.'.',', ............. ,' .... ,',.,.,.,',., .. ',','.',',·.·,·,·.·,·.·,·.r.·.·.',·.'.'.·.·.·,·,·.·,·,·.·,·,., ... ,.,.,.,., ... ,.,' .. ,' ................... '.', •.•... ·,·,·.·,·r.·.·.·,·.·,'.·,·.·.·.·,·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.' ..... ',','.'.',',., ......... , ....•.. ,.,.,' ... '.-.'.' 
Technical Durabili 1 j 
,."' ........ , .. " .. , ............... , ........ ~ .. ,.,.,., ... ,."""" .. " ................ : ....... " .. "".'""""" ......... "'., ........ : .. " ........... ""'., ................ , .... , ... " 
Technoloulcal Durabilitv i i 
·seiVfceabilih;·················,····,':.l··"··········,·,·,···,,·,,·"·"r··'·····,·····,······8'%·······,··,,···'·····r········,"",····,",·,',···················· .. . 
'Aestiletic·s .. ··':.l···,··"·,···,·"··,··"'·""·,·"""·"···············'··f"·"··,···············,··················,······f··'·'·,',··········,,·,·,··········· ............ . 
,~~,~!.-~~ii~·.-.-.-.-.'.-.-.'.-.-.'.-.·.·.-.-.-.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.-,·.-.-.-.-.·'-'-.''-'-.''-'-'-.·'-'-'-,·'-'-.''-'-'-.1'-'-'-'-'-.·'-'-'-'-'-,·'-'-'-'-'-.''-X'-~%·.·.-.-.-.-.-.·.'.-,·,·.-.·.·.-.-.·.1.-.-.·.-.-.-.·.·.-.'.'.-.'.-.·.·.-.. , . .-.. .-.-.......... .-.-.-.-.-.-.. .-........ .-.. .-.......... . 
Comnany Image i i ·C~st~~erj{eiatio~s··"'·"······ .. ···"·'··""""""·'·"·'r··""·"·""·····················,·"'····"'T'·'··················,·····,··············"'··· 
'Internal Due Date Performance ! ,. ., ........ ,', ... ,"', ..... .l..., ..... " ......... ,', .... ,'' ...... '."', ...... ' 
R " C : . Product unmng ost "L .,"""', .. , ....... , ..... ,', ..... " ........ .L.. ........................................ "', .. . 
" PI "bill . . .p.~~y.~ry ..... ,~~ .... , ... ~ .. , .. " ... , .. ,., .. , .... , ... , ............. " .. ~, .. ,., ... " ... " ....... , ...... , .... , ..... , .... ,'+ ....... " ... , ..... " .... "' ... "., .............. . 
Fl "bill . . !~fi~1.~~t~::::.:L-:~--.:.:~:~~::::~::J:::::.:.::::~~:.:::~:.:-:::.:::.:::: 
Safety i i 
325 
Factors Identified as Internally Important by the Management Trainees and 
Control in Company A 
G2.~.~~.~~~~~Y}~:~~~~ ................................... L ................... .l.. ............ 10% i 8% 
p.~~.:.............................................................: : 16/fifjO·········-r············ii/i/iji .. ······· .. 
.::::·:·:·:::::I:::::r:~~~~~~~J:ifi~:~: 
................................................. -........................... _- ......... :-._- ................... :., ... ·····-----·--·.· ... · ... ··.········· .. · .... --1---··· .. -·····.-_ ............................ . 
: i Pre-marketing i Post-marketing 
•• - ................................. - --- ........................................ -- ..... - .............................. -- .. -- .... ~ -- .................................... : ............ _. "._........ ................................. .. .... _~ .... .................. 0_""" ••• _ .. __ ................ .. .. .. 
~~~f.iil~~:·..· .. ·:.l.Q!:.J ..... :.. .. : ... t::· .. :~~% 
Features ! ~ ! i :g~~~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::I::::::::Q~::::-::l::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::t::::::::::::::::t!%:::::::::::::::: 
Conformance : ~ j i 
T~hDical·nmabilf···································r········Q'" S······r··········································r··· ...................................... . 
............................................. ~ ............................... .;. .................... .;. .......................................... ~ .......................................... . 
Serviceabili~ i Q6 i 1 
:A~~ili~~~:~::::: .. :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::C:::::QJ:::::::C::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::[:::::::::::::::::):%::::::::::::::::: 
Perceived Qualitv i Q8 j i 
...... _ .. _._ .... _._. ___ .. ___ ._ ...... ___ ~:J.. ...... _ ...... __ .... ___ ........... __ . __ ... _______ :.- ______ ... ___ ...... _____ ... } .... __ .... _. ___ ...... _______ ............. ____ ..... .( ....................... __ . __ .. ___ ............ ___ . __ 
Humani~ j QJ j i 
:y~~~::::::: .. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::L:::::~:::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
M~.~~~~g._~.I~~ .................. l ....... I.! ....... .l .................. ~.% ................. L .. -............ !.~.% ............... . 
Rate of Product Introduction i T2 1 1 
.P~~y.~j:~.·j}.~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:::.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·I.·.·.·.·.·.·.TI.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.L ........................................................ ·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.· ... ·.T.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ......................................................  
Due Date Perfonnance j T4 j 4% j 5% 
~~~~~~Y.::~(p~1~y~iY::::::::::::::::::::::::T::::::t~::::::1:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Manufacturing Cost 1 C 1 1 28% i 10% 
'Vaili'e'Added' ·············································-r-······ci"·····-r-··············24·%···············r··············24%················ 
.§.~.~.g .. :~£~: .......... :: ............ ::: .. : ......... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·_·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·r·.·.·.·.·.·.·.¢~::.·.·.·.·.I·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ........................................................  ·r.·.·.·.·.·.· ..... · ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .............................  
·rii~:h~hu::~:iii:i:~iO:]~i:rlu:·::I~~i:~·i:~:uu::::~::~:~~u~:::IU~~:h~~:~i:~:~:~~:::: 
........ ~Y-....... ~~....... . .... ~ F3! 7% 1 14% 
Resource Mix ! F8! 0 i 
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Gg.~.~~~~~.~~YJ~:~~2; ................................... L ................... l 12% i 16% 
P.~.:................................................. ............... i r·········iijiifjo-········-r···········i61i/9T··········· 
............ _-_ .... . 
---_._--_ .. __ ................................... __ ..... '-- ...... _-.-. 
~:t~~~~~~~~~r§I~r_~:~~~:~~~~~~--~r-~~ 
.g~.~~~~ ........................................................ j ........ Q~ ....... j ........................................... l .......................................... . 
Confonnance i Q1 i ! Teclllricairimabili···································T .. ·····Q··· s······!··········································1'··· ...................................... . 
............................................. ~ ............................... .;. .................... .;. .................... -- ..... -.-.--.. --..... ~ .. ------.. -.-- .. -....................... --. 
. ~~~~~~~w_~. ____ .. ______________ . ____ . ____ ................ _1_ .. _. ___ ~_ ... __ .]_. _____ ._ .. __________ .. ___ . ________ . _____ ..l ________ . ____ . ___ . __ ._. ___ . __ . __ . _____ . ___  
.A~~~~_~~.~ .. ____ ._ .. _ ... _________ ... __ . __ .... _ .... __ .. _. __ . _____ ._l_. ______ w _______ l __ . __ . __________ ... _. __ . ___ . _______________ l _____ . ______ ._. _______________________ . ___ _ 
Perceived Qualitv i Q8 i i 
-----.---- __ ...... __________ .... ___ .... ":J. _________ . __ __ ........... ___________ ... :.. ....... ___ . __ ... ___ .. __ :.._ .. __________________ ._. ______ .. _. __ ._ ... _~._ .. -. __ --_-_. _._ ... _____________ . ___ .. ___ . 
Humani!y i (l) i i 
:y~:~~:::::::-.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::I:::::::~::::::J:::::::::::::::::~%:::::::::::::::::t::::::::::::::::~I%:::::::::::::::: 
Manufacturing Lead Time i T1 l : 
-- ... ---------.-- .... - ...... --- ... ---- .. ---- .......... ---- .. -----.----- .. --- .. ---.:------ .. -- ...... --- ... --:-------- .............................. ·····i····_····· .. ·· ............ ··· .. · .... · .... ······ ........ ···· 
Rate of Product Introduction : T2: 9% : 5 % 
_p~~yi.i"_-~.-_f~~_-_-_-.-.-_-_-.-_-_-.-_-_-_-.-_·_-_-_-_-_-.-_·_-_-_-_-_-.-_-_-_-_r-.-_-_-.-_-_TI-_-.·_-_-.-.-_r-_-_-_·_-_-_-_-_·_-_·_-_-_-_J~_%_·_·.-.·_-_-_-_·_-_·_·_·_-_·_·I-_-_-_-_-_-.-_-_-_-_·_-_-_-.-_-_-_~_%.-_-_-_.::_._._-_-_-_-_-_-_-_._._ 
Due Date Performance \ T4 i 12% : 15% 
~~~~~~y::~(p~~y~ry::::::::::::::::::::::::::L:::::t~:::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Manufacturing Cost : C1: 28% 1 29% 
-Vai~e-Added' ---·--··---·-·------·--·--------·---------·--r·-·---ci-----r-----·-----------··----·-·-··----··--··-r--··-·----.. -.-.---.-.--------.. -.-------
--~-~-~-g-.-~~~.----------------------------.--.. --------.-... ---------------------------.... --------.-.---.-----T------.---.--·-¢~----.---.----T----.-.-.-.------.---.------------.. -----.-.-------------.--------------.-.---::-1"-.. -.... -------.-.-----... --.-.-.----------.--:----.-------.-.. --.---.--------... --
Running Cost 1 C4 1 : 
S'e~ce Co·st-··------·-----------------·-·----·----------·--T------CS·-----T----··-··---------------·-·--------------r---·-----·------··--·------·----··---··-
~~ft~j:~~~:u~::::::~~~:~:~~J:Jtl~~:~-~:l~~~~::~~:~:JH:;~~:~:;~;~~_~:~~ 
:ili:-u::_-:::::m-::m~mm::lmll:::mlm~:-:~~~~:~~~~~:m:::~~Imm~~:l~~:~~mm~~ 
Resource Mix i F8 i i 
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G9.~.~~.~~~.~~Y)~~:~.~~9; ................................. L ................... l. 6% i 14% 
~~~:--:-:~-:~~~~-:JI::~!';~~l~::I:~~~~t: 
! i i Trainee 2 
...................................................... ····························r······················r·· ········································r-··Pre·~·~ketii1·g ..... . 
.... --- ... ------------ ................................... ···· .. ·· .... _ .. ··· .. ·············:············ __ ·· __ · __ -1··············--·---··················---··r-·--·------·.--.......... ---.-- ..... -... -- .. 
~ei-f0tltl~~eJQrt---_5%T-:-:-
Features 1 Q2 1 1 
·RefuiJiiI·············································· .............. j ........ Q ... 3·······j·········································:·~· ......................................... . 
..................... ~ ........................................................ 1 ..................... 1 ........................................... l .......................................... . 
Conformance j ~ j i 4% Technic·ai·Dillibili···································-r······Q5······r·······································T······· ................................. . 
............................................. ~ ............................... -:. ..................... -:. .......................................... ~ .......................................... . 
SetViceabilitv i ()4 i i ·Aesthetic·s····":'·················································i"·······~·······t··········································1····································· ..... . 
·R~~~y~.·.~~~.·_·.·.·.·.·.·.·_·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.l.·.·.·.·.·.·.·Q~.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .................... ~.% ................................ '.' 
Humanitv i {"\Q 1 1 2% 
·yafue······":'··························································r-·····Q)······r·············"iT%······ .......... (" ....................................... . 
·M~.¢~~~g.X~~~(f~~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.C.·.·.·.·.·fI·.··.·::.T.·.·.·.·~.·:~.·:.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·: ............ : ...... : .......... : ........ :.1" .. ::: ........ ::.·.·.·::I~.%:::: __ ::.·.·:.·.·::: __ 
Rate of Product Introduction 1 12 1 6% j 
.p~~y.~iy-)~ff~~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· __ .·.·T.·.·.·.· __ :~P.·::.·.·.·.·T.·.·:.·.·.·::._.·.·._.·._.·.·.1"%.·._._._.·._.·.·._._.·._._.·._.·.·I·.·:._ .. ._._._._._._ .. ._._:._~~.% .. ._._ .... ._ .... ._._._ ........  
Due Date Petformance i T4 l 15% l 8% 
f~~~~~y.::~(p:~Wy.~iY::::::::::::::::::::::::T::::::t~:::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Manufacturing Cost 1 C 1 1 37% i 
'Vai~e'Adde(f ············································r······ci· ..... ;---........................................ [ ........ ·······"34%················ 
.. ~.~.~.g ... ~~~ ............................. .-............................................ .-............ .-.-..... ·.L.·.·.·.·.·.·.G}·.·.·.·.·.·.-r·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-.·.·.·.· .................. -.......... .-................ .-.-....... T.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. .-.. .-.......... .-......... . 
VIi F6 j 4% i ~:~::::-::::::!ij-:r_:::-::-:L::::~%::: 
Resource Mix i F8 i j 
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G9.~.~~.~~~.~~Y .. ~~.~9; .............................. _-- .. L.-.-.--............. l ............... }.~.% ............... L ........................................ . 
Date: i i 25/3/91 i 
···L····,~~i~~~~T· 
...................................................... ···························-:-····················r·········trailie<;··i·········r·································· ...... . 
...... ..................... ... . -._ .... -._ .................... - .... _ ............... )-.-- ..... _ ... _-_. __ . __ .. )- .................. -_ ... . ----.-.-.-.... -.... ~ .... -.-.-- ... -- .. -.---.... ------.- ..... _ ... . 
i i Post-marketing i 
~;==~~:~~:I:::.:.· 
Fean:i!es································ .... ·························r·······"Q2······r············· ............................ ]"" ........................................ . 
}~~~~~:::::::::::: ... ::.::.:::: .... :::::::::::::::::::::::::::L:::::Q~:::::::;::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Conformance 1 Q1: i 8% i TechiiicifDmabili···································T·······Q··· 5······r·········································r···· .................................... . 
............................................. ~ ............................... .;. ..................... ~ .......................................... ~ .......................................... . 
A~~:~:=::::::t~t::.::t::::::: 
~~~~~y.~.~~~ ....................................... l ....... Q~ ....... .L ............... ~.§.% ............... j .......................................... . 
Humani~ i ~ i 5% : 
·V-a!\ie······· ....................... : .............................. ····1············ ·········1···········································[ .......................................... . 
Value Added : C2 ...... L. ............. ~~.% ................ l. ......................................... . 
--_ .... --_ ... _.---_ ..... _---------_ .. -----_.---.--_.--- ...... _--_ ......... -_ .. _---.:- .. _----......... . : 
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G9.~.~~.~~~~~y' .. ~.~9; .................................... l ...................... l ................ ~~% .............. .1. ................. 7.% ................ . 
Date: j j 16/11/90 j 17/1/91 
.................. -- .... " ...... -- .... --" •• ----.--- ••• - •••••• • - •• " ••• - •••• - ••••••• -- •••• o.!--- •••• - •• - ••••• --.- ••• ~-_ •• -.- •• _ ••• _ •••• _ •••••• _ •••••••••••••••• ~ ....... _ ... _ •• _ • .............. _ ................ . 
1 i ! 
..... ~ ....................................................................................................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.L ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.··.·.·.·t·.·.·.·.·.~~.g~rij~.~~.·.·.·.·.t.·.·.·.·.·.M~~~i~g~~~~~·.·.·.·.·.· 
j ! Trainee 1 j Trainee 1 
.................................................................................. , ...................... , .......................................... ~ .......................................... . 
j j Pre-marketing j Post-marketing 
................. -................................................................ ! ............ _-_ ... _ ..... ! .................................... · .. ···r···· .. ·· __ ·················· .. _········· .. . 
~¢'~_~~_::LQrtj§.%:t~5%: 
.:f.~~~.~ ............................................................ .1 ........ Q~ ....... j ........................................... l .......................................... . 
. ~!?~~~ ........................................................ j ........ Q~ ....... L. ............. k!.% ................ l ................ ~Q% ............... . 
Conformance [ ~ [ [ Tec·illiicai"riiirnbili···································T······Q5·····T········································T······ .................................. . 
~~~~~i@.!Y=::T:Q6.J:---:-:::T_-
Aesthetics i q; i i 8 % ·Percei~e(f~ali~·····································T······Qs······T········································r··············"15·%················ 
.H~~{~.·.·.·:.::.·.·.·:.·.·.·.· .. :.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ........................ : ............................. ·.L.-.-:.·.·.Q?.-.·.-.·.-.T.-.-.-.-.-.·.·.·.-.-.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.-.-.-.-............ .-.. .-.......... .-.... .-.J.-.. .-.... .-.-.-................ .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-........ .-.... .-.... .-......  
Value ! ~! 10% 1 ·¥.~.~~~:~g~~~~(t.fu.i~:~:::::::.-~::.·.·~~.L~~.·.·~~tI~~~~~T~~~~~::~:.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-r.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~~.-.. .-.... .-.-.. ~.-~ 
Rate of Product Introduction i T2! 6% 1 .p.~~y.iiJ~{t~.·.-.-::::.-::.·::.·::.-.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.·::.·:.·.-T.·::.-:.·.jj:.·:.-:.-:.L.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-:.-.·:.-.-.-.-~·%.-.-.·.·.-.·.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-r.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.·.-.·.-.-.TQ%'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-. 
Due Date Performance l T4 \ 8% \ 6% ... . 
Ouwut ~ali!y' ! F2 j ...................................... L. ....................................... . 
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G9.~.~~.~~~.~~y .. g~.~<?; ................................... .l ...................... l ................ ~.~%. ............... ; .................. ?% ................ . 
Date: : i 21/11/90 : 16/1/91 
- ................................................................................. -:- ••••••••••••••••••• _-.;..-_ •••••••• _-_ ••••••• __ ••••••••••• -- ••• __ •• ..: __ •••••• __ •••••••••• _o ........ ___ • ____ • ___ •• 
...................................................... ····························1······················1·········No~·:··i990"·······j········"jan·~··i99i········· 
::r":rl: 
~~==="":!~~r~~~r""~~~ 
Featii!es················································· ···········r······~······r·········································r········································· 
·Reliabili~·······················································r······QJ·······(···············S%············ ..... r-................. ~)"% ................ . 
·Conformance···············································i········Qi·······(········································r········································· 
f.~~~~f~~wtr::: .. :::.: .. :::.::: .. :.:.::::::L:::::Q~::::::r::::::::::::::::A:%:::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::1.:%::::::::::::::::: 
Serviceabili~ : ~: 4% : 5% 
·Aesthetic·s····· ................................................. 1" .... ···qz·······1···············jO"%···············r··············i6%················ 
"I)ercei~edi\~~aii~······································r·· ..... Q ... s·······j···········································[· ......................................... . 
_._ .. __ . ___ ... _ ....... ____ ~~ ___ .. _':J __ ._. ____ ... _ .. _._. _____________________ .:- __ ........ _ ..... ______ :.. __ ........... __ ........... _____ .... __ ..... _.{ __________ . _____ . __ ... _ .... __ . __ ..... _ .... . 
Humani~ i (f) i i 
·Vai"ue······· ...................................................... ····j········~······-l··········································T·········································· 
·M~.¢.~~~g.·~·~I~~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·~.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·.·II·.·.·.·~.·.·L.·.·~~~.·.·.·.·~~~~~~~~~.·.·.·.·.·:~::~~:.·~.·.·~.·.·.·.·.·T~~.·.·~.·.·.·~.·.·~.· ...... ~~~ ...... ~ .. ~ ...... ~~~ .. ~~~ ...... ~~: .. 
Rate of Product Introduction j T2 j : 
.P~~y~)~.·.t~~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.L·.·.·.·.·.·.TI.·.·.·.·.·.·.I· .. : .............................. §%. .................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~.·%--: ..............................  
Due Date Perfonnance ~ T4 ~ 13% j 14% 
~f~~~~:~~i~:I;:~l~t"~::~~::iI~~:::~i:~:~ 
. . : C3 : : 
Resource Mix i i : 
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§~~i:s.~~~~~~~~:.:j:::j:::::·~!n'i9Li::~1@:(::.: 
·~·~~·~.~~~~.~.···~.··~.~~.~~~~·~~·~L .... ~LMlii~~j~(·J.~~g~~e.~~". 
\ j \ Trainee 2 
•• -- ••• _ ................ _-- ........................................... -- •••••••• --- .... :- .. -- .••••...•....... --;--- •. __ .......................................... _ • .f .................. -........................... __ .... .. 
j j ! Pre-marketing 
~~~~~~~::::::I~~F::::i~i::[:::;§~:: 
Features j Q2 j : 
·Reiiabij:f··············································· ............. \ ........ Q ... 3·······i··················9%·················i······· ................................... . 
..................... ~ ........................................................ : ..................... : ........................................... ~ .......................................... . 
Conformance j Q1 j j TeclUiicaiDUrabrn·····································r--······Q ... S······t·················4%·················1········· ................................. . 
............................................. ~ ............................... .;. .................... .;. .......................................... ~ .......................................... . 
Serviceabili~ i Q6 i 5% ! 22% 
·Aesthetics····· ................................................. ] .... ····Cji······j················"16·%················[··················7·%················· 
.~~~~y~~.~~~ .... ~~~ .. ~~ .... ~~~~~~~ ____ ....... ~. __ ... ~~~~~~.·I.·~.·.·~--~Q~~~~--~----.L----.·--------.-.·.---.·.-.-----.-.·--.·----------.-----.-.... ----------.. ----.T--.. .-.... --.... --------------------------~ .. ------------.. --.. ----.... ----.......  
. H~~~.~ ......................................................... j ........ ~ ....... j ........................................... l .................. ~%. ................. . 
Value 1 ~ 1 i 
·M __ ~iif~~~g.·~ __ .t __ ~~ __ ~._~ __ ~.·~ __ ~~~~.·~._~L--~~--.·ff.-.-~.-~~L.-~----------------------------------------.-----------------------------.J~----------------------------------------------~------------------------------------Rate of Product Introduction \ T2 j j .P~My.~)~ft~~--------.·--.·--------.·----.·--.·----.·------.·--.---.-.-.·.J----____ .· ____ .h._ ____________ r __ .·.· ________ .-____ .-.-.-.-.·._.9..-%·.-.-__ .-.-._.-.· ____ .-__ .-.-.-.-.r. ... --.-----.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-------.-.-.-.---.-.. .-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.... .-.-.. .-.-. 
Due Date Performance j T4 j 14% j 16% ~~r.~~~~~~f~~~~:~:~~~~:ru~l~~t::~:u~~~:::~::::~:::::f~::::~~;:~::::::: 
llin Price j C3 j i 4% 
......... ...................... ........ ; F3 ; j 11% 
·Resource··Mlx········· .. ················ i F8 i : 
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Gg·~·~~·~~~·~~y'.g~.~9.~ ................................... L ................... L ............... ~}%. ............... L ........................................ . 
Date: i: 25/3/91 : 
··~··~·~lT=~i~~~T 
................................................................................. r···················· r"""'" Trairi re" 2: ....... .. 1" .................... -- ................ '" 
....................................................................... --.-- ...... :. ...................... :- ........... -- ............. ----- ..... --_ .... ..;-_ ....... _--- ................... __ ........ . 
i \ Post-marketing 1 
............................. -- ................................................... : ...................... :.................................. .... .. T'" ................. -- ........ --. ---- ... " 
·R~rt~~.~~~.·.·.·.·._·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·._.·._.·.·.·.·._.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-.-.-.·.·.··.·.-.-.-·.·.-·.··.·.·.·.r .... ·· ..... ·.Q'X ..... ·.·.· .. T ......................... · ..... ~~?~·.·.· ........................ J.· ... · ....................................................................... '.'.'.'.' 
.~~~~~ ....... --.... --.............................................. 1 ........ Q~ ....... j ............................ --.-- ..... --.--l ... __ .... __ .. __ ..................... __ .... . 
R liabili· : Q3 : : e " -. 
'" -- ........ -- ...... ~ ..... --""" ........................................... : .................. -- .. ; .... --.. -- ... --........ , ................... ~ ............................. -- .. --.. ------
Conformance i n.1. i ! TechnicaiDiirnbili~ ......... -- --. --. -- --. ---- .. --T'''' --Q5' -- -- --r -- ----... -- .. -- --. -- -- ------ ------ .... -- --r ------.-- ------ -- -- -- ... ---- -- ---- .... --.. 
S'eiVice'abm ~ ..... -- .. -- .~J... -- -- -- -- -- -- --.. ---- --........ r .... ·Q§--··--r· ---- -- ----'--21"%" ------ --.... '1" .. ---- ----.-- .. -- -- -- --. --.. -- ----..... .. 
:A~ili~~~i:::: .. :::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::Q?:::::::C:::::::::::::::Z%:::::::::::::::::t::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 
Perceived Qualitv [ Q8 [ [ iIiiffiruii' --... -- ..... -- .. -- ~.J .......... -- ...................... -- ... r' --... ---- ------ --. r .... ··· .. ·· --. --2·%--··· .. ·· -- --. --. r'" --. --. -- ....... --" -- --. ---- .......... .. 
Due Date Perfonnance 1 ~~ .. -- ... L .. -- ........ ).~%.--.-- .. --...... L ................. -----.............. __ .. . 
Resource Mix i i : 
333 
Factors Identified as Internally Important by the Directors of Company B 
.G.9.~~~~.~~~~'y.~~9.: ......................... ~ ..................... ~ .............. J.~% ............. .1 ................ }% ............... . 
Date: ! i 22/1/91 i 28/2/91 
....................................... __ ............... ··············--·1-··· .... · .. ·· .. ······· .. ···:···_-········ .................... -- ......... : .............................................. . 
" , 
...................................................... ·················y···················y·····EiectroIrlcs······l·········FiilaIiclar······· 
.................................................................... ····f······················,········· ............................... , ........................................ . 
! j Desiun Director j Director 
.. -_ ............................................................. ···---····--·-·--~····-·--···-······· .. ··i···········- .. c·~~-·-· .. --···············r···-·-····-·· .. ··-····-·-··· ..... __ ....... . 
J:;¢~~~_::jQLJ:--::-1%-:--:J---:::-2%~::_ 
.:f.~~~~ ................................................. .L ....... ~ ...... l ........................................ j ........................................ . 
Reliabilitv ! Q3 i 9% i 13% .G·9·~9.~~~.~.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ............................... -.r ............... ~ ............ 1. ....... : ................. ~Q% .................... ·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~·.·.·~.Q%.·.·.·.·.~·.·.· .............  
Technical Durabili j Q5 i 6% ! 
.............................................. ~ ....... ···············f·····················,················ ........................ , ........................................ . 
Serviceabilitv 1 ~ 1 4% : Ae·stlietics····~.J.······································) ........ ?fj ....... ) ......................................... j ........................................ . 
. ~~~~y~ ... ~.~~ .......... : .............. : .............. ·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~.·.·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.·: ...... ::: .............. :::::::: ....................... T:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·::.·.·.·.~.~:%..·.·.·.·.·:::.·.·.·.· .....  
Humanitv j r£} j j vailie"·····~J.···············································1········Q1·······1·········································1········································· 
ManUiactwii1·g···~rufTiffie······T······T(·····T···············5%···············r···························· .. ········· 
·Rate··ofPnXluci·IntrOducrlonr······ri·······r·····································T······························ ........ . 
·P..~My.~."!:~:.t~~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·r.·.·.·.·.·.·~.·p.~:.·.·.·.·.·T.·::.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .. :: ...... :~::: ........ : .............. :: ....... J .... : ........ :~ .. : .. :::: .. ~: .................... : .. :: ...... :: ....  
Due Date Petfonnance 1 T4 i 22% i ....... . 
~~~~~~;E~~~I~~~~}~::~F~~~~i~~~~~~~~l~:-:::~~~~:-:~~:~:: 
, C2 ' , ~~!~~~j:::::::::::::::t:~lI::::::::::-:::::::t:::::::i~::::::::: 
Service Cost : C5 i ....................... .L. .................... ~ ................ . 
. M~~~~I·~~.·.·.·.·:--.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:--::--:--.·.·.·.·.·.·.r--.·------:~.(.·.·.···--·T·:.·--··················.·.·.· ........................ ~ ................ 1.9..% .............. . 
Ou~ut ~ali~ l F2 ....... l ........................................ L ...................................... . 
~~it.;t.t:::::::::::I-:~l:::t::_::::i:::::::::4~:::::::::: 
Deliverabili~ l F5 l ........................................ ~ ........................................ . 
:y2~~!~:::::::::: .. ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::f~L:::) ........................................ ~ ........................................ . 
Prod Mix ' F7 ' , uct ........... 1. ..................... 1 ......................................... ~ ........................................ . Resource·Mh························· : F8 1 i 
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.G~~~~~.~~~~y.g.~~.~.; ......................... ! ..................................... J.6% j 20% P·~~·: ............ ·· .............. ·· .............. ··········· .... f ........ · .. ···········f····· ...... ·~·~a~.f·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.ji~~.f.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
::::tL--M~ifug:-tM~~~~g 
j j Director j Director 
-. - - _. - - - - - ... - -- - - - - - - - - - .. -_.- -- - - - - _. - - - - _. -- - - ••• -- ............. _. - - -- - - ~ -. - -- - ....... _ ......... - .. -! -. -- -- - -- - -•• _._ ........ -. _ ••••. _.- ••• - ... -~ ••••••• - --_ .............. - •• _. _ •• - ••• _. - -- .•. -
.~~9.~.~.~~ ........................................................................... J. .............. Q( ........ ·.l.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~·~·%·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.t ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .................................... .. 
Features : fY) ! ! .g~~@~ ............................................................................................ r.-.............. ~ ........... j ..........................................................  ·..................... r ............................... ~.% ....... · ..... ·.· ......... ·.· ... ·. 
Conformance ! ~ ! ! ·Tecillricai"Durnbili~······················t········Q··· 5···· .. ·f .... ········ .... 5·% .. ··· .. ·· .. · .. ··1············· .. · .. · ..................... . 
.............................................. ":J ....................... ~ ..................... , ........................................ ~ ........................................ . 
Serviceabilitv j ~ j j Aestlietics····~L···· .. ······· .. ······················1···· .... ~ ....... 1' ........................................ : ....................................... .. 
PeiCeive<fQliaiih;··· ........................ j"······Qg·· .. · .. j" .. ·············8% .... ········ .... :--· ...... · .. ·····5·%· .... ···· ...... ·· 
_ .... __ . __ .. __ .............. ___ ............ ":1.. ... __ .... ____ ______________ . __ ~-_-.-._._- ..... __ ...... :-- ... _-- .. _.- ..... ___ .. _ .. _ .. _ .. _._. __ ... _. __ ~-- ...... -____ .... _ .. -._ .... -.-................. . 
Humanitv ! nl ! ! vaiue-.... ·~J.············ .. ···· .. ·········· .. ·· .. ··· .. · .. ···j···· .... ~ ....... l" ....................................... : ........ · .... ···7·%················· 
.M~~~~~i.t~~f.t~~.· ..... · ...... r ......... ·.·.·TI· ... ·.·.·.·.l.·.·.· ......................................... ~ .............................. 1' ...............................................................................  
Rate of Product Introduction! T2 ! j 
·P.~.~y.~.·~·.I~~· ........................................... r ............. TI.·.·.·.· ....... r ................................... ·.· ......... · ............. · ................ r ................................................................................  
Due Date Performance 1 T4 1 11 % 1 4% 
.~~~~ri~i .. ~f)?·~~Xy.~ry· ... · ....... ·.· ... · ........... T.· ..... · ... · .. tj ............. 1 ..... · ............................................... ·.· ..................... ·.T .............................................................................. . 
M~.~f.~~~.g.G2~~ ...................... j ........ GJ ....... l ............... ~.~.% ............... l ............... ~~% .............. . 
Value Added i C2 i j 26% 
: F3 : : ~~i~::u:u_u:::u:::u:::uut:Jftuu~~u::::u::uu:I:::u:::::::u:::::u: 
VI' F6 : . ~~-~-~-:~:::t-~F-:-::::::::::t::--~-:~~-::-:: 
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.GQ~~~~.~~~~y.g~~2.: ......................... > .•.......•..••••••••.. ~ ...•..•.•...••. ~.~% .............. L. ..................................... . 
Date: !! 12/4/91 , 
....................................................................... ~ ...................... ! ......................................... ~ ........................................ . 
...................................................... ··················:······················:·······M··········hani·········;···al··········;······················ .................. . 
i i ec c i 
............•....•.•••.•.......•.........•.•.......................•• , ··f .•.•...•.............. : ......................................... ~ ..................•...................... 
1 j Design Director j 
................. - .............................................. _ .. -.. -............ -_ ............................ -....... ~ ... ..................................... :........................ - .. -............... _ ....... -- - ~ .. -- ........ -_ .......... --_ ........... - ......................... . 
Perlormance i QC L 17%' 
·Feature·s··················································\·······i:rj"······r················S·%················r······································· 
·ReliabilC ........ · ........ ··············· .. ··· ...... · .... l ...... ··Q':<· .. ~ 3 .... ·-r .............. i9%· ............ ·r-...... · .................... · ........ .. 
..................... ~ .............................................. ; .................... ; ......................................... ~ ........................................ . 
Conformance j ~! 10% ! 
·Techiricaij5urabili .. · .. ·····················[········~·······:·········· .. · .. ·· ............ ·· .. ·· .. · .. r·· .. ··· .. · .. · .. ·············· .......... . 
.............................................. ~ ...................... , ........ ':<~ ....... + ....................................... + ....................................... . 
Serviceabilitv j rv.. i i Aesihetics····~~ .. ··················· .. ···············1···· .. ··Qj····· .. 1········ .... · ...... ·· .... ·· .... · ........ ·t· .. ···· .. · .... · .. · ...................... . 
Percei~e(fQijali~ .......................... T ...... ~ ...... T ............ · .............. ·· .......... T ........................ · ............ · .. 
. ~~~~~: .................................... : .. : ......... ······························::···r:····:···3iX.·.·.······r···::::::~~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r··~~~~~ .. ~~~~~~~~~ .. ~~::::~~~~ .... ~~ .... :::::. 
Value : fY\ i ! ManUfactUriil·g ..·i:eatffiffie ...... ·( ...... fi .. · ..·T·· ............ · ........................ [ ....................................... .. 
·Rate .. of'l>rOduct·lntrOducrlonT ...... ·Ti ........ [ ............ · .... · .................... ·T ...... · .......... · .................. · ..
·p~.~yiiY.·~·.i.~~·.·.·.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·~~~~.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.T.·._.·.·.·.·~j].·.·.·.·.·.·._.L·.·.·.·.·.·.·._.·.·._.·._.·._:----.·.·.·--.·.·.-.·.·.·.-.·.-.-.-.·.·.-.·.T·.·.-.·.-.---.·.·--.·--.·.-.... .-.. .-.......... .-.... --.-.-----.-.-.-.-.-.---.-. 
Due Date Performance j ... I~ ...... .1 ............... .1~.% .............. .L ....................................... · 
tiiii?~i~m:;~:rumut:u;u~~~::;if;;;u;:;uuu~: 
·R· ..  • C : ~ : : 
unnlng .. 2~.~ ..................................... l ..................... l .......... ·.·········· .. ········ .. · .. ···i···· .. ···· .............................. . 
............. ;..... .... : C5 i 8% : M1!a~:::::::::IJE],-::::::::I::::::::: 
......... . , F3 ' 
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~~~lstency~~o:;;;;:::;r;~;~:l~:;~~!~~~:::J:::::~:: 
j j Design Director j Director 
............. e ................................................................................. _ ................ 0 .......... ~_ .............................. : .................... e... • .......................... _0" ....... ~ __ .................... e_ ................... _ .......... .. 
" , :: : 
" , .~~if9.~'~.~~.'.'.'.'.'.'.'·.'·.'.'.'.'.'.'''''.'.'.'.'''.'.·.·.· ..... ·.·.·.···.·.·.·."t.·.·.·.·.·.· ... Q(·.·.·.·.·.l ......................................................... ·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.·.t ....... ·.·.· .. --.·.·.·--.·.·.·.·.·.· .. --.................... --.. --........ ----.. 
Features j (Y) j ! 
·Rellabili!Y··············································j ........ ~Q ... ~ j·····T··············i8%·············T················ ...................... . 
Conioimance····································r······~······r·············2"5·%···············[···············26%··············· 
·Techiricaitjurnbili~······················r········Q··· 5······1················5·%················r·········· ............................. . 
.............................................. ':J ....................... f •••••••••• · ··········f·······································+··· .................................... . 
Serviceabilitv i ()h! 7% ! 14% 
.......... _ .. __ .... _ ... _ ... _._.~.J. ........................... _. __ ._._ .. __ .... ~._ .. _ .. _~_ .. _ ... !. __ .. _ ......................... -.... ----- ... -.~_ ...................... __ ... _ ....... .......... .. 
Aesthetics ! rn j j 5% .~~~.~~y.~·.·~.~~· ____________________ .·.· ______________ .· ________ .· __ .·.L· __ .. ------.Q§--.... --------r..------.. --------...... --.. ----.. ----------------...... --.·.·--------.·------1·.·----------------.·.·.·.·.·.·------.·.·----.·.·.·.·------.. ------.......... ----
H . ' f1(} , , umamtv ! '<.7 ! j Vaiue·····~J.··········································· .... ) ........ Qj ....... ] ................................ ·········j···············24%··············· 
.M~·~~~~.gJ~~f.f~~ ______________ .L ____________ tI ____________ .T __ .· __________________ --------------------------------.·--------------------1--.·----------------------------------------------------------------------.. ----
Rate of Product Introduction j T2 j j ·P.~.~y~.·~· __ t.~~· __________________________________________ J ________ .· ______ P ______ .· ______ T ______________________________ .~·% ______________________________ .T ____ .· ______ .· __________ ------------.. ----.. ----------------------------------. 
Due Date Performance i T4 i 23% 1 ~~~~t~~;t~~~~:~~:~f~~~F~T~~~~~::~·:::~::::~~T:~~~~~:~::::::~::~ 
Value Added ! C2 i j .. 
Delivembili~ l F5 1 .................... ·················)··············· ........................ . ~i:::::::::::::::'ir:::L::::.::::.:::::::.t:::·:::::~~::::: 
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.G9.~~~~.~~~~Y.~~~9.: ......................... l ...................... l ................ ?.% ................ !. ................ ?% ............... . 
Date: :: 28(2/91 i 22/3/91 
-------. -~ ----_ .. _. _. _. _ ... --_. _. _. _ ...... _. _ .... -. -. _. ---............. ] ...... ---... _ ..... _. --j" ---. --. -_ .. _.0 •••• _ •• __ 0' _ •• _ ••• ___ • __ •• _" _. ___ • _____ • __ 0'" __ ••• _ ._ •• _. _______ _ 
::::::::::::::::::::::.:.::::::: .. ::.::::.::.:.::.::::::::::::::::::::::t:::::::::::::::::::::L::::::M:~~gfug:::::.J::M:~~f~~~g:: 
; : Director ; Director 
;~~~~~::::::H:::::I~1'J:~~%::I':::~~% 
Features ; Q2 : : 
'g~~~~.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'~~.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.··.··.·.r.·.···.·.·.·Q~.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·~·%·.·.· ........................... 1"." ............................. ~ .. ~.% ........................ : ..  
Conformance : ~ : : 5% ·feciUiicafriurabili~······················t········Q··· 5"······:········································1-···· ..... ~ ............................. . 
_ ......... __ ••• ___ • _. _____ • __ "0' .0. ___ • _. ___ 0 _. ~,1. ____ .. ____ .......... _A}' _. ____ ...... _. __ • ____ ~ •• _. - _ •• ___ •• - __ - ••••••• -0 ___ •• - _____ - _. ~ __ ••• ________ ._. __ .. - ____ ••• ___ ._ --- ••• _0. 
Serviceabilitv ; ~: 2% : Aestlietics····~~······································1········07·······\······································ ··r······································· 
.p~~~y~i~(·~.~~·~.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·r.·.·.·.·.·.·.~.·.·.·.·.·.·.T.·.·.·.·.·.· .......... : .............. : .... :::: .... : .......... :: ... ·:1.·.·:.·:::::::.·:.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·::::.·.·:::.·.·.·.· .. ~ .......  
Humanitv j Nl : : 3% Y~~i:::::~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::Q1:::::::r::::::::::::::~Q%.:::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::~:%::::::::::::::::: 
Manufacturing Lead Time i Tl : i 
'Rate"o{Prod~ctj~~uctio~r""'TI""""r"""""""'"······················T···························· .. ·· ...... . 
·p..~~y.~);~(TI~·~.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·~.·.·:.·.·.·:.·.·.r.·.·.·.·~~~p..·.·.·~.·.·.·.L~.·.·.·.·.·.·:.·~.·~.·~~~:::::~.·.·~:::::~~.·.·::~:r::.·.·:.·.·:.·.·.·.·:~.-~~.·:::.-::~~ .. ~.-.-.. .-.-.. ~.-::. 
Due Date Performance : T4: 12% i 7% .. ~~~~f~r~~~::HIH~::IHH::H::H·:::H::I:H:H:::H::H:H::H: 
················Added i C2 i : 31 % 
. P7 . . Prod Mix ' . 
............ ~~.~ ........................................... ·········i········p····g··········i·········································r·························· .............. . 
Rew~eMix 1 1 : 
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.G9~~~~.~~~~y.g~~9.~ ........................ L .................. ..l. .............. .4.% ................ J.. ...................................... . 1.)~:.........')~!4f)L:...... . 
................................. .... .......... ....................... ·r·····················j·······Mechailicai·····r··········· ........................... . 
.. ~ _ .. _. -. -_ ... -----------------_. ---------------_ .. -. ---... _. _. -.. ----'r' -.... -... ". -. -- ---··"t .. _. - - --. -. ____ ._. __ ._ ............. _ ... _-(_ .... ___ . __ ._ .. __ . _" ._ .. _._ .•........... 
: i Design Director: ~~~~~······:·r§iJ~~%! 
Features 1 (Y) 1 1 ·ReiiabilT·················································r········Q':<···~ 3·····T··············23%·············-r················ ...................... . 
..................... ~ .............................................. : ..................... : ......................................... : ........................................ . 
Conformance i ~ i 20% i 
l~~~~~~~~J~:r~~~::J: 
Aesthetics i qJ 1 i 
Perceiv(xf·rh·~aiih;·········---···············r·······~··· .... j ......................................... [ ........................................ . 
iI~ani~·x~···-···~J.·····························r·······<ij·······r·······································T····· .................................. . 
~~~~~~~t~~.I:~:~·:I:~:!~:::~I::~.:::~~.:::~.: 
New Product : F3 .1 ..................... ~ ............... L ...................................... . 
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G~.~.~~.~~~.~~Y...~~.~~: .............................................. : .................... 1.~.%. ................... : ..................... ~% ................... . 
Date: i 22/1/91 ! 28/2/91 
··:·:·:::.:.:::.::::: .. ::::·:::··T····::~l=:i~~···:l·~:=;~ 
:::::::::::::::···:::::.'~~~~i()~:r·:·:~!i:i:··:: 
......................... _ .... --- ........ -_.- .. - .. - ... - . .. --.- ..... -- .... ----.......... -....... --~.-.- .................... -..... -- ....... -.-........ ~-.......... - ........ ----_. __ ............ -_ .... __ . 
Product Performance : 20% : 9% 
·Produci·Feanires··········································· ...... -r ............................................... r··············································· 
.~~~·~·.·g~){~~i.4iY ................. ·.· ... · ........... ·.·.· .......... ···.·.··.·.·.· ..... · ..... · ....·.·.·.1· ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.· ..... · ... ·.·~.%..·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... · ......... ·.· ... 1· ... ·.·.·.· ....... ·.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·.T~·%·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.·.·.·.· .......  
. G2~P.~Y.~~~~~w~ .......................................... l ................................................ L .............................................. . 
Conformance 1 8% ) 20% 
I~~~~fp~~w~::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::T:::::::::::::::::::~%:::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Technolooical Durabilitv: i 
·SeiVi"ceabmh;·······················":J·································r····················4·%"····················r················································· 
·Aesthetic·s····":J····························································r················································r···································· ............ . 
}~ij~ji!~~g~ ....... · ............. ·.· ..... · ............................................................................... 1. ............................................................................................ "1 ................................................................................................  
Comnany Image i : 26% ·Ciist~mei·Relations··········································T················································r·············· .. ············· .. ·················· 
~~p!Qy~~:~~~~~Q~~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
.Y~~.~ .. f~.M2~~Y ................................................. 1 ................................................ 1. ............................................... . 
M~.~~~~g.~.I~~ ............................ j ................................................. j ................................................ . 
g.~~~.2f.~~~~.!~~9.4~~~~.~ ...................... 1 ................................................. 1 ................................................ . 
~!~fJ~j~~i.::::::::::r::uu::~;.~uu:u:.::::r.::::·.::::uuuu~uu~:uuu 
liv i i Fr~u~~~y. . .2f.p..~ ....... ~ry ............................... ······i··············································· .. : ................................................ . 
Maniifacturing Cost \ .?:.7..%. .................. L .............................................. . 
·y~~~ ... A¥.~ .................... · ............. ·.· ..... · ........... · ..... · ..... ·.·.· ... · ..... · ... · ..... · ... · ..... · .............. 1.· ........... · ....... · ....... · ................................... ! .................... ~~.%. .................. . 
~~:~lk~!li.n.i~i:::::::::J:·:·::::::::::.::::::.:::::t:::::::::::::§%":::':'::.:: 
'PrOduct Service Cost i ........................ 1.. .............................................. . 
............................................................................................ ,........................ : 4nt. W C ' '-10 ~~~~ ....... ~.~ ...... 2~~ ............................... ····1·················································t················································· 
~ciP.~t~~~~=:L::::::::::::::t:::4:~:=~~~~:~::~:~:~:~:~~::: 
Prod In od " , '-10 New uct tr uctlon ... L .......................... ·.····················l ................................................ . PiUdiiCi··MOdificarlon····································· i ............. 1 ................................................ . 
. p.~~y.~ry~B~~@.~::.·:.·:.·::: .. :.·:~::~::::~~::~~:~~~~~~~~~~::~~~r:~::~~:~~~~~~~~··~~·~%~~~~~~····~·········l··· .............................................  
F1 "bill ' , .y2~~ ....... ~~ ........ ~ ....... ························ .............. + ................................................ + ................................................ . 
PrOOuct Mix F1exibili~ ............................... 1.. ............................................... i .. ·························· .................... . 
Re'source"MiX'F1eXiiJuiiY \ : 
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.G.~~.~~~~~.~~y .. g~~9.; .............................................. ! .................... ~.§.% ................... L .................. ~.9.% .................. . 
Date: : 28/2/91 : 1/5/91 
...................................................... ······································1·················································1··················· ............................. . 
.. ----.--- ..... _--------- ......... _ ............................................... _-_. __ ........... __ ... }-_ ........... -... -.- .. -.. ---.-------.----.. -.... --~---.-- ... -.. -... -.. __ .... __ .......... ----------_. 
1 Manaulng ! Manufacturing 
............................................................................................ j ............... ~~~ ············-;-··············b·ireCtor····· ...... . 
~~~~~~~~:=~~F~;~r~~ 
·~~·~~.·.f.~~~.~·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... · ..... ·.· ..... · ....... · ... ·.·.·.·.· ... ·.· ....... · ........... · ..... r ..... · ............................................. · ........................................... r ............... · ............................................................................. .. 
. ~~~~.g~~~~g~~ .............................................. 1.. ............................................. .1. .................... ~.% .................... . 
Comnany Reliabilitv ! ! ·Confunnanc·e·············~,J···········································r················································r············································· ... 
I~~~~:~~W~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r:::::::::::::::::::~%.:::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Technoloulcal Durabilitv i 1 ·SefViceabilih;·······················~.J..·····························T············································ .. T················································ 
·Aesthetic·s .. ··~,J······································· .... ················r···············································1··········································· ..... . 
. ~~.~~ .... ~.~g.~ .............................................................................................. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.1 ... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ......................................................... ·.1.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.~.%.·.·.· ..................................  
Comnany Image : 8% : ·G~.~~~~~i ... ~~X~~2~.~· ..... ·.· ... ·.·.·.· ... ·.·.· ... ·.· ..........  ·.·.·.·.·.·.· ... ·.· ... · ... ·.· ... ·.·.·.·.·1·.·.·.·.· ... ·.· ................................................................................. 1" ...............................................................................................  
y~~IJi~~~ii~~~.~~~~~~L~~~~~~~.~t.~~:~~~f~ 
~it.m~~~~~ .. ·:.·.:t: .. : ... :..: .. :.·:.l:::·.:::: .. 4~: ... ' 
"Internal Due Date Perfotmance 1.. . .............................. L .............................................. . 
·~~~~~.~· .. ~~.·.P~~ ... ~~ifQ~~~~ ..... · ... · ....... · ........... r ............................... ..!.!.% ................... j ................................................ . 
FrPIluencv of Delivery ..................................... ] ................................................. ; ................................................ . 
...... :':'.~ ........... .l .... ;...................... : 28% j 26% 
°al ~ali' . ifi~~~;::::::;:r:;:;:;;.;;Iu.u:;:;;:: .. 
. P~~y~!Y..B~~.!?W~ ............................................. ~ ................................................. ~ ................................................ . 
. y9.!~ .. B~~~~ ............................................. ~ ................................................ + ................................................ . 
°bili . . ~~~~ .. ~.B~~ .. : .... ;~ ................................... j ................ ·· .. ·2~ ...... ·· .......... ···1······· ........ ·· .. ··2%· .... ·· .... ··· .... .. 
Resource Mix Flexlbihty : 0 : 
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Consistency Ratio: i 12% i 
P~:~:::::::::::::: .. :::::::::::::::::·:::·::::: .. ::::··:.: .... :::.: .... :::::::::::r::::::::::::::Iy4i~I::::::::::::::j::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
...................................................... ·······································~···········Mecha:iiicai"··········l ................................................ . 
...................................................... ······································:······nesi~··Direc·tor·····:············································· ... . 
............................................................................................ j ................. ~.': .......................... j ................................................ . 
·PrQdu·ci·Pe!formance···································T··················i7%··················r················· ............................. . 
. ~~~~ .. ~.~~~.~ ........................................ ·.· .. · .. ····.·· .. · .. ·.·.·.·.·:.·.·.·.·.·.·f.·.·.·.·.· ................................ $..% ..... : ...... : ....... ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.r.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· .......... : .....•.........•.•...•......•..................... 
Product Reliabili~ i 19% i 
·Company··Rellabili&········ .. ······························T··············································T····· .......................................... . 
·Conformance·············· ···········································r···················iO%···················!······················ .......................... . 
Technic·ai·D-ilfabili············································ ... 1' ............................................... "1" ............................................... . 
............................................. ~ .......................................... : ................................................. : ................................................ . 
Technolo~cal Durabili~ i i 
·Serviceabm····························· ................................. : .................... ·····························1························ ........................ . 
. y.~.~.~ . .fQ~.M~~~y. .................................................. l ................................................. ~ ................................................ . 
1~1!r~~~~~:::::::r:::~~:J::-::::-: 
Internal Due Date Perfonnance .. i ................................................ L .............................................. . 
...................................................... ···················ce········ .... j 12% i 
External Due Date Perfonnan ....... : ................................................................................................. .. ~r~~~~~~:-_:::-~~~-::t-:::~~~_-:J:::-:-:~~ 
~~~tN~~g-_9>~i:-::t-:-__:_:L::-_:-:--
Product Servtce Cost i . .. ................................ ~ ........................... , .................... . 
~~~ .. M~.~.~~9.~ ........................................ ) ................................................. j ................................................ . 
"bill ' , _~fJ:~~~tit:::::::t-:::::::: 
Pr<Xiuct Mix Flexi!?~~ ................................... L ................................................ j ................................................ . 
Resource' Mb{"Aexibility i 
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~.~.~.~~.~~~~~y .. g~.~2~ .............................................. : ..................... ~% .................... L. .................. ~% ................... . 
P.~.: ................................................. ············· ... ·············.·l·.· ... · ......... ~Y~!2J ........... ...l ................ ~~(7!?J ............. . 
. . 
: : 
...................................................... ·····································-r··········EiectrOnics·········-r············Fblailciai·············· 
-:rl':J(:~~~!<>I::r::::::~i2i: 
.~ •••••• ------.--- - - - _ •• -----._ •••• ------ •• ____ ••• ___ ••• _. - _ •• _. - - _ •• 0 _______ A_A ••••••• _ •••• • ~ •••••••••••• _ •• _ ••• _______ • _________ ._ ••• _._ .. _ .. _ .. ~ .. ________ ••••••••••••• __ ............ _._ ••• _._ •••• __ 
Product Performance 1 i 
·Produc'iFeanires···············································r··············································r··· ........................................... . 
~~~~tt&!~~::I?~~-]::::-::-::: 
Conformance i 25% i . 26% 
I~~~:p.~~W~::::::.:::::::::.::::· .. : .. ::::::::::::::I::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::r::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
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APPENDIX IV 
Data collected during the shadowing study 
Introduction 
This appendix contains a summary of the data collected during the shadowing 
study. It presents both the diary that the author kept during the course of the 
study and a copy of the completed check sheets. 
Day 1: Production Manager - 10/6/91 
Initially I talked to the production manager about the bonus systems used in 
company A, particularly those that applied to him. The production manager 
explained that he felt that the emphasis on cost had increased since the company 
had been subject to a management buy-out. He said that following the buy-out 
the manufacturing director had introduced an annual bonus system based on 
output and cost. Feedback on progress was provided on wall charts which 
were updated bimonthly and these showed the projected level of bonus 
payment, which varied from £1000 to £0. In the first year that the system was 
being operated, however, it became apparent by period two that, because of a 
lack of demand, nobody would be getting a bonus. And the production 
manager argued that this led to many people mentally abandoning the system in 
period two. (N.B. The production manager said that he felt that an annual 
bonus was too infrequent. I would agree with this, particularly if you can 
know by period two that you will not get your bonus. The other problem with 
a site-wide bonus is that people may not believe that they can affect the 
outcome. Why should I try hard? How can my single action affect the bonus?) 
Next the production manager explained the operator's individual incentive 
scheme. He said this was bas.ed on their weekly output, calculated from the 
performance indices and standard times. He acknowledged that the individual 
incentive scheme emphasised productivity and agreed that this would not 
necessarily help achieve the company achieve its schedule. 
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Following this discussion the production manager suggested that we walk 
around the shop floor and had a look at where the various departments were 
with respect to the schedule. We went to the mechanical assembly shop where 
the head of department explained about the skills matrix he used. The matrix 
records the skills each operator possesses and everyone, as far as the schedule 
allows, is encouraged to learn others. Most operators are employed to do a 
particular job and are paid for the standard rate for it, but if they are needed on 
another job they will be moved and temporarily paid a higher rate if the job 
requires a higher level of skill. 
The rest of the day is summarised on the check sheets. Basically we went to 
two meetings: health and safety and product plan progress. 
Day 2: Foreman 2 - 11/6/91 
When I arrived foreman 2 appeared to be pleased to have me shadowing him. I 
say this, because although he took great delight in walking around the shop 
floor first thing in the morning with me following obediently behind shouting 
"Good morning" to everyone we passed, he spent much of the remainder of the 
day sitting in his office. After we had walked around the shop foreman 2 and I 
sat down to complete the time and attendance records. To do this foreman 2 
simply looks at what is on the screen and checks who has clocked in and who 
hasn't. This ensures that he knows how many men he has for that day. 
Although completing the time and attendance records should be a five minute 
job, it took foreman 2 about an hour and a half, primarily because I kept 
disturbing him and asking him questions. 
At about l0.30am the head of department A came to ask foreman 2 something. 
I'm not sure if he ever found out what he wanted to know, instead he asked me 
what I was doing and we ended up talking about the company for two hours. 
Most of this discussion centred on how the manning levels were calculated. 
The production scheduler calculates the hours required to manufacture the jobs 
on the next week's schedule. Each department has an assigned percentage 
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efficiency (department 2 is known, from past history, to operate at 81 % 
efficiency, while department A operates at 98% efficiency). Hence the required 
hours are increased to allow for known efficiencies. A further allowance of 9% 
is added for absenteeism and set-up. Each head of department (or foreman, if 
the job is delegated) then decides what his manning requirements are. The total 
labour cost for each department is divided by the required hours to give a cost 
of labour per hour, which is compared with the budget and forecast figures. 
The head of department A said that because he lost hours (i.e. hours were 
clocked on a blue or white cards and only hours clocked on a green card were 
recorded) and because he saved money (i.e. hours on a blue and white card 
were not paid at 1 ()() PI) he found he could use overtime to increase the hours 
worked and hence use up the spare money he had from the forecast. He 
accepted that this would cost more than employing extra labour to work the 
normal thirty seven and a half hour week, but argued that because he could not 
ask for extra labour he only had the option of using overtime. I think I need to 
spend half a day with the people that calculate the hours and the costs because I 
am not sure (and neither was the head of department A) what figures were used 
where. For example, forecast hours were based on production scheduler's 
schedule plus the historical department efficiency plus the 9% allowance. 
Forecasts labour cost was based on this plus the type of labour required (skill 
level) and the spread of labour (shift premiums). Total hours actually worked 
were found on the green cards (productive time). Total actual cost was 
probably a combination of green, blue and white cards plus the performance 
indices. The end result of the system seemed to be that the head of department 
A did not work to schedule, he did not spend all the money allocated to him, he 
did not get all the productive hours he should have got, but that he was efficient 
in the work he did. (N.B. Actual efficiencies were calculated from the total 
actual hours, blue card divide by the cost). 
During the course of the morning foreman 2 received various signals 
concerning the schedule, i.e. where are these jobs, what are you doing now, 
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when is this going to be ready? Once the head of department A had gone I 
asked foreman 2 what other signals he received. The first one that he identified 
was an explanation of why he thought that some of the people I had already 
interviewed did not see quality as important. I showed foreman 2 a summary of 
the factors identified by all the production people and explained that I was 
interested in identifying what affected the different interviewees' profiles. 
Quality, or more precisely conformance to specification, came out as one area of 
discrepancy and foreman 2 suggested that maybe some people didn't see quality 
as important because they never got work returned to their department. I took 
this to mean that foreman 2 sometimes received quality related feedback in the 
form of rejects from other departments. Next foreman 2 explained the 
individual incentive scheme. When operators are producing a component and 
they have had the first off inspection done they clock onto a green card. They 
stay on a green card (one for each job) all the time they are doing productive 
work). At the end of a batch of work the operator clocks off the green card and 
writes in how many components he has produced during that period of time. 
The time taken to produce x components is compared with the work study 
standard and forms the basis for calculation of the operator's performance index 
(PI). The minimum is 75 PI and the maximum is 105 PI. 
A couple of interesting points emerged during these discussions. First it 
appears that although the technical leading hands are responsible for allocating 
the jobs to the operators, the technical leading hand on the early shift tends to 
give out all the easy jobs and hence the afternoon shift gets all the difficult jobs, 
i.e. the ones that are difficult to complete in the standard time. Also the daily PI 
reports suggest that operators work hard at the beginning of the week (120 PI) 
and slow down on Friday (75 PI). Initially this was hearsay from both the head 
of department A and foreman 2, but I had a look at the job sheets for Friday and 
Thursday of last week. On every occasion when I found the same operator 
doing a job on both Thursday and Friday, I found that on Thursday the operator 
had a PI of approximately 120 but that on Friday it dropped to about 80. 
Bearing in mind that company A changes its schedule frequently and that work 
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requirements can change between the beginning and end of the week, this drop 
off in perfonnance may affect the ability of the company to stay on schedule. 
Furthermore. with the blue card system in operation it is relatively easy for an 
operator to work hard for three days and spend about two days clocked on to a 
blue card "labouring" which is paid at 90 PI. 
Further information I collected on the payment system from the weekly pay 
report received by foreman 2 includes; 50% of people were on +/-2 PI of the 
105 maximum. (17 people of 34). Of the 34 people in the department there 
were only 13 who were not earning a full bonus. (4 labour were earning a full 
bonus and 4 labour were not). Therefore of the 26 permanent employees in the 
department only 9 were not earning full bonus. Although I didn't note down 
this figure I have a feeling only 2 or 3 permanent members of staff were 
working at less than 103 PI. Hopefully I'll be able to get these figures 
tomorrow when I'm with the head of department 2. 
Other forms of feedback/signals foreman 2 gets include; (a) departmental 
efficiencies reports, (b) time and attendance records, (c) performance index 
report. In addition the production manager frequently calls in to ask where the 
department is versus the schedule. 
Day 3: Head of Department 2 - 912/6/91 
I spent today with head of department 2. I got in at 8.30 and the head of 
department spent the first half hour on his computer working out a cutting list 
for his new wardrobe! We then went for a walk around the shop. Most of the 
signals head of department 2 received and sent were informal face-to-face 
messages. I tried to discuss the reports etc. he received but he said, "oh I just 
get the same ones as foreman 2". He did say that he got a quality report based 
on rejects found in final assembly on a monthly basis. We spent some time 
discussing the payment system. The head of department 2 said that he would 
scrap the old system and implement a plain piece-work system with no capping. 
I asked him whether he thought that a group based bonus system might be 
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better but he said he had already implemented three plain piece-work systems as 
replacements for group based bonus systems. He argued that if group bonuses 
are introduced instead of slow workers speeding up to the rate of the fast 
workers, the fast workers slow down. 
We also discussed his interviewee profile. The head of department 2 said that 
his profile was not really based on signals he received, but on common sense. 
He felt his answers were based on his view of how a company should operate. 
I am not sure what this means for the audit. Can I really examine signals that 
will influence the individual's perception? 
The rest of the day is recorded on the check sheets. I spoke briefly to the 
production manager. He agreed that I could have access to past data on the 
payment system. 
Day 4: Head of Department 1 - 13/6/91 
I spent between 8.30am and 2.00pm with the head of department 1. Foreman 1 
was also with us between 8.30am and 10.30am. I did not attempt to shadow 
head of department 1, primarily because nothing much was happening. 
Department 1 was due to run out of work by the afternoon which was why I left 
early. The other thing was that I'm not sure how much more I am going to get 
from shadowing people, although I'm going back tomorrow. 
We spent the first hour discussing department 1 and how it operated. Because 
department 1 feeds parts to the rest of the factory the head of department is 
given a complete set of schedules. Hence he decides which components they 
need to make first. Department 1 uses the stores as a buffer. Every job from 
department 1 goes into store before being passed on to any other department It 
tends to produce batches of 2~0 components. When a new schedule is raised 
the head of department 1 will talk with the production controllers and decide 
whether or not to load a new batch of components. For example, if they want 
50 machines and there are 250 parts in buffer stocks he will probably not bother 
354 
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making the parts. This is only the case for commonly used parts. All others are 
made for the specific job. The way the head of department 1 schedules work is 
as follows. All parts not available from the stores are loaded first. Jobs for 
departments A and 2 take precedence over those for final assembly. Next all 
components where the buffer stocks are getting low are produced. These 
components are placed into stores and used to replenish the buffer stocks. Both 
the head of department 1 and foreman 1 argued that this was the most sensible 
way of operating because the use of buffer stocks provided a safety net 
Once foreman 1 had left I asked the head of department 1 about his interviewee 
profile and why he felt he had given me the answers he had. He said that he felt 
the most important thing was for the company to hit delivery targets and only 
then worry about costs. He then added that he felt that manufacturing director 
seemed to put the emphasis the other way around, i.e. cost followed by delivery 
schedule. This change is something that numerous interviewees felt had 
occurred site the management buy-out. We then spent some time discussing 
signalling systems in company A, particularly bonus systems. The head of 
department 1 explained that they used to have a secret bonus. Anyone at or 
above the head of department level was paid a bonus of £500 every six months 
if the factory sold the budgeted number of machines. In this system there was 
no emphasis on cost. 
When asked about the performance measurement the head of department 1 said 
that he assessed his own performance against his peers. If either department's 
2 or A were getting better figures then him he would worry, but because they 
were not then he felt he could afford to relax to a certain extent 
Day 5: Foreman 1 - 14/6/91 
I did not spend long in company A today because it only operates for half a day 
on Friday and because I was not gaining much more from shadowing. I arrived 
at 8.15am and spent about an hour chatting to foreman 2. I showed him his 
interviewee profile and asked him to comment on it. As ever foreman 2 was a 
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little hesitant and made one or two comments about the differences between his 
profile and the others, but they were of such a general nature that they were no 
use. Next we went to a meeting (video on blow moulding), but as nothing else 
was due to happen that day, I then made my excuses and left. 
On reviewing the week I think it was quite useful but I am not sure where it has 
got me. As expected, the manager of company A appear to use goal setting, 
performance measurement, feedback and reward systems to influence people's 
behaviour. There seem to be some problems with communication between 
departments, particularly at head of department level. From the point of view of 
my research I need a chance to review the work. It appears to me that I started 
out by arguing that once a strategy had been selected then it was important that 
the employees understand the salient parts of this strategy (quality, time, cost 
and flexibility). Hence the first thing to do was to try and find out to what 
extent these characteristics were understood. In company A's case the 
interviews appear to suggest that there is an underlying level of congruence that 
I have not picked up. At least the systems company A operates and the actions 
people take suggest there is an underlying level of goal congruence due to the 
scheduling system used. The company appears to be schedule driven. Why 
then in the interviews did I not pick this up? I think it is mainly because I was 
using the generic terms (quality, time, cost and flexibility) whereas each 
company has its own "company language". In company A's case I think if I 
had asked everyone how important they thought the schedule was I am sure I 
would have got a consistent, or more consistent, answers. Why then was this 
not converted into importance of passing work from one department to another? 
Perhaps I have too many factors. What about interviews with the senior 
managers. From these and a group discussion I could begin to develop a 
picture of the firm's strategy. Once these interviews had been completed I 
could define those factors whi'ch were important in "company language" and 
then begin the individual interviews. Hence in company A's case if I had 
interviewed the directors I could have got a list of important factors. These 
could then be used as the basis for short interviews with other employees. 
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Firstly they could complete the pair-wise comparison, then they could tell me 
why they thought what they thought. Can this be converted to an audit? Yes; 
first pairwise comparison, results need to be output immediately ... careful 
questionnaire design. Second look at ranking and ask questions. For example, 
what is the most important factor? Why do you think this? Or statements ... my 
payment system emphasises this .... 
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APPENDIX V 
Data collected in companies C and D 
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Data Collected During the Structured Interviews In Company C 
Prioritisation 1 Prioritisation Prioritisation 
~1~~;~i~~~!r:~1tf~I~1~tfi~:~il!r~~: 
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................. ~.~~~.Y~ .. ? ................................ }Q.% ............. ..l ................ ?.~% ............................... J~.% ............... . 
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Data Collected During the Structured Interviews In Company C 
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Data Collected During the Management Group Discussion and Structured 
Interviews In Company D 
Prioritisation ~ Prioritisation Prioritisation 
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Data Collected During the Management Group Discussion and Structured 
Interviews In Company D 
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